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Based on 22 months of fieldwork in highland southwestern Ethiopia, this thesis focuses on
the role of values in processes of social change. The thesis thus joins current efforts to move
beyond  seeing  values  exclusively  as  factors  of  social  reproduction.  Extending  earlier
research, I argue that it is not only the adoption of new values that can lead to profound
change. Established values can be powerful drivers of change, too: The desire to realize
their values more fully can motivate people to take up new and substantially different forms
of practice. At the same time, what promises a fuller realization of one value may turn out to
undermine another, and this can motivate further change. 
My theoretical argument emerges from an ethnographic analysis of change in Dell, a
rural Aari community in Ethiopia’s Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region. The
starting point of this analysis is the people of Dell’s frequent lament about a change for the
worse  in  the  social  life  of  their  community.  On  their  account,  feasting  and  everyday
hospitality are on the wane, neighbours hardly visit each other anymore, there is less unity
and affection among kin, and greed, envy and selfishness are on the rise. Summarily, Dell
people discuss these changes as a decline of ‘respect’ (Aari’af:  bonshmi, Amharic:  keber).
To  explain  this  decline  as  well  as  to  understand  how  people  cope  with  it,  this  thesis
examines the recent history of Dell. 
The first part of the thesis shows that the decline of respect has been an effect of
attempts to better realize established values through new cultural means. First, since the late
1990s, almost two thirds of the population have become evangelical Christians. Motivated
by a quest for blessings, conversion came at the cost of respect: it is only by abstaining from
numerous practices which previously mediated respect that God’s blessing can be secured.
Second,  over  the  past  decade,  Dell  people  have  embarked  on  a  quest  for  economic
development. Motivated by a long-standing concern with building ‘name’ through wealth,
the pursuit of development requires shifting resources from kinship and commensality –
which afford respect – to modern forms of wealth – which do not. In the second part of the
thesis, I examine two responses to the decline of respect, both of which constitute attempts
to revive a more respectful mode of sociality. I discuss the Evangelicals’ current struggle to
mobilize Christianity as a way to confine people’s feverish quest for development and the
antagonisms  that  are  its  result.  And  I  analyse  the  recent  emergence  of  an  Ethiopian
Orthodox community in Dell as an attempt to rebuild relations centred on commensality. 
Primarily a contribution to the anthropology of values and the study of change, this
thesis also engages with debates about Christian individualism, economic development as
an ethical project, the relation between evangelical Christianity and economic development,
and dis/continuity in conversion to Orthodox Christianity. 
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A Note on Language and the Transcription of Aari’af Terms
Aari’af has long borrowed from Ethiopia’s national language, Amharic, and today features
many loan words. I indicate Amharic terms by underlining them when they first appear in
the text and I italicize them afterwards. Aari’af terms are italicized throughout. 
Personal names have been anonymized. 
ʒ – voiced postalveolar fricative, as in the English ‘vision’
t’, ts’, ch’  – explosives
s – voiceless alveolar sibilant, as in the English ‘sea’
x – voiceless velar fricative, as in the German ‘Bach’ or the Spanish ‘ojo’
z – voiced alveolar fricative, as in the English ‘zoo’
Glossary of Key Terms
alem – follower of traditional practice; from Amharic ‘world’
amain – evangelical Christian; from Amharic ‘believer’
anʒe – blessing
ateri – sadness 
bonshmi – respect, deference
buts – to confess 
darilsi – transgression, sin
karta – traditional practice 
Gamma – generic term for people from northern Ethiopia
gabinti – ‘growth’, economic development
gomma – suffering caused through a transgression
manna – low-caste person
miks – beg, pray
nami – name, reputation
negane – forgiveness
toidi – lineage head
xantsa – high-caste person
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With a sudden move, Hastabab jumped to his feet. ‘I’m off’, he announced abruptly, having
arrived only a few minutes earlier. ‘I’m in a rush. Really, there’s no time. So thanks to you! I
will return it in the evening.’ Leaving behind a half-empty cup of coffee, Hastabab picked
up the sickle he had come to borrow from his neighbour Kalibab and briskly walked out of
the house into the bright morning sunshine. 
For  a  few  moments  everyone  silently  listened  to  the  flopping  noise  made  by
Hastabab’s sandals as he strode away. Then, helping himself to another handful of roasted
grain and reclining in his chair, my host father Kalibab said with a sigh, 
‘You see, Juli, that’s what I’ve been telling you about. These days people only come to
visit when they want something from you. They don’t come just like that. They don’t say,
“I’ll go and drink coffee with my neighbour, I’m longing to see my neighbour!” No, they
only come when there’s a problem or when they want to borrow something. And when
they come, they don’t stay. “I’m in a rush”, they say, and off they go.’ 
Now Mangeshinda, the second of Kalibab’s three wives, joined the conversation. A mother
of  eleven and in her  mid-50s,  Mangeshinda was not  usually  prone to  talk  a  lot  in  her
husband’s presence. But here was a topic that was clearly a burning issue for her and that
called for her contribution. A recent visit to the house of one of her younger brothers still on
her mind, Mangeshinda began telling me about how in the past,  when you visited your
brother, ‘he wouldn’t let you go home quickly.’ His wife would make coffee and bring beer,
Mangeshinda explained. ‘And then we would sit together, chatting, chatting, chatting.’ ‘If
you said that your stomach was full’, she reminisced, ‘your brother would cry out: 
“Oy! Sister! What’s the matter with you? Don’t go yet! It’s bad to make haste. Why do
you make haste like a  manna  (lower-caste person; alleged to do all things hectically)?
That’s  not  our  custom,  is  it?  Stay  a  little  longer,  sister,  just  a  little  longer.  Your
conversation hasn’t yet sated me. We will drink another cup of coffee, or two if we like.”’
So you would sit together with your brother for a long time, Mangeshinda continued her
account, and later, ‘when it started getting dark and you were about to leave, he would fetch
some grain from his granary. “How can I let you go empty-handed?” he would ask, “What
are your people going to say about me? << This one doesn’t know how to treat his sister
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with  respect  >>,  they  will  say.  So take  this  grain  and go.  May we meet  again  soon.”’
‘But today’, Mangeshinda concluded with a tinge of sadness in her voice, ‘today where are
the brothers that give you grain? Where are the kin who chat with each other as we chatted
in the past? Now kin no longer love each other and everyone only thinks about themselves.
Truly, these days there just isn’t any more respect (ta bonshmi daki).’
* * *
‘There just isn’t any more respect these days’ – it was a lament I heard many times during
my fieldwork in Dell,  a rural Aari1 community perched on the southwestern tips of the
Ethiopian highlands.  Whether  conversing with my host  family over  breakfast,  as  in  my
introductory  vignette,  or  interviewing  informants,  or  listening  to  people  talk  among
themselves – conversation often came around to what Dell people summarily described as a
decline of respect (bonshmi).
One part of this lament concerned reduced visiting and hospitality among neighbours
and kin. My interlocutors suggested that previously it was much more common for people to
pay each other spontaneous visits in the morning or evening (the time when families gather
for coffee and food). They also recalled how returning from your field in the afternoon and
passing by someone’s homestead you were often hailed to come in for a moment ‘to quaff
some beer’ (gola shamken) – and how you would then sit together for a long time, chatting
and  ‘smiling  together’ (kikin  jintsh).  But  not  only  did  Dell  people  lament  a  decline  in
everyday commensality. Feasting, too, was discussed as being on the wane. Funerals and
weddings, for instance, now were over much more quickly than in the past, I was told. And
where kin had regularly united for lineage rituals – sacrificing sheep and eating together for
a whole day – they now hardly took notice of each other and everyone went their own way.
Finally, there was also frequent talk about reduced cooperation and an increase in conflict,
jealousy and selfishness. All in all, my interlocutors expressed the view that recent years had
seen a change for the worse in the social life of their community and that people now made
less efforts to cultivate affectionate and respectful relationships. 
Dell people’s laments about a decline of respect are far from unique in contemporary
Ethiopia.  Similar discourses are now widespread across the country  and have started to
register on the ethnographic record. In the Gamo Highlands, for instance, 100 km northeast
1 The Aari are an ethnic group of around 290.000 people (Population and Housing Census 2008: 84), who
mainly live in the South Aari district of South Omo Zone, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
Region. 
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of Dell, Dena Freeman observed a decline in practices of respectful greeting and visiting as
well  as  rising  concerns  about  resentment  and  jealousy  (2015a:  162-166).  On  the  Zege
peninsula in Amhara region Tom Boylston noted a pervasive ‘narrative of loss’ concerning a
‘decay of hospitality’ (2018: 105). And in inner-city Addis Ababa people described to Diego
Malara how ‘heavy’ it was to maintain respectful relations with neighbours and kin (2017:
66). 
This widespread sense of a decline of respect is all the more significant given that
respect (Amharic: keber) has often been described as a – if not the – key value in Ethiopian
life. Some decades ago Donald Levine suggested that, ‘[f]orms of obedience and respect
comprise the principal fibre of the Amhara social fabric’ (1965: 105), and this suggestion
has recently been endorsed by Boylston and Malara (2016: 49-53). The centrality of respect
has also been emphasized for other ethnic groups such as the Arsi-Oromo, who refer to
respect as wayyuu (Østebø 2018: 73), or the Wolaita, who speak of bonsho (Data D. Barata
personal communication). In the concise words of one locally produced guidebook sold on
the streets of Addis Ababa, in Ethiopia, ‘[a]mong many traditional customs, respect is very
important’ (Tesfaye 2017: ix). 
Given the high value many Ethiopians place on respect, it is important to understand
what  accounts  for  the  widespread  sense  that  respect  is  on  the  decline.  The  works  of
Boylston, Freeman and Malara offer first insights on this question, pointing to the role of
successive modernist governments’ attacks against feasting (Boylston 2018: 105), growing
economic  competition  (Freeman  2015a:  163f.),  or  the  challenges  of  living  in  densely
populated, resource-poor urban settings (Malara 2017: 66). Yet, the question of what has
happened to respect is not central to these scholars’ works. The regional literature could
therefore benefit from a more extensive analysis of this problematic. In this thesis I take first
steps in this direction by making the following question central to my ethnographic analysis:
In the case of Dell, what accounts for the changes that people lament as a decline of respect
and how do people cope with this decline? 
The Theoretical Problem: How Can Established Values Drive Change? 
In order to bring out the theoretical interest contained in the ethnographic situation that I
have  just  sketched,  it  is  helpful  to  consider  two  ways  in  which  anthropologists  might
respond when faced with laments like those heard in Dell. 
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A first response would be to frame these laments as an instance of nostalgia and,
following on from this,  to cast  doubt on whether  the alleged changes have really  taken
place. This line of reasoning would suggest that when people talk about a past richer in
respect this must surely be a romanticization, a longing for something that is unlikely to
have ever existed in the form people suggest it did (cf. Angé and Berliner 2004: 4). From
this perspective, wanting to ‘explain’ what has led to a decline of respect in Dell would
seem misguided due to naively taking for granted what likely is an expression of distorted
memory.
Helpful and legitimate as this kind of suspicion may generally be, it is misplaced in
the present case. To be sure, there is a good measure of nostalgia in Dell. But this should not
blind us to the fact that the lamented changes have really taken place. On the one hand,
since the 1990s around 60% of the local population have converted from their traditional
religion and practice (karta) to an austere brand of evangelical Christianity. Here, what was
formerly key to cultivating respectful relations – especially feasting and expanding kinship
– is condemned as a source of sin and effectively curtailed. On the other hand, since the
early 2000s people in Dell have started to pursue economic development (gabinti), and this
has come with profound changes in their economic lives. Practices that traditionally were
generative of respect, such as the exchange of gifts or hospitality, have been reduced as a
result of the attempt to accumulate modern forms of wealth. In brief, when Dell people
lament a decline of respect this is more than just romanticism. It points us to substantive
changes that have occurred in their community over the past two decades and that call for an
explanation. 
Here we come to the second way in which anthropologists  might  respond when
faced with laments like those heard in Dell. This would be to assume that, if the lamented
changes have really taken place, they must have occurred under compulsion. Why, to put it
bluntly, should people give up on something they value unless they are in some way forced
to do so? Why should they start to pursue economic development or join an austere brand of
evangelical  Christianity  if  what  they  really  care  about  is  cultivating  respectful  relations
through kinship and commensality? Literature on development has repeatedly pointed to the
force involved in the imposition of development schemes or ideologies (e.g. Scott 1998,
Escobar 1995). One might therefore assume that something similar has happened in Dell.
Likewise, we could think of Joel Robbins’ (2004) moving account of the Urapmin people of
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Papua New Guinea, who took up Christianity in response to humiliating encounters with
colonial powers, which gave them the sense that their traditional values and practices were
worthless (2004: 15).
However, this is not what happened in my case. My analysis suggests that the people
of Dell  did not  engage with development or evangelical Christianity because they were
forced to do so or because they had come to despise their traditional values. Rather, they
engaged with these new cultural formations in an attempt to better realize values which had
long been important to them. As I will show, conversion to Evangelicalism was driven by
the desire to realize the value of ‘blessings’ (anʒe) more fully. And the turn to development
was motivated by long-standing aspirations to build ‘name’ (nami)2 or reputation through
wealth. The use of new means to realize old values, however, led to profound changes in
people’s  way of  life  and restricted  their  capacity to  realize the value  of  respect,  which
remains important to them.  
At this point we have arrived at what is theoretically interesting about the case of
Dell:  the finding that established values here have driven a process of profound change
demands  to  be  theorized.  As  I  explain  in  the  following  section,  anthropologists  have
traditionally conceptualized values as factors of social stability and reproduction and thus in
opposition to change. Recently, there have been efforts to develop more dynamic accounts
of values. These efforts have mainly focused on how changes in values can cause extensive
cultural change. By contrast, we do not yet have theoretical accounts of how established
values can drive change. The main theoretical aim of this thesis is to contribute such an
account. After reviewing scholarship on values I will therefore draw on work by Naomi
Haynes (2017) and Max Weber (1946) to develop a model of how established values can
drive change. The subsequent thesis outline shows how this model is instantiated in my five
ethnographic  chapters.  In  the  final  part  of  this  introduction,  I  introduce  Dell  and  my
fieldwork in greater detail. 
ii. The Anthropology of Values and Change
Since around the turn of the millennium, anthropology has seen the emergence of a number
of related fields which together constitute something like an ‘anthropology of the good’
(Robbins  2013a)  – an anthropology,  that  is,  which explores,  ‘the different  ways people
2 The phonetic similarity between ‘nami’ and the English ‘name’ is coincidental.
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organize their personal and collective lives in order to foster what they think of as good’
(ibid.: 457). One key development here has been the growth of an anthropology of ethics
(e.g. Laidlaw 2014, Faubion 2011, Lambek 2010). But there has also been rising interest in
the study of values, and it is above all to this field that my thesis aims to contribute. 
Broadly speaking, work on values  so far has proceeded along two lines.  First,  a
number of publications have provided the conceptual groundwork for the study of values
(Robbins  2012,  2013b,  2015a;  Graeber  2001,  2013;  Otto  and  Willerslev  2013a,  2013b;
Iteanua and Moya 2015; Haynes and Hickel 2018). Second, anthropologists have started to
use  values  as  an  analytical  tool  to  understand  things  in  the  world  (e.g.  Robbins  2004,
Scheele 2015, Haynes 2017). 
One of the things anthropologists have studied through the lens of values is change.
This recent interest in values and change departs from earlier perspectives on values. It is
helpful to briefly recall these earlier perspectives in order to bring out the importance of the
current discussion, to which this thesis contributes.
Values as Factors of Stability 
The concept  of values first  gained prominence in anthropology and neighbouring social
sciences during the 1950s, when pioneering work was carried out under the auspices of
Talcot Parsons and Clyde Kluckhohn (Parsons and Shils 1951, Kluckhohn 1951, Vogt and
Albert 1966a). Here, values were understood as cultural standards which people internalize
through  socialization.  This  internalization  was  credited  with  leading  to  an  alignment
between what people desire to do and what they are required to do from the point of view of
the ‘needs’ of society. For instance, when people strive for professional success, or start
families, or obey the law – all of which are necessary for the smooth functioning of society
–  this is not because they are forced to do these things, but because they have been taught to
perceive them as good and desirable. As Kluckhohn (1951: 400) asserts forthrightly,
‘a social life and living in a social world both require standards “within” the individual
and standards roughly agreed upon by individuals who live and work together. There can
be  no  personal  security  and  no  stability  of  social  organization  unless  random
carelessness, irresponsibility, and purely impulsive behavior are restrained in terms of
private and group codes. .... Above all, values add an element of predictability to social
life.’ 
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In this functionalist tradition, then, values were regarded as key to the production of social
order and stability. As such, values were also seen to restrict historical change. This view is
particularly evident in the design of the 1950s’ most ambitious research project on values,
the ‘Harvard Comparative Study of  Values  in  Five Cultures’.  This  study concerned the
values of Navaho, Zuni, Spanish-Americans, Mormons, and Texans living in the Rimrock
area of New Mexico. These groups had coexisted under similar ecological conditions for
several generations. That they had each nonetheless retained their cultural uniqueness was
seen as the result of their different values (cf. Vogt and Albert 1966b: 2f.). In other words,
values here were conceptualized as factors that make ‘cultures’ maintain their shape over
time. 
This 1950s work was certainly important at its time. In retrospect, however, it can be
said to have done the concept of values a disservice. This is because the understanding of
values as conservative, stabilizing elements in social life made the concept unpalatable to
anthropologists once the discipline started to move away from an interest in the smooth
functioning of societies.  Marxist-inspired scholarship,  for instance,  was unable to see in
values anything other than elements of ideological superstructure that help to perpetuate
exploitative  social  arrangements  by  blinding  subaltern  groups  to  their  ‘real  interests’
(Godelier 1977,  Bloch 1989, cf. Ortner 1984: 140).3  Similarly, the understanding that to
speak of values is to speak of social stability was a key reason why the concept fell out of
favour during the 1980s and 1990s, when anthropologists were keen to stress constant flux
and variability (e.g. Clifford and Marcus 1986, Marcus and Fischer 1986). Louis Dumont, in
turn, who was one of the few major theorists to uphold an interest in values during this
period (Robbins 2013b: 99), was repeatedly attacked for his alleged incapacity to deal with
change (e.g. Macfarlane 1993: 19f., Graeber 2001: 20). Given that Dumont did pay attention
to change (1977, 1986, cf. Ortner 1984: 136), this criticism may in some cases have resulted
less from a consideration of Dumont’s work than from preconceived notions of what it is to
speak about values.
3 This understanding of values as essentially conservative has also shaped broader public understandings.
As Julian Bourg (2007: 6) notes in his intellectual history of the May 1968 events in France, Marxism’s
‘longstanding suspicion toward ethics, morality, and other forms of value-talk’, meant that, ‘[i]f one spoke
of “norms” in 1968, one did so mostly to criticize and reject them. Norms were the smoke and mirrors of
bourgeois culture … to be dispelled by the revolution.’
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Values Reconsidered
Given  that  earlier  rejections  of  the  concept  of  values  were  partly  based  on  its  alleged
conservatism,  it  makes  sense  that  recent  attempts  to  revive  this  concept  have  been
concerned to elaborate more dynamic accounts and to point to ways in which values can be
used for  the study of  change.  Joel  Robbins  (2004,  2005,  2007,  2009a)  has  been at  the
forefront of these efforts. Drawing on a Dumontian understanding of values as elements of
culture  which  structure  the  relations  between  other  elements  (2007:  297),  Robbins  has
offered us two main ways to study change through the lens of values.
The first of these ways uses values descriptively. Here, the basic idea is to study a
given society’s value system at different points in time, and to thus discern how relations
between existing values have changed, or what new values have been introduced and how
these rank in relation to older values (see Robbins and Siikala 2014: 122-127 for a concise
summary). This approach affords a systematic description of change. It is more rigorous
than accounts which speak of ‘mixture’ but do not specify how exactly old and new cultural
elements  have been mixed,  or  how profound or  superficial  the  observed change is  (cf.
Robbins 2004: 5; see for examples of this kind of analysis Eriksen 2008, Kallinen 2014).
More importantly for the present discussion,  Robbins also uses values to  explain
processes of change. His basic idea here is that if people take on new values, this entails a
reordering of  their  culture.  Just  as iron fillings  change their  position when a magnet  is
moved from one place to another, so too the elements of a culture get rearranged through
changes in the culture’s value hierarchy. This is because when people start evaluating their
established ways of doing things in the light of new values, they may discover that some of
their practices, ideas, or institutions are at odds with these new values. This can lead them to
discard these cultural elements entirely, or to rework them, or to confine them to contexts in
which they do not pose a challenge to higher level values. In the case of the Urapmin, for
instance,  the adoption of Christian values led people to abandon most elements of their
traditional  religion  (such  as  initiations,  taboos,  and  sacred  houses),  since  these  were
recognized as incompatible with the value of leading good Christian lives and being saved
(2004:  93,  220,  145-152).  It  also  led  to  the  problematization  of  practices  which  had
previously  been  valued  for  their  capacity  to  create  relations  but  which,  in  the  light  of
Christian values, appeared as sinful due to requiring people to assert their will over others
(ibid.: 246f., cf. 2007: 309). 
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By theorizing how changes in values can lead to profound cultural change, Robbins
has done much to move us beyond accounts that conceptualize values exclusively as factors
of social stability. In this thesis I aim to contribute to Robbins’ project of elaborating a more
dynamic theory of values by showing how established values can motivate people to change
their  practice.  To be able to  make this  argument  as  well  as  to  bring  out  the  difference
between our approaches, I need to mention one assumption in Robbins’ theory with which I
disagree. This is the assumption that changes in values are not simply one possible source of
profound cultural  change but that  changes  in  values  are a  necessary condition  for such
change. Robbins derives this view from the work of Marshall Sahlins, and it is helpful to
briefly reconstruct Sahlins’ argument here.
In an article titled ‘The Economics of Develop-Man in the Pacific’, Sahlins deals
with Pacific islanders’ relation to the ‘encroaching Western economy’ (1992: 13). He begins
by observing that when islanders first came into contact with the Western economy, they
often used commodities  or  wealth gained through the market  to  further  their  traditional
goals. That is, rather than to maximize wealth according to the logic of Western capitalism
they used wealth to, say, expand their rituals or become big men (ibid.: 13, 17). As Sahlins
puts it, rather than to seek ‘development’ they sought ‘develop-man’. This kind of argument,
of  course,  is  well  known  from  Sahlins,  who  has  often  shown  how  indigenous  people
subsumed new things  and ideas  under  their  established cultural  categories  (e.g.  Sahlins
1985, 1988, cf. Robbins 2005: 7). In his 1992 article, however, Sahlins goes a step further
and suggests what is required for such projects of cultural reproduction to come to an end.
He argues that islanders only moved from ‘develop-man’ to ‘development’ – i.e. only started
to act according to a Western economic logic – when they were humiliated and came to
despise  what  they  had  previously  valued  (1992:  24).  Robbins,  who  has  adopted  and
elaborated this idea, explains it as follows: 
‘People will not stop perceiving the world that confronts them through their received
categories and bending it to their own values until they come to see those categories and
values  –  that  is,  their  culture  –  as  something  shameful  and  debased’ (2005:  4,  my
emphasis). 
On Robbins’ account it were precisely such experiences of humilitation which led Urapmin
to adopt Christianity without trying to ‘syncretize’ it  with their  traditional culture. What
matters to me here, however, is not the argument that it is humiliation  which leads people to
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stop ‘bending’ the world to their own values. What matters rather is the more fundamental
assertion that a change in values (whether through humiliation or some other influence) is a
necessary condition for substantive cultural change – meaning change where people engage
with new cultural formations such as development or Christianity without trying to ‘bend’
these to their own cultural logics. In other words, my concern here is with the notion that for
there to be substantive cultural change, values have to change first. 
As I have suggested above, the case of Dell does not conform to this theory: my
analysis  of  the  reasons  for  the  decline  of  respect  shows  that  long-established  values
motivated people to take up new and substantially different forms of practice. This does not
mean  that  Robbins’ theory  is  wrong.  On  the  contrary,  his  theory  certainly  has  great
analytical  leverage  for  many  cases.  My  modest  point  here  is  that  in  some  instances
substantive change can also be motivated by existent values. Before I offer a model of how
this can be the case, it may be helpful to point to a further observation which has motivated
me to formulate this model. This was trying to understand why my initial research question
had not worked out. 
Influenced by the above sketched views, I had initially designed a research project
that was to look at how values change (i.e. taking values as the dependent variable). This
seemed  theoretically  interesting  because  if  substantive  change  presupposes  a  change  in
values, it is evidently necessary to know more about how values change. Dell seemed to
afford such a study. During exploratory fieldwork (carried out between late October 2014
and July 2015) I had been struck by the extent to which life in Dell had changed over the
past two decades due to religious conversion and the quest for economic development. I
assumed that these changes indexed a change in people’s values, and I wanted to understand
the mechanisms through which this change had occurred. In the course of analysing my
data,  however,  I  realized  that  my  initial  expectations  had  been  wrong:  To  tease  out
mechanisms of change one obviously first  has to describe what the change in values is
supposed to consist in. However, the more I strained myself to describe this change, the
more puzzled I grew. For while there had certainly occurred substantive changes in people’s
practice, people’s values – that which motivated their practice – had hardly changed at all.
Take evangelical Christians, for example. Their way of life differs profoundly from
their pre-conversion practice. They abstain from alcohol, dancing and polygamy, they have
adopted novel forms of greeting and speaking, they employ new ways to solve conflicts or
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bury the dead or distribute household income, to name but a few changes. At the same time,
what  motivates  Evangelicals’ engagement  with  Christianity  –  what  they  say  they  find
attractive  about  it,  and  what  makes  them  eager  to  align  their  practice  with  Christian
principles – has long been a key value in Dell: to enjoy the ‘blessings’ (anʒe) of good health,
children that grow into strong adults, livestock that multiply, crops that give good yields,
and so on. Similarly, the pursuit of development comes with profound changes in production
and consumption practices. But the value that motivates people to pursue development, i.e.
‘growing their name’, is a value that has been important in Dell long before development
appeared on the scene. The lament about a decline of respect, finally, points in a similar
direction. It suggests that people still care deeply about respect – for why else should they
be sad about its decline? But it also suggests that there have occurred momentous changes –
otherwise people’s sense of a decline of respect would be hard to understand. In brief, I
found that the values of respect, blessings and name, which had been important in the past,
were also the values that mattered most to people at the time of my fieldwork. This finding
suggested the need to understand how discontinuity at the level of practice could co-exist
with continuity at the level of values. The following model answers to this need by showing
how established values can motivate people to change their practice.
Established Values as Drivers of Change 
To begin with, let me be clear that by ‘values’ I mean conceptions of the good. That is, I use
‘value’ not in its economic, linguistic, aesthetic or logical sense but in what David Graeber
refers to as the term’s sociological sense: ‘conceptions of what is ultimately good, proper, or
desirable in human life’ (Graeber 2001: 1). 
Scholars who take values in this sense often distinguish two levels at which values
can be found or two modes in  which they can exist:  a  subjective mode at  the level  of
persons and an objective mode at the level of culture (cf. Brubacker 1984: 62, D’Andrade
2008: 25, Robbins 2015b: 219f.). Robbins has usefully suggested that analytical purchase
could  be  gained  from  the  subjective/objective  distinction,  for  instance  for  ‘engaging
questions of the relationship between structure and practice’ (2017: 663f.). So far, however,
we are still at a relatively early stage of working out what exactly this distinction could help
us  do,  or,  indeed,  how  precisely  the  relation  between  the  two  levels  should  be
conceptualized (cf.  Laidlaw 2014: 131). In this thesis  I point to one possible use of the
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subjective/objective  distinction  by  making  it  central  to  my  model  of  change.  In  the
following, I will first describe the two forms of value in more detail. I then suggest how the
articulation between them can be a source of change. 
The concept of subjective values is easy to grasp. If you desire education and think
that  it  is  morally  justified to  have this  desire,  then you subjectively value education.  A
subjective value,  in other words,  is  marked by the conjunction of desire and a sense of
propriety. This is often expressed by speaking of values as ‘conceptions of the desirable’
(Kluckhohn 1951: 395). On this account, subjective values are distinct from mere desires,
which one might have but not approve of – a desire to eat chocolate, say, or to gossip about
others. At the same time, values are distinct from norms, which are considered ‘right’ but
lack the element of desire elicited by the ‘good’.  As Hans Joas (2001: 44) puts it, ‘norms
refer to the obligatory and restrictive dimension of morality, values refer to its attractive
dimensions.’ This attractiveness makes values a source of motivation; the desire to realize
their values energizes people and leads them to direct their lives in a particular direction.
Subjective  values,  in  brief,  are  those  things  that  particular  people  find  good and strive
toward. 
To study values as objective phenomena, by contrast, is to disregard the question of
what particular people find desirable and to ‘consider value on the cultural level alone’
(Robbins 2004: 11). Education, for instance, is not only something you may subjectively
value. You also find this value outside of yourself, for instance in federal constitutions or the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Similarly, you might think of the values expressed
in religious or political doctrines, such as salvation in Christianity or a classless society in
communism. These values are ‘objective’ in the sense that they are an established part of
these doctrines, independent of whether anyone actually values them subjectively.
Now, a key idea concerning objective values is that they are not only culturally given
statements about what is good. Such values also coordinate (or ‘structure’) sets of ideas,
practices, and institutions, in the sense that the latter are geared toward their realization (e.g.
Robbins 2009a: 66f.). For example, the value of education coordinates the various elements
of the educational system: teachers, schools, universities, the writing of textbooks and so on.
Similarly, if one looks at universities, which are one element of this system, the various
activities that take place within them – from the cleaning of lecture theatres to the writing of
exams – are all ultimately aimed at producing education. 
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I  will  speak  of  a  ‘cultural  formation’ to  designate  that  which  is  formed  by  an
objective  value  and  the  ideas,  practices,  and  institutions  which  it  coordinates.  My
understanding of cultural formations is heavily influenced by Weber’s concept of ‘value
spheres’ – realms of activity, such as religion or politics, ‘in which certain values, norms,
and obligations are immanent’ and which ‘exist independently of and prior to the individuals
who participate in them’ (Brubaker 1984: 69, 71; cf. Weber 1946: 323-357). If I prefer to
speak of ‘cultural formations’, this is because I wish to include phenomena of different scale
and at different levels of abstraction. In my understanding, a country’s educational system is
a cultural formation but so is a particular university. Similarly, we can look in abstract terms
at the values and associated practices  and institutions that  characterize Christianity  as a
whole, but we can also look at a particular instantiation of Christianity in a specific place.
As they  are commonly understood,  ‘value  spheres’ are  not  associated with  this  kind of
scalability but only refer to the most abstract cultural formations found in a society (such as
economy,  politics,  religion  etc.  in  Weber’s  treatment,  or  similarly  abstract,  though
differently shaped spheres in other societies [cf. Terpe 2018: 2].)
The next step in building my model is to specify the relation between subjective
values and the cultural formations created through objective values. I would like to make
two points.  Firstly,  I  suggest  that  people  mainly  realize  their  subjective  values  through
participation  in  cultural  formations.  One  may,  of  course,  invent  a  private  religion  to
guarantee the salvation of one’s soul, or one may seek to educate oneself independently. But
mostly it is through attending university or being part of a church – or through participating
in  any  other  cultural  formation  –  that  people  seek  to  realize  their  subjective  values.
Secondly, in order to successfully realize my values through a given cultural formation, I am
more or less required to act according to the latter’s own logic. This point derives from Max
Weber’s  notion of  the autonomy of  value spheres (Weber  1978:  1116, 1946:  331ff.;  cf.
Brubaker 1984: 84f.). In Weber’s understanding, value spheres are autonomous in the sense
that  activity in them proceeds according to a specific logic, and that the logic of a given
sphere is not up to the whim of the people who participate in it. The classic example for this
is the capitalist economy, which is geared toward wealth maximization. If I wish to realize
the value of wealth by way of participating in this sphere, I need to act according to this
sphere’s inner logic. This means, for instance, that as an entrepreneur I cannot (at least not at
any large scale) give things away for free, since this would soon mean financial ruin. It may
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well be that my subjective motivation for participating in the market economy is not wealth
per se. I may even wish to acquire wealth to finance the overthrow of capitalism. However, I
can only succeed at this if I play by the rules of this system. To give a second example, to
realize the value of education through university I need to act along the lines set out by this
institution. I may need to attend classes, hand in essays and write exams. Some of this may
not conform to my personal understanding of what constitutes good education. Learning for
exams may strike me as source of superficial knowledge that will soon be forgotten. Yet, if I
refuse to learn for exams and spend my time reading Heidegger, my academic career will
come to an end before long, and I will no longer be able to realize the value of education
through university. 
Having  outlined  my understanding  of  the  subjective/objective  distinction,  I  now
explain how this distinction helps us understand how established values can drive change. A
first step here is to repeat that subjective values are ends which people perceive as attractive
and which they are motivated to attain. 
Now, the desire to realize their values more fully can lead people to look for new and
better ways of doing so. Naomi Haynes (2017) has seen this very clearly and provides an
excellent example of what this may look like. Haynes writes about the Zambian Copperbelt
where  ‘moving’ is  a  key  value.  ‘Moving’ means  ‘progress  that  comes  about  through
connections to others’ (ibid.: 40). The most common way to realize ‘moving’ is through ties
of  patronage to  wealthier  people.  In  times  of  economic  down-turn,  however,  this  is  no
longer possible since patrons themselves are struggling to get by (ibid.: 53ff.). The Global
financial crisis of 2008 led to a particularly strong down-turn in the Copperbelt economy. In
this  situation,  Haynes  argues,  people  turned  to  Pentecostalism as  a  new way to  realize
‘moving’. Here progress could (among others) be realized through connections to powerful
pastors, who were understood as mediators helping believers access the prosperity promised
by God (ibid.: 67). 
Haynes  does  not  frame  her  work  in  terms  of  change.  Indeed,  she  explicitly
juxtaposes it with studies of Christianity that do look at change (ibid.: 10) and suggests that
her study, by contrast, is about shifts in the way that ‘established values are imagined and
measured’, and about the creativity that is involved in ‘looking for new ways that old values
might be realized’ (ibid.: 11). Given her ethnographic case, Haynes is clearly right to not
foreground the topic of change. As she notes, Christianity has long been firmly established
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on the  Copperbelt.  And  not  only  were  most  of  the  people  in  her  study  brought  up  as
Christians.  Many  had  also  been  members  of  mainline  Pentecostal  or  pentecostalized
churches before they joined one of the neo-Pentecostal churches that are at the heart  of
Haynes’ study (ibid.:  59f.).  These people,  in  other  words,  did not  have to  change their
practice a great deal when they engaged with neo-Pentecostalism since they had long been
practising Christians. 
In Haynes case, then, the use of a new means to better realize an old value did not
entail profound change. But in other cases, I argue, profound change can be the result. This
is because of the aforementioned need to act on the inner logic of the cultural formations
through which one seeks to realize one’s values.  Where this  logic comes with forms of
practice that differ significantly from one’s earlier practice, a change in one’s practice is
inevitable if one wishes to attain one’s ends. 
I may, for instance, subjectively value something like ‘brotherly love’. So far I have
tried to realize this value through communism. The brotherhood of all people is an objective
value in communism, and there are ideas about what is required to attain this end as well as
practices and institutions which accord with these ideas. However, I may eventually find
that communism does not properly realize the value of brotherly love and I may instead turn
to Christianity. Here, a very different kind of practice is required. Instead of violent struggle,
for  instance,  meekness  and forgiveness  are  deemed necessary  to  realize  brotherly  love.
Throughout,  what  I  ultimately  care  about  has  remained  the  same,  but  my  practice  has
changed profoundly.
A final element for our model of change is the observation that the change in practice
required  to  realize  an  old  value  through  a  new cultural  formation  may  undermine  my
capacity to realize other values I care about. While I was able to practice free love as a
communist, I am no longer able to do so as a Christian. As we will see, something similar
has happened in Dell. Evangelical Christianity and economic development, while affording
ways to better realize blessings and name, made it harder to realize respect. This kind of
unintended consequence can bring people to look for yet other ways to pursue the ends they
care about. 
To  sum up:  The  desire  to  better  realize  one  or  several  of  their  personally  held
(‘subjective’) values can motivate people to engage with new cultural formations that are
geared toward ends (or ‘objective values’) which resonate with what they hope to achieve.
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To successfully attain those ends, however, requires people to align their practice with the
requirements of the particular cultural formation in which they have started to participate.
This may mean a significant change in their practice.
iii. Thesis Outline
Having provided a theoretical frame for this thesis, I now return to the ethnography which
motivated me to elaborate this frame in the first place: the question of what has happened to
respect in Dell. My answer to this question is distributed over five chapters. The first three
chapters discuss reasons for the perceived decline of respect; Chapters 4 and 5 examine two
recent attempts to revive a more respectful mode of sociality. Conceptualized in the terms of
my model, my argument is as follows. 
Chapter 1 looks at karta or ‘traditional practice’. Karta was everyone’s shared way
of life until the 1990s. But today only one third of the population continues to participate in
this  cultural  formation.  Significantly,  however,  even those  who no longer  participate  in
karta often talked about it as being ‘good for respect’. This makes karta the right starting
point for this thesis: What exactly is meant here by ‘respect’? What role does respect play in
karta? And if  karta is deemed ‘good for respect’, then why have so many people stopped
participating in it? Examining the ideology and institutions of  karta, the first part of the
chapter  shows that  respect  is  a  key  objective  value  that  structures  the  activities  in  this
cultural formation. We encounter an ideology of social hierarchy, which asserts that people
need to show respect to their seniors in order to receive blessings from them. We also see
how life  in  karta is  oriented toward  kinship and commensality,  which  both turn out  as
central to realizing respect. But if karta is ‘good for respect’, people in Dell also perceive it
as  an  obstacle  to  leading  richly  blessed  lives.  Experiences  of  suffering  and  a  general
perception  of  karta as  ‘dangerous’ are  the  main  reasons  why  a  majority  has  stopped
participating in this cultural formation. The second part of the chapter therefore seeks to
understand why karta is perceived as dangerous. Noting that all suffering in this system is
understood  as  the  result  of  disrespecting  seniors,  I  show  that  it  is  often  seniors’ own
relentless  quest  to  be  respected  which  drives  juniors  into  acts  of  disrespect.  As  a
consequence, there emerges a sense of karta as a system in which it is hard not to fall prey
to seniors’ anger and the suffering it is thought to entail. 
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Since  the  1990s,  the  desire  better  to  realize  the  value  of  ‘blessings’ (anʒe)  has
motivated many people in Dell to convert to evangelical Christianity, and today some 60%
of the population confess to be  amain (Amharic for ‘believer’).  So what does it  take to
realize blessings through Evangelicalism rather than through karta? What kind of change in
practice may this require? Chapter 2 examines these questions in order to understand how
conversion has affected respect. I show that there is a pervasive concern among  amain  to
avoid sin because God blesses the righteous but punishes sinners with suffering. Crucially, a
key form of sin is disrespecting others, and this applies for everyone, whether senior or
junior, kin or stranger. Thus the importance of being respectful is not only reaffirmed but
further emphasized. If many people in Dell nonetheless feel that Evangelicalism has played
a part in the decline of respect, this is because respect in this cultural formation is ultimately
less important than blessings. I show how the paramountcy of blessings leads respect to be
sacrificed wherever it threatens to hinder the realization of blessings. Specifically, I show
how  concerns  about  feasting  as  a  source  of  sin  have  led  to  a  stark  reduction  in
commensality. Many Evangelicals struggle with this reduction since it means that there are
fewer occasions to be in respectful interaction with each other. Here, Evangelicalism is felt
to undermine respect, and for some people this is a reason to revert to karta.
In parallel to the rise of Evangelicalism, everyone in Dell has started to participate in
another new cultural formation, namely economic development or ‘growth’ (gabinti). First
promoted  by  local  state  institutions  in  the  early  2000s,  Dell  people  engaged  with
development in a quest to better realize the value of nami – ‘name’ or reputation. Chapter 3
examines this quest and its consequences for respect. I explain that name has long been an
important value in Dell, but that until recently it was realized through wealth in people and
sponsoring  feasts.  Since  the  2000s,  progress  at  development  –  reckoned  in  terms  of
ownership of modern goods – has become the primary metric to assess reputation. I explain
how  this  shift  took  place,  arguing  that  Dell  people  embraced  modern  consumption  to
improve  their  name  vis-à-vis  Northern  Ethiopians  (known  as  ‘Gamma’),  whom  they
consider superior to themselves. Moreover, acquiring modern goods affords a greater name
vis-à-vis people within the community since these goods are understood to turn their owner
into a Gamma – and thus into a greater person. In the final part of the chapter I show how
realizing name through development requires people to act on the inner logic of this cultural
formation. Wealth needs to be reinvested or converted into modern goods rather than to be
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spent  on  kinship  and  commensality.  This,  however,  means  that  building  name  through
development runs directly counter to creating and cultivating respectful relations.
Though development’s detrimental effect on commensality may be of little concern
to  Dell  Evangelicalism,  there  has  in  recent  years  nonetheless  emerged  an  explicit
evangelical  critique  of  development.  This  is  because  the  increasingly  feverish  quest  for
development is seen as an obstacle to realizing the vision of a world in which people are
united  in  humility  and mutual  respect.  The quest  for  wealth-based reputation,  the  local
church observes, leads people to privilege their own interests over the interests of others, to
be boastful,  or even to  use aggressive means to  get  an economic advantage.  Chapter  4
reconstructs this critique and goes on to ask how the church currently seeks to defend the
vision of a society marked by mutual respect. I show that one defence consists in reminding
people  in  moments  of  illness  that  they  cannot  realize  blessings  –  and  thus  economic
progress – by disrespecting others. Secondly, I discuss the efforts of dedicated Evangelicals
to lead by example and to renounce economic opportunities wherever these threaten to lead
into sin. I suggest that one of the reasons why these people are able to invest less effort into
economic progress is that local Evangelicalism allows them to gain a name on the basis of
Christian virtue rather than on the basis of wealth. 
In Chapter 5 I look at a second recent development which is partially a reaction
against the decline of respect: the emergence of a small community of Ethiopian Orthodox
Christians. I begin by showing that those who converted to Orthodoxy aimed to realize two
values  more  fully:  Having  had  difficulties  to  obtain  blessings  in  karta,  they  embraced
Orthodoxy as a new source of blessings. And having come to perceive lacking a ‘religion’ as
shameful, they hoped to realize the value of name more fully by taking up Orthodoxy. In the
second half  of  the  chapter,  I  show that,  beyond affording blessings  and reputation,  the
particular  attraction  of  this  cultural  formation  is  that  it  features  commensality  as  a  key
objective value. Feasting (next to fasting) is the main form of lay religious engagement in
Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity. This allows Dell converts to recreate relations centred on
commensality and to thus enter into the kinds of respectful interactions which they value. 
In the conclusion, after summarizing my argument, I point to a further reason for
Dell people’s sense of a decline of respect: religious pluralization has made it more difficult
to  coordinate  social  life.  At  the  same  time  I  note  people’s  everyday  efforts  to  bridge
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religious cleavages and suggest that these efforts point us to their ongoing shared concern
with building a world rich not only in reputation and blessings but also in respect.
iv. Introducing Dell – Place, History, Fieldwork
Dell is located in the southwestern corner of Ethiopia, at 420 kilometres from the country’s
capital, Addis Ababa. Your way to Dell takes you through Jinka, the capital of South Omo
Zone. Until a few years ago, Jinka was a sleepy town with a couple of unpaved streets and a
sputtering generator for its only source of electricity. Located at a bumpy six hour ride from
Arba Minch – which is an hour’s flight away from Addis – Jinka was literally at the end of
the  road.  Due  largely  to  agro-industrial  developments  now  underway  in  surrounding
lowland areas,  Jinka has  recently become a  buzzing regional  hub.  The main  street  was
paved, a roundabout built and new cafés exude an almost-metropolitan flair. Electricity is
more reliable than in the capital, and in 2017 an airstrip was opened to cater to the growing
numbers of Ethiopian and Chinese professionals coming to work in the region. 
If you get to Jinka on a Saturday, you will meet some people from Dell at the market,
selling horse-loads of leafy cabbage, grain and onions. Following them back home in the
afternoon, your way takes you into the green hills that rise steeply behind Jinka. A narrow
path winds itself uphill past small fields and homesteads, through patches of palm forest and
across pleasant creeks. The higher you get, the more stunning the view: there are mountain
ranges  toward  the  East  and the  West,  and in  the  South  there  is  an  immense plain  that
stretches all  the way down to Kenya. Three and a half  hours later,  and having climbed
almost 800 metres, you arrive on a ridge that commands a fine view of Dell. 
      Located at an altitude of 2000 to 2300 metres, Dell sits on the southern edges of a
mountain  mass  known  as  the  Aari  mountains.  Dell,  which  is  a  kebele (the  smallest
administrative unit of the Ethiopian state, see below), covers some 20 km² of hilly, fertile
terrain, some of it forest covered, most of it cultivated. Toward the north you see a towering
volcanic peak.  Locally known as  Ager and  a popular  destination  for  evangelical  prayer
outings, this mountain marks the boundary to Shangama, as the area further into the Aari
mountains  is  called.  In  Dell’s  east,  there  is  a  steep  escarpment,  which  drops  several
hundreds of metres into a dry valley inhabited by Maale people. A precipitous slope marks
Dell’s western boundary. 
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Figure 1. View of Dell, with Ager mountain on the left
To cross from one side of Dell to the other takes about one hour, and doing so sends you up
and down steep hills separated by streams that meander through lush meadows and bamboo
groves. In the western part of the territory you find Dell’s only village. Founded in 2010 on
the initiative of the local administration, this village by September 2017 had grown to about
30 houses. It is proudly referred to by people as their ‘town’ (katema). Most of the local
government  employees  live  in  this  village,  there  are  several  bars,  including one with a
generator-powered television, and a weekly market is held on Tuesdays. Since a road was
cleared in 2014, the village has become accessible via a rough 40 minute motorbike ride
from Gob. A small town at the western foot of the Aari mountains, Gob is the capital of
South Aari district (woreda), to which Dell pertains. 
Dell has a population of around 4000 people. Apart from those in the village, people
all live in scattered homesteads, which are surrounded by fields and often no more than a
five minute walk away from the next neighbour. Patrilineal descent groups (mata) settle in
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contiguous  areas,  and  this  means  that  people  usually  have  kin  as  their  immediate
neighbours. But since most mata are not very large (between 100 to 500 members including
children), there will usually also be unrelated people in a given neighbourhood.
Homesteads  are  commonly  encircled  by  a  grove  of  arxemi (Amharic:  enset).
Reaching several metres of height, the starchy stems of these ‘false banana’ plants are used
to make several kinds of food, including a nutritious bread (washi), which a 1950s German
ethnographer could not help but describe as ‘tasting like sauerkraut’ (Pauli 1959: 95, my
translation). Inside the  arxemi grove there are, depending on the seize and wealth of the
household, anywhere between two to eight straw-thatched huts (misa eja). Roughly one in
two homesteads in Dell now also features a rectangular tin-roofed house (corcora). In the
case of polygynous households each wife has her own hut. In monogamous households wife
and husband live in the same hut or tin-roofed house. Boys and girls, when reaching their
teens, build small huts for themselves; boys spend the first one or two years after marriage
living in this hut with their wife. 
Fathers pass on land at marriage and sons establish their household close to that of
their father. Land scarcity has only recently started to become an issue in Dell.  For one
thing, this is because the 1974 revolution made available extensive lands previously owned
by northern landlords (see below). Moreover, until being outlawed by the government in the
mid-2000s, clearing forest was a common way to expand landholdings. Forest clearing is
still  sometimes  done,  though  at  the  risk  of  going  to  prison  for  several  months.  Today,
landholdings range between half an acre – which is the bare minimum to support a family of
six – to ten acres. Most people have between one to four acres. 
So far there has been only very little outward migration from Dell, both because land
scarcity was not a big issue and because there was very little opportunity for cash labour in
the wider region and beyond. This is bound to change soon, however, since a good part of
those who are now coming of age will not receive sufficient land to meet their subsistence
needs. Many young people today therefore aspire to become mengist seratenia (government
employees), such as teachers or health workers. At the time of my fieldwork about 25 young
men and women had managed to do so. Some of them had found employment in Dell, while
others worked in other parts of South Omo Zone. 
Apart from these government employees who ‘eat a salary’, people in Dell make a
living in farming. Each household functions as a unit of production and consumption under
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the authority of the household head (eja bab). The main food crops are maize, sorghum,
wheat, barley and peas. Surpluses are sold in the market, and so are cash crops (garlic,
onions, beetroot) and sometimes livestock. Sheep and cattle provide meat and milk, and
many households also keep bees for honey. The main crop is planted at the start of the long
rainy season in early May. The summer months see everyone out in the fields weeding.
From September onwards the rains get less and so does work. The main harvest is during
the dry season in December and January. A second crop is planted in late February when the
short rains set in. This crop is harvested in September or October. 
Political History of Dell
During the final two decades of the 19th century, the Abyssinian empire conquered the vast
territory  which  today  forms  the  southern  half  of  Ethiopia  through  a  series  of  military
campaigns (Markakis  2011:  90).  At this  time,  Dell  belonged to one of  nine  small  Aari
kingdoms, called Baaka4. Having but spears to fight against the invaders’ guns, Baaka was
defeated in 1898, and a garrison town called Bako was established at 1.5 hours’ walk from
Dell. As elsewhere in the South, conquest for Baaka people meant transition from political
autonomy to a state of serfdom. In what is known as the ‘gebbar system’ (Donham 1986:
37), the northern invaders imposed themselves as landlords on local peasants (gebbar), who
had to pay tributes and provide corvée labour. Until the 1930s, slavery was widely practised,
too (Naty 1994: 261). 
Starting in the 1940s, the burden on local people was slightly eased due to reforms
initiated  by  emperor  Haile  Selassie  as  part  of  a  project  of  political  modernization  (cf.
Crummey 2000: 231). Among others, Haile Selassie aimed to replace the  gebbar system
(Donham 1986: 27). Efficient as an instrument of control, it had failed to raise the revenues
needed for consolidating the empire because the landlords consumed most of what they
extracted  from  their  serfs  (Markakis  2011:  12,  99).  Hence,  the  emperor  decreed  ‘the
conversion  of  all  taxes  and  dues  from  kind  to  cash  and  the  elimination  of  all  social
intermediaries between the state and the payers of tribute (Crummey 2000: 231). In Dell,
however,  things  hardly changed.  Due to the  high taxes  they would have had to  pay as
independent farmers, many people decided to become tenants (chisenya) of their previous
landlords; taxes owed to the landlord were lower than those asked by the state (cf. Naty
4 Baaka continues to exist as a territorial entity. However, its leader, the so-called babi (‘father’ or king) no
longer has any formal political power and is recognized as a ritual leader only by those who follow karta. 
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2002: 62). The resultant continuity in local power relations was buttressed by the fact that
all government structures, including police and courts, were manned by Northerners. This
made  it  hard  for  Aari  people  to  denounce  exploitative  practices.  By  and  large,  things
therefore remained the same until feudalism was blown apart by the 1974 revolution.
Against this background, it is no wonder that when people in Dell today remember
‘the days of Haile Selassie’, they above all speak about the economic exploitation they had
to endure. One image I heard repeatedly evoked was that of the landlord who comes to Dell
on one of his regular visits. Mounted on a horse that is led by a servant, he is followed by a
second servant who carries his gun. Seeing him approach, women and children fearfully
‘run off into the forest’, not least, as one woman explained, because ‘had he addressed us,
how could we have answered him, not knowing a single word of Amharic?’ A horn is blown
to announce his arrival and call together his tenants. The landlord examines the field they
cultivate for him to check if it has been properly harvested or to decree what they are to
plant next. He also goes to look at the tenants’ own fields to determine how much tribute
they owe. If he sees a fat sheep he seizes it, and if there is honey he takes honey. As one old
man put it, the landlord was ‘the milk’s cat’ (dashite walla). 
We owe to Donald Donham (1999) a formidable account of how, in the wake of the
1974 revolution,  this  exploitative system came to an end in nearby Maale.  Very similar
events occurred in Dell.  In 1975, the new regime, known as the  Derg, sent out student
campaigners (zemecha) to take the revolution to the countryside. ‘They came one evening’
Kalinda, who today is in her late 50s, recalled. 
‘I had only recently been married. Kalibab and I lived in a small hut and two of them
came to stay with us. They showed me how to use a match... I roasted peas and wheat for
them, I served them coffee… The next day they called a meeting and told us that the days
of the Gamma (Northerners) were over.’ 
Incited by the students, people throughout the region sent former landlords running. There
was widespread looting of property, and in some cases landlords’ wives and daughters were
raped (Naty 2002: 66). In Dell, the only Gamma who had lived there (rather than in Bako or
Jinka), a man called Abebe, had mysteriously left some years prior to the revolution. Things
therefore remained relatively calm, although a small group of men did set out to kill and eat
landlords’ cattle in the neighbouring Sinigal area.
In  the  same  year,  Dell  became  a  kebele.  Sometimes  referred  to  as  ‘peasant
association’, this institution was created by the Derg and to this day remains the lowest
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administrative unit of the Ethiopian state. A couple of huts were erected to house the kebele
administration – fittingly in the very spot where Abebe had lived – and leaders were elected
from among the local population. In the following years, the kebele carried out the Derg’s
land reform and redistributed formerly Gamma-owned land. The kebele was also supposed
to serve as a mouthpiece for government teachings. Soon after taking power, the Derg had
adopted Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology, and this came with a focus on economic
and cultural modernization. Classified as ‘primitive-communalist’ (Naty 1992: 238), groups
like the Aari were to give up ‘backward’ customs, especially ‘all traditional practices that
were deemed to be exploitative and hierarchical’ (Freeman 2002: 39; cf. Abbink 1997: 241).
People in Dell remember that the student campaigners did bring outlandish ideas,
like the one that  manna and  xantsa  (caste-like groupings) should eat together, or that the
babi  (ritual king) should no longer be respected. However, after the campaigners had left,
these ideas no longer had much currency and were promoted only on the rare occasions
when Derg representatives from outside of Dell came to speak at meetings. One reason for
this is that the newly elected kebele chairman was a committed ‘traditionalist’ (and first son
of a powerful lineage head). Moreover, and contrary to Donham’s case (1999: 120), there
were  at  that  time  no  evangelical  Christians  in  Dell  who  could  have  served  as  a  local
vanguard of the attack against traditional practice. This lack of local interest in abandoning
karta appears as one key reason why this cultural system hardly changed under the Derg,
but retained the form it had when first described in the 1950s (Jensen 1959; cf. below p.30)
Dell was also spared the collectivization, villagization and resettlement schemes that
wrought havoc elsewhere in Ethiopia (cf. Clapham 2002: 17f.; Pankhurst and Piguet 2009).
Retrospectively at least,  people’s main critique of the Derg concerns the conscription of
young men for  the war with Eritrea.5 Other  than that,  this  period is  remembered rather
positively. With landlords gone, this was a time when wealth levels rose and traditional
institutions expanded. ‘There wasn’t so much food under Haile Selassie’, one man mused
fondly, ‘but during the days of the Derg we really started eating’ (see also Gebre 1997: 860).
5 The actual number of conscripts was low, however. This was widely attributed to the intervention of the
then kebele chairman. As one man explained in response to my question whether many had gone to war:
‘From here? No, from us only few went because in those days we had a good chairman. He went to our
babi (ritual king)… . This is where he went. He said “people from my land are going away to die, they are
caught and brought away to die...”. He went and spoke like this and beat his chest [sign of deference] and
the babi responded, “Your people will not go. The recruiters will not see them.” “They will not go”, he
said, and indeed they did not go. Our babi truly heard us.’ 
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In 1991, the Derg was toppled by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF), which remains in power to this day. Commentators agree that there are both
ruptures and continuities between the two regimes (cf. Watson 2006: 74). On the one hand,
the EPRDF ‘gave up the Marxist metanarrative of socialist progress for a more qualified
rhetoric  of  the devolution of power and economic liberalization,  democracy and human
rights’ (Donham 2002: 151). Thus, religious freedom was proclaimed, ending the Derg’s
suppression of religion (Haustein and Østebø 2011: 756). Similarly, where the Derg had
promoted an ideology of supra-ethnic national unity, the EPRDF adopted a model of ‘ethnic
federalism’. This means that local cultures and languages are valorized and ethnic groups
granted a measure of self-determination. On the other hand, and despite the language of
devolution, Ethiopia remains a tightly organized state in which most things happen in a top-
down manner (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). As under the Derg, state apparatus and ruling
party are  thoroughly  intertwined (Vaughan 2011).  And,  as  for  the Derg,  rapid,  state-led
development is a key concern for the EPRDF, with China often being cited as a role model. 
In Dell the first decade of EPRDF rule was marked by a relative absence of the state.
Not only was the new regime still consolidating its power at the national level. Also, the
local kebele administration had closed after Dell and neighbouring Bako had been merged
into a single kebele, which was administered from Bako. In 1978, a primary school had been
built in Dell, and throughout the 1980s there had been around a hundred students per year
(most  of  whom  left  after  Grade  1  or  2).  But  during  the  1990s,  student  numbers  fell
drastically and there was even talk of closing down the school altogether.6 Similarly, people
recall that there was only very little government-ordained communal work. Like the 1980s,
the  1990s  are  mainly  remembered  as  a  time  when wealth  levels  were  on  the  rise  and
traditional  institutions expanded (cf.  Freeman 2002: 44 for similar  observation from the
Gamo highlands). 
In  2001,  Dell  became a  kebele  of  its  own again  and the  administration  was  re-
opened.  In  subsequent  years,  the  EPRDF increased  its  efforts  to  promote  development
through local  state institutions.  A health  post was opened, and an agricultural extension
worker  dispatched  to  Dell.  In  2008,  school  attendance  was  made  compulsory.  Student
numbers  began  to  increase  significantly,  and  between  2012  and  2016  the  local  school
expanded from Grade 4 to 8.




My  fieldwork  in  Dell  was  distributed  over  two  periods  of  eight  and  fourteen  months
respectively. My first stay was from late October 2014 to early July 2015; my second stay
was from early July 2016 to mid-September 2017. During my first stay I rented a room in
the main village and took my meals with a young couple who were both from Dell and who
worked as a teacher and a health worker respectively. During my second stay, I lived with a
host  family  in  a  homestead  15  minutes  walk  away  from the  village.  The  head  of  this
household was Kalibab, who was in his early 60s. Kalibab had three wives, Kalinda and
Mangeshinda as well Medayinda who had been widowed and continued to live in her late
husband’s  homestead  ten  minutes  walk  away.  Kalibab  had  15  children,  including  four
married daughters, who had gone to live with their husbands, and three married sons, who
had established their  own homesteads  not  far  from that  of  their  father.  Another  son of
Kalibab’s had become a teacher and was working as the director of the local school. Two
further sons were on their way to becoming teachers; they and the remaining children as
well as a number of grandchildren lived in Kalibab’s homestead. 
I carried out my fieldwork in Aari’af, which I learnt during my first stay with the
help of two local teachers who knew some English. A South Omotic language (Hayward
1990), Aari’af is Dell people’s mother tongue and the language in which everyone feels
comfortable.  Knowledge  of  Ethiopia’s  national  language,  Amharic,  by  contrast  varies
greatly. Most adult women and elderly men speak hardly any Amharic at all, mid-aged men
tend to know a bit more, and young people who have attended school for at least six to eight
grades  are  usually fluent.  Use  of  Amharic  is  largely  confined to  the context  of  school,
though it may sometimes be used during political meetings or in church. For such cases I
have relied on translators. 
In terms of methodology, my fieldwork relied on a standard ethnographic approach
of participating in local life as extensively as possible and complementing my observations
with  in-depth  interviews.  Next  to  sharing  the  daily  life  of  my  host  family,  I  regularly
attended  Sunday  services,  weekly  prayer  meetings  and  other  events  at  evangelical  and
Orthodox churches;  I  observed lineage rituals,  went  to  more than  a dozen funerals  and
several  weddings,  assisted  bridewealth  negotiations  and conflict  resolutions,  sat  through
political meetings and court hearings, joined people in carrying out communal work and
occasionally helped with agricultural labour. 
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In  all  this  I  paid  close  attention  to  values:  I  listened  for  explicit  evaluative
statements,  whether  in  everyday talk  and gossip  or  as  contained in  official  discourse.  I
recorded strong emotions of outrage or happiness, which commonly indicate the violation or
realization of key subjective values (cf. Joas 2000: 8, Robbins 2015b: 223). I paid particular
attention to the decisions people made about how to use scarce resources, notably time and
wealth, and what ends they ultimately hoped to attain in this way. This perspective, notably
developed in Munn (1986), is able to reveal subjective values since, as Graeber (2001: 45)
notes, ‘[o]ne invests one’s energies in those things one considers most important, or most
meaningful.’ Finally, taking my cue from Robbins’ approach to studying values as objective
phenomena (e.g.  2012),  I  also collected systematic  data on the key ideas,  practices and
institutions of each of Dell’s four principal cultural formations, i.e.  karta, Evangelicalism,
Orthodox Christianity, and development. 
Figure 2. The main village
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Chapter 1. Respect: Its Potentials and Perils in Traditional Practice 
1.1 Introduction
‘Ay!’ Esias exclaimed with a big sigh, ‘from time to time it really pains me to see our karta
(traditional practice) go.’ It was a chilly evening in August 2016, and my host family was
gathered in Kalibab’s house to drink coffee. His wife gone to attend a training for health
workers, Esias, the third of Kalibab’s nine sons, had come over to join us. Exceptionally
bright and quick-witted, Esias had, in 2006, been the first from Dell to finish Grade 10. He
had gone on to become a teacher and was now, at age 30, director of the local school. Esias,
who had been amain (‘believer’) since he was 19, was also widely recognized as one of the
most committed Evangelicals  and served his church in a leading position.  Aware of the
government’s and the church’s opposition to karta, Esias’s exclamation took me by surprise.
Why did it pain him to ‘see karta go’, I enquired. Always keen to help me with my research,
Esias motioned that I should switch on my voice recorder and answered at some length as
follows: 
Look, Juli, in the past, when I was a teenager, when none of us had become amain yet,
our kin group was united. I strongly remember how Gamibab [the head of Amen lineage]
called us Amen people from time to time for ch’iltch’i (lineage ritual, c. ‘purification’).
He would  build  a  bamboo  fence  around  our  kashi  (ritual  site)  and  await  us  at  the
entrance. One after the other, in order of precedence (katay katay), we crawl through his
legs [into the kashi]. … Then we confess (buts). If you have become sad about someone,
if there has been a quarrel, if you have done something disrespectful, you confess. The
one who has done wrong asks forgiveness (negane).  … Gamibab stabs sheep – two,
three, four sheep. Our fathers look at the intestines. When they have found all the gomma
(transgressions that lead to misfortune), when the intestines have cleared up, Gamibab
grills the [sheeps’] livers. In order of precedence he hands each of us some morsels. Later
we eat the cooked meat. The whole day we sit together, we chat, we drink beer, we eat.
We treat  each other with respect (kikin bonshebonshda)  … Let me give you another
example. In those days, when karta was strong, people ate in siri (feasting groups). When
a  siri  had  come  to  our  house,  father  [Kalibab]  afterwards  called  his  [four]  brothers
alongside their wives and children. He slaughtered a big sheep for them. Then, when a
siri  had come to  their  house,  they would call  us  in  return.  Is  all  of  this  not  respect
(bonshmi)? Ay, this is great respect! So, what I’m saying is this: there were surely some
bad things in karta, but for respect it was good.’ 
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Esias recalls with nostalgia the ritual and social life of his kin group that he witnessed as a
boy and teenager. He describes how the Amen people regularly united for ritual and how
this involved resolving conflicts and eating together. He also describes reciprocal invitations
and  hospitality.  The  implicit  background  of  his  narrative  is  what  he  and  others  often
discussed as a decline of unity and respect among the five brothers, who, alongside their
extended families, constituted Amen  lineage. For one thing, the brothers no longer united
for ritual, since only the lineage head Gamibab continued to practice karta, whereas two of
his  brothers  had  become  amain and  two  (including  Esias’s  father)  Orthodox.  But  the
different households now also hardly ever invited each other for food or coffee – and this
despite  being  proximate  neighbours.  As  Esias’s  mother,  Kalinda,  once  put  it  somewhat
drastically, ‘now everyone only lives in their own house. The only time we see each other is
for  funerals.’ It  is  against  this  background  of  present-day  disunity,  that  Esias  wistfully
recalls the commensality and sociability that prevailed among the Amen people when they
all still participated in karta. This memory, in turn, leads him to conclude on a generalizing
note: The decline of karta pains him, his explanation suggests, because ‘karta was good for
respect’. 
Esias here voices a sentiment that was widespread in Dell; the notion of karta being
‘good for respect’ was a very common one. Indeed, not only was it upheld by the  alem7
people, as those who continue to practice  karta  are known in Dell. But I also repeatedly
heard Evangelicals like Esias speak along these lines – people, that is, who had ‘left’ karta
and who were otherwise critical of it. Opinions differed, however, on whether  karta had
only been good for respect in the past, or whether this was still the case in the present.
Evangelicals tended to use the past tense, saying things like, ‘previously karta was good for
respect, but now it has cooled down (zaste), now it’s useless (meyay)’. Other people, by
contrast, though acknowledging that karta was no longer as ‘strong’ (zami) as it used to be,
opined that it  was still  ‘good for respect’ – and in any case better than Evangelicalism,
which they felt did not afford a great deal of respect. 
This discourse about karta and its link to respect raises two questions, which I would
like to address in this chapter. First, in what exact sense is (or was) karta ‘good for respect’?
Second, if karta is (or was) good for respect, and if respect is something people value, then
7 Amharic for ‘world’,  this term was first  introduced by Evangelicals to designate ‘unbelievers’.  Today
‘alem’ is also used as a self-designation by those who follow karta, and I will therefore refer to them by
this term.
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why have so many people opted to leave karta in recent years or failed to return to it? My
analysis  of  these questions  will  help us get  a sense of what  Dell  people understand by
respect and what role this value has traditionally played in their lives. It also offers first
insights into the processes that stand behind the perceived decline of respect. 
Approach and Argument
In present-day Dell,  karta is a cultural formation in which about 30% of the population
participate.  Prior  to  the  rise  of  Evangelicalism  and  Orthodoxy,  however,  karta was
everyone’s shared way of life. This raises the question whether I here intend to look at karta
as it is currently practised, or whether I want to describe karta as it used to be in the past.
This question is a slightly tricky one. On the one hand, it would betray my ethnography
were I only to write about karta as a thing by-gone – after all, karta remains a meaningful
part of the lives of a third of the population. On the other hand,  karta has clearly seen a
number of changes over the past decades. This is evident not only on an analytical level.
Dell people themselves displayed a keen sense of  karta’s historicity and frequently talked
about  ways in  which  it  had changed.  It  is  therefore  conceivable  that  the answer to  the
question why  karta might be ‘good for respect’ would be different if one looked at past
instantiations of karta rather than at its current form. 
To decide what is the right approach to karta, it is helpful to be more specific about
the kind of change karta has undergone. To get at this, I have collected extensive data on
changes in the various institutions that constitute this cultural formation. There is also some
historical ethnography on Baaka and neighbouring Aari groups (Jensen 1959, Haberland
1959, Naty 1992, Gebre 1995). This material reveals two broad lines of change. First, a
number of institutions are no longer practised or on the verge of disappearing. For instance,
until the early 2000s, young people met for night dances (belart) during the dry season, but
this is no longer done today. Similarly, while during the 1990s many people participated in
feasting groups (siri), in 2016 there was only one such group left. Second, the complexity
and costliness of many institutions has been reduced.  Karta funerals, for instance, today
involve much less ritual destruction of wealth than in the past, and lineage rituals are less
elaborate. It is this disappearance or simplification of certain karta institutions – alongside
the fact that fewer people participate in karta – which accounts for Dell people’s sense that
karta has ‘cooled down’ and is less ‘strong’ today than it used to be. At the same time, the
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basic ways in which  karta affords respect have not changed. Whether one looks at past
instantiations  of  karta or  at  its  current form, respect throughout appears as a key value
which structures the activities in this cultural formation – only that the formation itself has
overall become less complex.8 In other words, the answer to why karta might be ‘good for
respect’ does not greatly vary across time. Against this background, I have decided to write
about karta as I observed it during my fieldwork, adding information on changes where this
matters for the question of how karta affords respect. 
My starting point in this chapter are karta conceptions of social structure. Here we
encounter an ideology of social hierarchy, which is based on the understanding that juniors
need to show respect in order to receive seniors’ blessing. Blessings, in turn, are vitally
important to enjoy good health and abundance, and so respect in  karta appears as directly
tied to  the reproduction of life.  In a second step,  I  show that  the various practices and
institutions  constituting  karta are  geared  toward  respect.  My  starting  point  here  is  a
discussion of karta funerals and how these afford extensive realizations of bonshmi. Noting
that kinship and commensality are key to achieving a good funeral, I go on to show that
kinship and commensality are important in karta more generally, and that both are central to
realizing respect. I end this first part of the chapter with a conceptual account of what sort of
respect specifically we are dealing with in the case of  bonshmi. In the second part of the
chapter, I look at the problem of  gomma,  which people cite as the key reason for leaving
karta. I explain that in the local understanding, all suffering is the result of disrespecting
seniors, but that often seniors push for respect so relentlessly that juniors end up acting
disrespectfully. As a consequence there emerges a sense that karta is a system that – though
good for respect – is also eminently dangerous and poses real obstacles to leading richly
blessed, flourishing lives. 
1.2 Why Karta is 'Good for Respect’
1.21 ‘I Can’t Lengthen Your Thumb By Pulling At It’ – Hierarchy and Respect
One of the more memorable lessons I received on karta understandings of social structure
came some months into my first period of fieldwork. I was sitting in a bar in the main
8 Dena  Freeman  (2002:  81)  offers  a  similar  observation  for  a  cognate  cultural  system  in  the  Gamo
Highlands. Writing about what she calls the Gamo ‘sacrificial system’, Freeman suggests that, ‘there has
been no real transformation of the system… only a general weakening of it that can better be described as
devolution. The system is rather less elaborated… but its general structure is still pretty much the same.’
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village one afternoon, when a booming ‘Ashamate!’ (Greetings!) sent a sudden wave of awe
through the room. The voice belonged to a tall man wearing sandals and a black suit, who
had just entered and whom I had not seen before. While the newcomer adjusted his eyes to
the dim light, several men jumped to their feet and approached him in a crouching position.
Some kissed his knees, while others remained at a little distance, repeatedly beating their
chests with their fists. Medaybab, otherwise very boisterous, told me in a hushed voice that
this was God Worka – ‘God’ being the abbreviated form and honorary title of a  godmi or
ritual  expert  (and unrelated to the English ‘God’).  Worka lived an hour  away from the
village  and  was  the  main  godmi for  Dell.  He  was  ushered  to  the  best  available  chair.
Catching sight of me, he invited me to sit next to him. 
Within a few minutes, a dozen or so bottles of beer accumulated on the rickety table
in front of Worka since several men bought him one or two bottles each. One after the other,
Worka then called these men to come and kneel before him. In each case, Worka grabbed a
bottle, took a sip from it, sprayed saliva over its mouth, held it to the lips of the man, let him
have a small sip, sprayed saliva over the bottle’s mouth again, and finally handed it to the
man to take it back to his place for consumption. I had also bought two bottles of beer for
Worka,  and so he eventually turned to me. But rather than bless me in the way he had
blessed the others – for this was what he had been doing – he decided to impart a lesson to
me. Taking hold of my left hand and extending it so that the palm faced upward, he pointed
to  the  middle  finger  and said  that  this  was  the  babi (ritual  king).  The index  finger  he
declared to be a godmi. The slightly shorter ring finger, in turn, was a toidi (lineage head),
the small finger a kanni (younger brother),  and the thumb a manna (a person belonging to
the  marginalized,  caste-like  minority  of  craftworkers).  Then he  suddenly  and forcefully
pulled at my thumb until I winced with pain. ‘You see’, he said gleefully, ‘I can’t lengthen
your thumb by pulling at it.’ Similarly, he went on to explain, no one can turn a ‘below
person’ (tamabab) like a manna into an ‘above person’ (zermabab) like a babi – ‘not even
the  ferenji (white people) with all their technology can do that, because this is how berri
(God) has created the world.’ 
Worka here enunciates an ideology of social hierarchy widespread across highland
southwestern Ethiopia (cf. Donham 1999: 60-63 for Maale; Dori 2011: 20-26 for Oyda;
Haberland 1993: 126ff. for Dizi; Freeman 2002: 66-71 for Gamo). In this ideology, society
is represented as a hierarchy of statuses. In the case of Aari, the figure at the top is referred
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to as babi.  Literally meaning ‘father’, the term is commonly glossed as ‘ritual king’ (Naty
1992: 328). The  babi is followed by a group of ritual experts or  godmi, each of whom is
responsible for a particular geographical region. Below these ritual leaders are the  keysi
(commoners), who subdivide into xantsa and manna. Xantsa – who form the majority – are
commonly described as farmers and manna as craftworkers, but many manna have long also
carried out some farming. According to traditional ideology, xantsa rank above manna. To
this day, the two groups are largely endogamous, and restrictions on commensality have
been  loosened  only  among  Evangelicals,  but  continue  to  be  upheld  by  alem  and  local
Orthodox Christians.9
Importantly, hierarchy exists not only between these broad social groupings but also
among kin. A given person ranks ‘down below’ (shosh tama) those who are classified as
their father (babi), mother (indi), uncle (irki), older sister (mitshi), older brother (ishmi), or
grandparent (aka) (see Figure 3).  In turn, a person ranks ‘up above’ (pes zerma) everyone
who is classified as their child (jintsi), younger brother (kanni), younger sister (inani) or
nephew (aaksi).10 Every person then is senior to some people, and junior to others.
Figure 3. Aari kinship terminology (showing ego’s seniors)
9 Manna further subdivide into animan (who are known as wood-workers and also play an important ritual
role for xantsa) and pekaman (who are blacksmiths). Animan rank above pekaman and the two groups do
not intermarry or eat together (see  Freeman and Pankhurst 2003 on marginalized minorities in Ethiopia
more generally). 
10 There is also hierarchy between affines, with wife-givers ranking above wife-receivers. This hierarchy is
clearest between a man and his wife’s parents (baisi). At the level of the parent generation, hierarchy can
become blurred since lineages often exchange brides both ways. Relations between brothers- and sisters-
in-law (wotni) are conceived as egalitarian (yekka). 
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What is this ideology of hierarchy based on? In what sense is someone ‘below’ their mother
or ‘above’ their younger siblings? Here we come to one of the most important and central
notions of karta, which I heard asserted innumerable times: Those above have the power to
bless  (anʒken)  those  below,  who vitally  depend on these  blessings.  To receive  seniors’
blessing is a necessary condition for well-being: one’s own health depends on it, and so does
the health of one’s children, the multiplication of one’s livestock and the growth of one’s
crops.  In  order  to  be  blessed  by  seniors  one  has  to  show them respect  (bonshmi).  By
contrast, treating seniors disrespectfully – ‘belittling’ them (toksi) – leads one to experience
gomma, a state marked by illness, death and misfortune.11 
Indeed, what had brought Worka to this part of Dell that day was just such a case of
gomma. Kunko, the first son of a respected elder, was dangerously ill with high fever. A
week earlier, Kunko’s mother had died a sudden and unexpected death. Having been amain
for several  years,  Kunkinda was buried according to  the evangelical  way.  Among other
things, this meant that no sheep or cattle had been sacrificed for her since the church rejects
sacrifice  as  ‘spilling  blood  for  Satan’. In  Worka’s  opinion,  however,  this  had  been  a
dangerous mistake.  As first  son, Kunko (who is  alem) ought to have sacrificed a sheep
nonetheless. His failure to perform this requisite act of bonshmi had angered his mother, and
hence she was ‘calling him from the grave [to follow her into it]’. Worka’s advice therefore
was that Kunko sacrifice a sheep at his mother’s grave, fall on his knees and apologize for
having ‘belittled’ her. This, Worka assured, would appease Kunkinda and make her send
Kunko ‘coolness’. 
As Worka’s advice reveals, respect is not only necessary to avoid suffering in the
first place, but is also what it takes to overcome suffering when one has been hit by gomma.
In the words of a local saying, ‘respect is the medicine for everything’ (bonshmi rej mullite
desha).
So what do acts of respect and blessing look like in practice? The scene with Worka
offers first impressions. To begin with, it features a number of acts people in Dell would
describe as  bonshmi.  These include crouching or kneeling before someone, kissing their
knee, beating one’s chest,  using honorific titles of address, offering a good seat, buying
drinks, not drinking before the other has not drunk, and displaying an attitude of obedience,
submissiveness and fearfulness (bashi). These and other forms of showing respect are used
11 The relation ‘respect ↔ blessings’ is found throughout Ethiopia, in the traditional cultures of the South no
less than in Orthodox Christianity, evangelical Christianity or Islam (cf. Dulin 2016: 94ff.). 
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not only in interactions with ritual experts like Worka. Much more importantly in everyday
life, they are also used in relation to senior kin. Thus, running into your older sister, for
instance, you would address her as ‘amtsha’, which is an honorific kinship title (she greets
by using your first  name),  and you would slightly bend your knees and kiss her on the
mouth from below. 
Note how these acts of respect make hierarchy visible. Crouching, I appear ‘below’
the other. Waiting for them to start drinking, I exhibit that I come ‘behind’ or ‘after’ (bur)
them. There also is a symbolism here of being owned. To kiss someone’s knee is a visible
acknowledgement that one is ‘below their leg/foot’ (dutite goir), a common local expression
for ownership. And to beat one’s chest, I was told, shows that one’s life is in the other’s
hands. Indeed, when beating their chest people often exclaim ‘shall I not die below?’ (shosh
deyayto), ‘kill me!’ (deys’ime), and this too is classified as an expression of respect. 
Worka reciprocates the respect people show him by letting them have a sip from a
bottle over the mouth of which he has sprayed saliva. Spraying of saliva – onomatopoeically
described as  t’uph – and ‘making drink’ (wotshi) are two paradigmatic ways of blessing;
they are found across southern Ethiopia (e.g. Epple 2006: 72, Lydall and Strecker 1979:
118f.). In Dell both are understood to produce shimma, a state of ‘coolness’ or absence of
problems, which a friend once likened to the pleasant sensation of ‘resting in the shade of a
large tree on a warm day’. Both forms of blessing appear in numerous contexts. Most rituals
at  some point  involve  ‘drinking water’ (or  beer  or  coffee).  For  instance,  in  the  sort  of
lineage ritual Esias described in the introduction to this chapter, people first confess and
resolve their conflicts, and then – in order of hierarchical precedence – kneel before the
lineage head and take a few sips from a half-calabash (shorxa) that he holds out to them.
This clears away any ‘heat’ that the conflict resolution may have failed to extinguish from
their  stomachs (the seat  of the feelings) and ushers in a state of coolness and blessing.
Spraying of saliva, in turn, is often associated with greeting. Thus, I repeatedly observed
how Kalibab affectionately sprayed saliva over the head of a nephew or niece, who had
shyly come up to kiss his knee. By the same logic, Mangeshinda one day lifted her shirt at
the shoulders, spat under it, and massaged her breasts the way breast-feeding mothers do to
stimulate the flow of milk. Her married son Mangesha had sent her a gift of meat, and by
‘saying t’uph’ and ‘taking him to the breast’ (ami jedi), Mangeshinda explained to me, she
was answering his act of bonshmi by extending her blessing to him. The form of these acts
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illustrates the ideological tenet that blessings flow from high to low, and that they are only
obtained in return for respect. I need to crouch before I am able to drink from the calabash a
senior holds to my lips. I cannot have saliva sprayed over my head, unless I bend forward.
Figure 4. During a lineage ritual a boy drinks from a shorxa held by his toidi.
The Value of Hierarchy
In recent years, anthropology has seen a reappraisal of hierarchy (Ferguson 2013, Piliavsky
2014, Peacock 2015, Haynes and Hickel 2018). Previously dismissive of hierarchy for both
political and intellectual reasons (cf. Haynes and Hickel 2018: 5-8), anthropologists are now
starting to take due account of the positive value that hierarchical relations have for many
people. Thus, scholars have shown that hierarchy may be valued as the basis for achieving
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fruition (Hickel 2015), as a means to achieve progress through connection to others (Haynes
2017), or as the basis for politics (Ansell 2014; Piliavsky 2014).
As the preceding section has suggested, in Dell, too, hierarchy has traditionally been
valued, namely for affording both blessings and respect. This observation, however, leads on
to the question which of these latter  two values  is  the more important  one in  karta.  Is
hierarchy here primarily valued for affording blessings or for affording respect? As we shall
see in the following, respect in karta clearly ranks above blessings. This is so inasmuch as
karta institutions invite people to use blessings for the pursuit of respect: one gets health and
wealth by being respectful, and these blessings are in turn used to create the relations and
occasions through which respect is realized. 
1.22 The Institutional Foundations of Respect
So far we have identified one answer to the question why karta might be ‘good for respect’:
To enjoy good health and abundance people need to show bonshmi to their seniors, and thus
the  very  reproduction  of  life  is  tied  to  respect.  A second  answer  is  that  the  various
institutions which constitute  karta – from modes of agricultural  production to life-cycle
rituals to ways of dealing with conflict – are all geared toward respect. Lacking the space to
demonstrate this for all of these institutions, I will focus on one example. Funerals make for
a particularly good example because they are of central importance in karta and reveal what
matters in this cultural formation at large. Consider here the funeral of Betsinda and how it
points us to the broader importance of kinship and commensality for realizing respect.
Betsinda’s Funeral
Early one Monday morning in January 2017, I am woken by long drawn-out wailing. A few
moments later, Kalibab knocks at my door and tells me with a stern and determined look
that Betsinda, a woman in her late 40s, has died, and that we need to leave immediately to
condole  (alxshken).  Kalibab’s  first  wife,  Kalinda,  who  is  the  older  sister  of  Betsinda’s
husband, Betsibab, heads our group. There is her and Kalibab’s two other wives, and two of
Kalinda’s daughters-in-law; there follow Kalibab and four of his sons and myself. Single
file and at a good pace, we walk through dewy meadows, a bright sun rising in our backs.
As we near Betsibab’s compound, the wailing intensifies. Now the women of our group start
wailing, too, and soon we traverse the shadowy and leafy  arxemi grove that encircles the
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compound. The space between the huts is densely packed with people, and so intense is the
grief and the wailing and so abundant the flow of tears, that one can only join in the moment
one  steps  into  this  cauldron  of  sorrow.  Lacking  the  extensive  knowledge  of  the  dead
woman’s kinship network, which is crucial for condoling, I stay right behind Kalibab and do
as  he  does.  With  precision  Kalibab  moves  through  the  crowd,  seeking  out  in  quick
succession the many dozens of people who are brothers or sisters, children or parents to
Betsinda, and whom it is so essential to condole lest they feel that one has not shown them
proper respect in this moment of loss and despair. 
Before long, things take on a more business-like feel. The funeral has been set for
Thursday, and much remains to be done before then. There is fire-wood to be collected and
grain to be ground, food to be cooked and beer to be brewed; and these tasks are taken over
by women. Meanwhile, men erect sun shelters for people to sit under, build a coffin, and
remove a small hut from the centre of the compound to make room for dancing. Seven men,
who are neither members of the same moiety as Betsibab nor affines are selected as duki ed
or ‘burial people’.12 Their tasks include digging the grave, carrying the coffin, and, after the
funeral, dividing up Betsinda’s belongings among those who inherit. The preparations for
the funeral involve a great number of people, many of them relatives, but also unrelated
neighbours. There is a strong spirit of co-operation and trying to be helpful. 
On Wednesday afternoon, one day before the funeral, Guo’s hour has come. Short,
wiry, and always with a whimsical smile,  Guo is a  manna in his  sixties,  who regularly
carries out ritual work for Oni lineage, the lineage to which Betsibab belongs. So far, Guo
has guarded the dead body of Betsinda from mice and ants, but now he initiates the ritual
activities that lead up to the funeral. In hierarchical order, he binds shala-headbands (made
from strips of dried arxemi leaves) around the heads of senior Oni men. He then asks for a
spear to be brought and for an anno-gadab – ‘a person who calls her “mother”’ – to come
forward.  Kari  is  the  genealogically  highest  ranking  alem Oni  man  from the  generation
below Betsinda – and so it is his task to sacrifice sheep for her. Guo tells Kari to perform the
sacrifice right next to the hut in which Betsinda is stored ‘so that she may see’, and ‘so that
she can drink the blood [of the sheep]’, which is not collected but left to flow away. When
the sheep has expired, its intestines are removed and placed on an upturned wooden bowl.
Quickly, a small crowd gathers around the elders who read the intestines to discover ‘what
12 There are two exogamous moieties, indi and ashenda. Evangelicals do not recognize this division, but for 
alem it remains relevant, both with regard to marriage and in the context of ritual life.
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killed her’ and whether there are any ‘problems for her children’. A little later, Kari spears a
cow and again intestines are read. Parts of the meat go to the  duki ed as reward for their
labour, parts go to Guo, and the rest is for Betsibab, who uses his share of meat to feast
important guests. 
On Thursday afternoon, I am in Kalibab’s compound. There is a group of about 25
people, composed of Kalibab’s kin from Amen lineage, and of neighbours from Wotsha and
Zi (lineages that belong to the same moiety as Oni). We eat together, and then we head to
the funeral. Kalibab, due to having married Betsibab’s sister, is baisi (affine) to Oni lineage.
It is on this basis that he has invited his kin and neighbours to ‘walk in his back’ (raxik muk)
to the funeral. When we are still at a little distance from Betsibab’s compound someone
thinks to understand from the noise that the coffin has already left the hut and that the burial
is immanent. Kalibab’s first son, Kali, dashes off, a rolled-up sheet of tin roof in one hand
and white blankets and a 6 litre jerrycan with arake (liquor) in the other. These gifts need to
be handed over before the burial,  otherwise there is a risk of  gomma – and for Kali,  in
particular,  this  is  an  issue,  since  as  Kalinda’s  son,  the  Oni  people  are  his  ‘uncles’ and
‘mothers’ and thus to be respected at all costs. 
But when we arrive, it becomes clear that the coffin is not out yet. The crowd is
boiling though. There are at  least five or six groups like ours, each centred around one
affine. Each dances as a tight throng, and people brandish spears and slam shields, blow
horns and chant. The group of the ‘first affine’ or  wotti bais  – the man who has married
Betsinda’s eldest daughter – launches an attack against the bamboo fence that surrounds the
hut with the coffin. But it is only several attacks later, and after receiving a jerrycan with
arake from Oni, that he finally tears down the fence. It is growing dark quickly now and the
atmosphere is near its fever pitch. There is a crowd of some 300 or more people, and there is
intense  wailing  and  erratic  gun  fire.  The  coffin  is  paraded  back  and  forth  through  the
compound three times and finally the duki ed move toward the grave and everyone follows
them in one dense swarm. 
Later, under a bright moon, our group sits down in the shade of a tree and Kalibab’s
wives hand around bowls with food. Two Oni men come to reciprocate Kalibab’s gift of
arake by giving a slightly smaller amount of arake in return, and Kalibab then has the liquor
distributed  among  his  ‘followers’.  There  is  some  more  dancing  afterwards,  but  since
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‘Betsinda didn’t get very old’, the dancing soon stops and wrapped in blankets our group
lies down to sleep in the chilly night. 
It had been a fine funeral, people agreed afterwards. Of course, it would have been
even grander had Betsinda been a bit older. Her daughter’s sons would have grown up and
would have provided further sheep for sacrifice. There would also have been more affines
since her two teenage daughters would have been married. And dancing would have lasted
longer. But her husband’s lineage was very large, and this alone meant that a seizable crowd
had attended the funeral. And then there was a good number of affines after all. There had
even arrived a group of affines from the low-lands, and these people had helped to ‘heat up’
(oysh)  the funeral,  because  they just  did not  care if  the government said  you were  not
supposed to fire guns. Betsinda had also done well to die at this time of the year, when there
was a lot of grain. And while not everyone had managed to prepare beer in time, there still
was a good deal of drink and food. All this had combined to produce a descent bedlam,
worthy of someone who ‘had given birth’. 
The Value of Kinship
In the next chapter we will  see that  amain funerals take a very different and much less
exuberant form, and that this has to do with Evangelicals’ pervasive concern to avoid sin.
But for alem and Orthodox people in Dell, to be buried in a grand funeral of the kind just
described – to be honoured with a final grand display of respect – was a key aspiration (see
Dulin 2016: 181 for similar observations from northern Ethiopia). Indeed, I hardly ever saw
people get more exited than when picturing their own funeral. ‘When I die, people will
come like flies’, Kalibab told me one day, giddy with excitement: 
‘From Oni they come. From Zi [lineage] everyone comes. Berr [lineage] comes. Down
from the low-lands many people will  come… From here to that tree over there,  [the
space] will fill up with people. They will say woaaah, woaaah … My sons bring sheep,
nephews  bring  sheep,  my  daughters’  sons  bring  sheep.  I  greet  them  through  the
intestines, ‘abetto, abetto!’ [hello] I say.’
Kalibab’s statement, no less than my description of Betsinda’s funeral, reveals kinship or
relatedness13 as the crucial factor to achieve a great funeral. The index or ‘quali-sign’ (Munn
13 In this thesis I include under ‘kin’ both consanguineal and affinal (as well as fictive) kin. I am aware that
anthropologists often treat affines and kin as two distinct categories, rather than to treat affines as a sub-
type of kin. If I  use ‘kin’ as an overarching category, this is – apart from being a useful shorthand –
because Dell people themselves include consanguineal, affinal and fictive kin under one and the same
term: sosa. (Though they also have more specific terms, such as ‘baisi’ for affines.)
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1986:  17)  of  a  great  funeral  –  and thus  of  a  life  well  lived  – is  a  tremendous  uproar,
onomatopoeically described as ‘woaaah’.  And it is primarily on the basis of kinship that
people come to your funeral and perform the various acts which together create this uproar.
The loudest and most heartbreaking wailing is that of daughters and sisters.  Beli (‘fictive
kin’,  see  below)  chant  in  praise  of  the  dead  person.  Male  descendants  provide  sheep.
Nephews brandish guns while paraded on other people’s shoulders. Tumultuously, the first
affine destroys the fence protecting the coffin. Affines dance, blow horns, and chant.
Indeed,  of  all  kin,  affines  are  perhaps  the  most  important  for  a  funeral.  This  is
because from each affinally related lineage, one man will call together a group of people to
‘walk in his back’ to the funeral.  For this man, it is crucial that his group be as big as
possible because his reputation (nami) is tied to its size. My neighbour Agero once imitated
what he feared others would say about him were he to fail at uniting a sufficiently large
group for an upcoming funeral: ‘Oy! What’s that?! He didn’t treat his affine with respect. Is
there nothing [to eat] in his house? No, he has some grain. So he must be stingy (disha) or
what? What sort of affine is that. Tsa!’ Agero here reveals the understanding that it is a
matter of respect for the kin of the dead person to turn up with a large group, and that one
would otherwise lose reputation. Contrarily, one gains reputation if one manages to unite a
sizeable group, and if it exalts the dead person by dancing a lot and making a great deal of
noise. Hence, affines have a personal interest in bringing many people to the funeral and
they thus contribute significantly to its overall size. 
Kin, then, – their number and type – are key to funerals. This invites a particular
kind of activity in life: To attain a great funeral one needs to strive to have many kin. Of
course, to some extent, the number of someone’s kin is beyond their control. One is born
into a large or a small lineage, one is elder sibling or dokka (last child), one has many sisters
(and thus nephews) or few. Also, there is a natural up-ward movement over the life-course:
As  one’s  siblings  have  children,  as  a  new  generation  comes  into  being  ‘below’,  one
automatically becomes ‘father’ or ‘mother’ or ‘uncle’ to others. But there are also ways to
actively expand kinship, and my data suggest that people in Dell until recently invested a
great deal of wealth and energy into this. This has changed with the rise of development.
There are now competing uses of wealth, and people invest relatively less into kinship than
previously. Yet, the relations created in the past persist into the present. If we look at the
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relational networks of older people in Dell, i.e. of those who lived the greatest part of their
lives in pre-development times, the following lines of striving can be discerned. 
To  begin  with,  men  aspired  to  have  several  wives.  Marriage  requires  paying
bridewealth, and a father only pays bridewealth for his son’s first wife. While not everyone
could afford further marriages, a majority of the men who today are in their fifties or older
have at least two wives, and several have three or four. Wives were important for both their
labour and their gestational power. Indeed, to have numerous offspring was a key goal not
only for men but also for women. Many of the older women in Dell have borne eight to
twelve children; though many have also lost a considerable number of these. The value of
children was manifold and included their labour power and the care and support they would
provide in old age (see Noguchi 2013 on ageing among the Aari; Donham 1990: 111 on the
value of children in Maale). What stands out from people’s accounts about the value of
children, however, is the respect they afforded. Women would highlight, for example, how
their married sons would send them gifts of grain at harvest time, or how they would invite
them whenever  there was meat  in  their  homes;  and these were above all  considered as
expressions of bonshmi. Or take Kalinda. One day, upon learning that many women in my
country have only one or two children, Kalinda exclaimed emphatically, ‘But to give birth is
nothing bad! It’s something very good. It means great respect. Your son-in-law (baisi) will
show you a  lot  of  bonshmi.’ Significantly,  Kalinda here  makes  a  direct  transition  from
talking about children to talking about affines. For her, children are sources of respect also
in the indirect sense that you get affines through them, and affines – especially sons-in-law –
mean respect. 
Indeed, next to aspiring to have a great number of children,  people in Dell  have
traditionally placed high value on affinity – and the more children you have, of course, the
more affines you can get.  The concern with increasing the number of one’s affines also
became evident in how people reasoned about good and bad marriages. In an interview on
this topic Kalibab explained: 
‘The people of Berr [lineage] are our affines, aren’t they? Now, for example, if Ambi
[Kalibab’s teenage daughter] marries someone from Berr – ay, that’s useless! Look, it
doesn’t add affines on top of our affines. But if she marries into Boca, for example, that’s
good. I would like it if I became affines with Boca. If there’s a funeral in their house
[lineage] we go, if there’s a funeral in our house they come.’ 
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As with children, the value of affines is not limited to respect. Thus, Kalibab on another
occasion explained how marrying Kalinda had been a good move because her natal lineage,
Oni, is the largest lineage in the area, and as his affines the Oni people would all come to
help  him if  ever  he  got  in  trouble.  Yet,  while  people  sometimes  mentioned security  or
economic  benefits,  the  value  of  affinity  was  above  all  discussed  in  terms  of  bonshmi.
Affines were people whom you might not see all  the time, but who showed you lavish
hospitality when you did pass through their land. It was through affines that funerals got
noisy. Indeed, more practical forms of help that affines might grant – such as providing
access to grazing land – tended to be framed as demonstrations of bonshmi, too. And so its
affordance of respect has traditionally been a key motivation for working to expand affinity. 
The  value  placed  on  kinship,  finally,  also  becomes  visible  in  a  range  of  karta
institutions for creating ‘fictive kinship’ and the wealth people formerly invested in these
institutions. As Medaybab told me, ‘in the past, when people got some money, they thought
“on top of my kin, I will buy kin” (inte sosate zen sosa shendite).’ He went on to explain
how you could, for instance, become beli with someone by exchanging cattle or sheep and
feasting together, and he noted with pride that he had six such  beli. Scholars working in
neighbouring societies, have commonly glossed ‘beli’ as ‘bondfriend’ (e.g. Girke 2010). But
it  is important to note that in Dell  at  least,  people conceive of this  relation in terms of
kinship (sosemi) rather than friendship (gohdemi). Not only would they describe their beli as
‘brother-like’ or ‘sister-like’ (women create beli relations, too). But they also said that if one
treated beli with disrespect, this could become gomma for one’s children. Gomma, however,
is explicitly understood to only occur among kin. 
Next to making beli, you could, in the context of mol’a work groups or belart dance
groups, become ‘affines’ with a person of the opposite sex. As in the case of beli, this went
through reciprocal exchange: the woman prepared beer and food, which she and her ‘affine’
consumed during the group’s yearly feast, and the man would reciprocate with things like a
self-made palm leave mat,  a hand-carved stool, or money. From that time onwards they
would greet each other respectfully as ‘baisi’ and treat each other with the same respect as
‘real’ affines do. All in all, then, the creation of different forms of kinship has traditionally
been a key concern for people in Dell, and karta features numerous institutions to do so –
from polygyny to fictive affinity. Given my earlier discussion of ideas about social hierarchy
and the respect people can expect from juniors, it is clear that an expansion of kinship, and
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specifically the creation of people ‘down below’, means an increase in the respect one can
command. Karta invites this kind of striving – not least because a good funeral is a loud
one, and it is kin who make the noise. 
Cultivating Respect through Commensality 
Next to the role played by kinship, a second conspicuous feature of the above described
funeral is commensality. A few hours after Betsinda’s death, women start to prepare food. In
the days leading up to  the funeral and in  the week after  it,  there is  a  steady stream of
visitors,  who spend some hours sitting together  with the close kin.  At regular  intervals,
everyone is served coffee and boiled maize, and once the beer has been brewed, there is
always a  calabash that  circulates among the guests.  Meanwhile,  food and beer  is  being
prepared in the houses of those who are baisi and who have invited others to follow them to
the funeral. As I have explained above, it is important for the baisi to unite a large group,
since his ‘name’ depends on this. To be able to invite many people, one has to be able to
offer them food. For if one failed to do so, they would complain and gossip: ‘If there’s no
food in his house, then why did he call us?!’ Indeed, preparing a lot of food is not just
necessary to be able to invite many people in the first place. It is also necessary to, as it
were, keep them going during the funeral. It is important for one’s group to dance a lot and
to make a great deal of noise. This both shows one’s respect for the dead person and their
kin and it  gains  one the admiration  of  onlookers.  The group’s  boisterousness,  however,
depends on it being well-fed and getting a good measure of alcohol. 
All this commensality is closely bound up with bonshmi. To serve guests coffee and
maize, or, as a  baisi,  to feed one’s followers, is understood as a demonstration of respect.
And those who are thus fed, in turn contribute to the great uproar which marks the death of a
respected person. Food also mediates respect in numerous other ways during the funeral.
Sacrificing animals is a requisite form of showing respect to the dead person. At the same
time it makes available meat, and while parts of the meat are given as a payment to the
manna and the duki ed, other parts are used by Betsibab to show special respect to important
visitors. Note also how the actual burial of Betsinda can only take place after the wotti bais
has destroyed the fence around her hut, and how he only destroys it after the Oni people
have shown him respect by giving arake.
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As with kinship: the prominent place commensality occupies in the funeral reflects
something about its place in karta more generally. Whether you look at life-cycle or lineage
rituals, at conflict resolution or modes of creating fictive kinship, at production institutions
like dabba work parties or at leisure institutions like siri feasting groups – eating together is
at the heart of karta. This makes karta markedly different from Dell Evangelicalism: as we
will see in the next chapter, evangelical institutions involve considerably less commensality,
and evangelical ideology explicitly devalues ‘just eating’. At the same time, those who still
follow karta now invest relatively less into commensality than they did in the past. This is
because  of  the  pursuit  of  economic  development,  which  makes  competing  demands  on
everyone’s resources (cf. Chapter 3). As I have mentioned above, several karta institutions
have been dropped or down-sized, and this has mostly occurred with regard to the aim of
‘saving’. Similarly, everyday commensality among neighbours and kin, like visiting each
other at meal times,  has, on my interlocutors’ account,  been reduced. As we saw in the
opening vignette of this thesis, this is something they lament and cite as evidence for the
decline  of  respect.  Against  this  background,  it  is  essential  to  understand  the  role
commensality  has  traditionally  played  in  Dell.  Here  are  three  observations  on  how
commensality mediates respect. 
(1) Commensality presupposes and thus helps to produce social harmony. In Dell, as
elsewhere in southern Ethiopia, it is thought that people should not eat together if there is a
conflict between them; and it is fitting to note that a common way to express that one has
become angry with someone, is to say ‘my stomach has become sad’ (norti ist aterte). If one
eats together despite a ‘sad stomach’, this can lead to illness or worse. One time during my
fieldwork,  several  members  of  a  neighbouring  household  fell  ill  with  diarrhoea  and
vomiting after attending a social event where they had eaten food prepared by Oni women.
For  those  to  whom I  spoke about  this,  there  was no  doubt  that  this  was because  their
household head, Haikobab, was in a land-conflict with Eaybab, whose wives had prepared
the food. Indeed, Haikobab and Eaybab had sued each other in a customary court operated
by God Worka, where they had ‘placed words [curses]’ against each other. This marks an
advanced  level  of  enmity,  and  Haikobab  correspondingly  did  not  attend  the  event  at
Eaybab’s house. But his wives and children did – falling ill afterwards.
As this case shows, people will not always refrain from eating together if they or
those  ‘above’ them are  at  conflict  with  someone.  This  can  have  various  reasons,  from
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thinking they are without blame and thus not prone to suffer harm, to simply considering the
conflict as not particularly grave and hence nothing to worry about. Members of the same
household face the added difficulty that there will always be  some tensions, but that it is
hardly  practical  to  hold  a  conflict  resolution  before  every  meal.  (Though I  did  witness
several instances when my host family delayed dinner because someone’s ‘stomach had
become sad’, and when the conflict was discussed and formal apologies extended before
food was served; see p.116 for an example) 
It  makes  good sense,  then,  that  there are institutionalized moments in  social  life
where people, when brought together for commensality, are compelled to voice and solve
conflicts before they start eating together. Nowhere does this become more obvious than in
the kind of lineage ritual (ch’iltch’i) described by Esias above. But the dynamics apparent in
that  case can be observed whenever  sheep or  cattle  are slaughtered:  during funerals,  in
feasting groups, at the annual feast of work groups, in the context of marriage and so on. For
whenever livestock are slaughtered, their intestines are read. Just as the human stomach –
which,  remember,  becomes  sad  at  having  been  wronged –  intestines  are  called  ‘norti’.
Indeed, the intestines of animals are thought to represent conflicts between people. Sadness
in the human norti, in other words, manifests in the animal norti. While there is no space
here to go into the details of reading intestines, we can briefly say that they are conceived as
a map of social relations: they represent your ‘house’, affines, uncles, children, ancestors,
neighbours, and people under ‘different kings’ (babi galla); irregularities, red spots, ‘paths’
that  are  present  or  absent  indicate  for  specific  relations  that  ‘there’s  something  to  talk
about’, i.e. that there is gomma. Indeed, even before the animal is slaughtered, those who are
to partake in the meal are asked to ‘confess’ (buts) their grievances, and this often leads to a
first round of confessions and discussions. But the intestines in most cases will show that
not all issues have been uncovered, and thus people are drawn into further discussions and
confessions. Then another sheep is slaughtered to see if all conflicts have been resolved.
Importantly, one cannot eat the meat – which everyone starts craving strongly at this point –
before the intestines have ‘cleared’. Thus people are effectively compelled to voice conflicts
before  they  eat  together.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  commensality  in  presupposing  social
harmony helps to produce it. Given that most conflicts are framed in terms of disrespect, the
solving of conflicts means nothing other than the reinstitution of a state of respect. 
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Figure 5. Reading intestines at a funeral
(2) Commensality creates relations. Food plays a crucial role in creating the different
types of kinship discussed above. A baby only becomes a member of its father’s lineage
when, at the age of three or four months (depending on whether it is a girl or a boy), the
lineage head takes it in his lap and feeds it with barley paste; this is known as illa lasi or
‘making lick flour’. Affinity, in turn, is only fully established when the members of two
lineages  meet  in  the  ritual  site  of  the  wife-givers,  where,  in  a  wooden  feeding  trough
(gonga), they mix meat brought along by each side. It is by eating from ‘one gonga’ that
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they become related. This echoes the understanding that people of the same lineage are ‘one
gonga’ (gonga wolax); an expression which makes reference to the fact that during lineage
rituals the lineage head hands out to his junior kin morsels of grilled liver that have been cut
up in such a feeding trough. The role of eating together for creating relations, finally, is
highly  visible  when  it  comes  to  fictive  kinship,  which  is  always  established  through
feasting.  The  relation  of  beli,  for  instance,  is  created  through  three  successive  –  and
successively larger – feasts; the role that food and feeding plays between two beli is also
expressed when, decades later, one of them wails at the other’s funeral, ‘Oh, belio, belio! I
have eaten from your hand. Whose hand am I to eat from now?’
We can distinguish two ways in which commensality creates relations. First, there is
the logic of the gift,  which needs to be returned and thus creates relations. This is what
happens when the lineage head feeds a new-born baby: in a sense the fed person will work
their whole life to repay this gift (and its renewal in the form of blessings) by paying respect
to the lineage head. Similarly, people on the way to establishing fictive kinship oblige each
other through invitations that go back and forth between them. And on a less formal level
the same things happens when neighbours invite each other in turn, whether to drink coffee
together in the morning or for larger social events. Here it is not so much the act of eating or
the  food  in  itself  which  relates,  but  the  act  of  inviting  and  hosting  and  the  resultant
obligations for the other to invite and host in return.14
It is true, however, that Dell people have traditionally also conceived of the very act
of eating together – especially when it comes to meat – as creating kinship. This became
evident in an interview with Gamibab. Talking about feasting groups, he explained: 
‘We have come together in one house. We have slaughtered a sheep – that’s like [being
of] one blood. We don’t abandon each other. We ate from the same plate, we all extended
our hands to the same plate. We don’t quarrel – the sheep’s intestines would be angry
with us [show gomma].’ 
14 A striking expression of this notion can also be found in shishi, memorial celebrations held some months
after a funeral. At the outset of a shishi, a manna spills a small quantity of coffee, beer and cooked maize.
This is understood to feed the bunka or spirits of the dead. It is thought that during the months after their
death, dead people live on the hospitality of those who have died before them. However, if their living kin
fail to reciprocate this hospitality after some months, the other  bunka will get angry and will no longer
feed the new-comer bunka. This forces the latter to ‘return to his kin’; but the return of the dead means
death for the living. To securely relate the one who has recently died to the community of the dead, it is
necessary to reciprocate the latter's hospitality.
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‘One blood’ is a synonym for kinship; and, as we know by now, the notion that the intestines
will show  gomma between the group members points to the assumption of kinship, too,
since gomma only occurs among kin. One becomes kin by ingesting the same substance. 
(3) Commensality draws people into respectful interactions. Take as an example here
the interactions among the people of Kalibab’s group, when uniting in his house before
heading off to the funeral. It is Thursday afternoon and slowly the guests start to arrive.
Whenever someone comes through the door, there is a moment of gay and noisy greeting.
‘Older sister, abo!’, ‘Oysabab, ashame!’, people call out, using kinship titles or teknonyms,
before they kiss the newcomer affectionately. The latter is then invited to sit down. Things
to sit on are limited and of different symbolic value – from mats on the floor over smaller
and bigger stools, to chairs with and without armrests. Often, someone who is junior to the
newcomer will offer them their seat. This has a knock-on effect. If Ambi offers her (large)
stool to her married older sister, (Ambi expects that) her younger sister Gogi jumps up to
offer Ambi her (smaller) stool. This in turn has consequences for Gogi’s younger siblings,
and so on until the youngest children get pushed out of the house altogether. When everyone
has arrived, people are invited to wash hands. Gogi, holding a plastic bowl in her left hand
and pouring water with the right, has to pass back and forth because Kali refrains to wash
his hands before his  father,  Kalibab,  has done so,  but  then the person who sits  next to
Kalibab is junior to Kali and insists that Kali should wash hands before them, and so on.
Now food is served. As household head, Kalibab has the right to dom, i.e. to take the first
bite, and so everyone waits respectfully until he has blessed the food and started eating. At
the same time, it is understood that by having invited them and feeding them abundantly,
Kalibab is showing his guests respect. During the funeral, they repay in kind: when the
group dances and Kalibab steps into its centre brandishing a spear, everyone makes a great
deal of noise and beats their chests with their fists, and this is great bonshmi for Kalibab.
In  sum,  this  scene  contains  various  expressions  of  respect,  from  greeting  and
offering seats, to deferring to others in matters like washing hands or starting to eat, to
reverential forms of dancing. All of this could also have been observed by looking at any
other instance of commensality. Whenever they unite for commensality people are drawn
into this type of respectful interactions.
Commensality, then, does not only contribute to respect in the two senses discussed
above. It does not only push people to avoid conflicts and restore harmony where it has been
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disturbed;  nor  does  it  only  create  relations  in  which  there  are  expectations  of  respect.
Commensality is also linked to respect in the very immediate sense that it provides the most
important context in social life where respectful interactions take place. Commensality helps
to realize respect. Alongside kinship, with which it is interwoven, commensality is at the
heart of the kind of social life that karta affords. 
      
On ‘Respect’ 
So far I have used ‘respect’ as a translation for ‘bonshmi’ without having explaining this
choice yet. Now that we have gained an ethnographic sense of what bonshmi means in Dell,
I would like to spell out why ‘respect’ is an adequate translation and what sort of respect
specifically we are dealing with here.
To begin with, let me explain why I speak of ‘respect’ rather than ‘honour’. Honour
would be an appropriate translation if  used in the active sense of ‘to honour someone’.
However, in the anthropological literature, ‘honour’ mostly appears in the sense of ‘personal
honour’ (cf. Stewart 1994). As such, honour is about moral worthiness – about particular
qualities of a person’s character or conduct, such as male virility and female modesty in the
Mediterranean  (Peristiany  1974),  generosity,  honesty  and  independence  among  Bedouin
(Abu-Lughod 1986: 87) or military prowess in 19th century Yorubaland (Iliffe 2005: 67).
Bonshmi, however, has nothing to do with personal qualities. Linguistically, it is nothing
that one can ‘have’ or ‘lose’ or ‘defend’. Rather,  bonshmi is something that is  done – that
one receives from others or shows to them. 
To  make  ‘respect’ work  as  a  translation  for  ‘bonshmi’ it  is  important  to  note
philosophers’ distinction between respect as attitude and as action (Dillon 2016). Bonshmi
corresponds to the latter form: it is ‘respect expressed in action’. People may feel respect for
someone, but it is only when this attitude manifests in tangible actions that one can speak of
‘bonshmi’. 
A second point concerns the bases on which people can receive bonshmi. Two bases
should be distinguished. (1)  Seniority. Speaking with philosopher Stephen Darwall (1977,
2009: 120f.), the respect people obtain on the basis of seniority is ‘recognition respect’. The
bonshmi shown to, say, an uncle or an older sister is independent of their merit (and thus
does not constitute ‘appraisal respect’, cf. ibid.).  It is granted simply due to recognizing
them as a particular kind of person. One may further note that this recognition respect is
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directional  not  mutual:  it is only juniors who ‘respect’ seniors, whereas seniors ‘bless’ or
‘help’ juniors but do not ‘respect’ them (cf. Dulam 2006: 30 for similar observations from
Mongolia). In the next chapter we will see that Dell Evangelicalism promotes a mutual form
of recognition respect, where everyone is entitled to respect independent of their rank. (2)
Exchange.  Next  to  having  rights  to  juniors’ respect,  people  can  also  work  to  receive
bonshmi  in  a  logic  of  exchange  –  giving  respect  to  be  respected  in  turn.  This  is  what
happens where people invite each other reciprocally to feasts or everyday commensality. It
is also what we saw in the case of funerals, where an affine feeds a group of followers, who
reciprocate by exalting him when he dances in their midst. 
1.3 The Quest for Respect and the Problem of Suffering
The previous section has given us a sense of why people might want to describe  karta as
‘good  for  respect’:  it  is  a  cultural  formation  in  which  respect  is  a  key  value,  and  to
participate in  karta affords rich opportunities to realize respect. But for all the respect it
affords, karta has continuously lost followers since the 1990s. A definite part of the ‘decline
of  respect’,  the  withdrawal  of  two  thirds  of  the  population  from  karta requires  an
explanation. If karta is good for respect, and if respect is something people value, then why
did they leave karta or fail to return to it? 
When I asked Evangelicals and Orthodox Christians in Dell why they had left karta,
their answers primarily turned around the problem of  gomma: In most cases people said
they had converted in response to suffering illness, the death of children or livestock, or
some other calamity – problems they explained as the result of having disrespected a senior
and thus having incurred their gomma. But apart from giving personal histories of suffering,
many people also suggested in more general terms that ‘there’s a lot of  gomma in  karta’
(karta gir  gomma bedebeda). I encountered a pervasive sense of  karta being ‘dangerous’
(darlaisaf) or ‘problematic’ (astshagari). Importantly, this sense was also shared by those
who still participated in karta.  Karta, in other words, though being described as ‘good for
respect’ was also seen to pose real obstacles when it came to accessing blessings and leading
flourishing lives. 
To understand people’s withdrawal from  karta, then, we need to understand their
sense of karta being ripe with gomma. To get at this, I analysed numerous past and present-
day  gomma cases  with  regard  to  the  question  what  exactly  people  thought  had  caused
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gomma in them. Below, I present one of these cases, which illustrates my two main findings.
First, I found that in some cases people had been hit by gomma without having committed
any conscious act of disrespect. I suggest that this can lead to a sense of  karta  posing an
uncontrollable danger. Second, in many cases people did act disrespectfully before being hit
by  gomma.  Crucially,  however,  they  only  acted that  way after  seniors  had  aggressively
pushed them to show more respect. This kind of experience, I argue, gives people the sense
that even if  they try hard to be respectful,  it  is  difficult  to live up to seniors’ ceaseless
demands for respect – and easy to fall victim to their anger. 
Kalinda’s Ordeal
During my time in Dell, I spent many an evening by the fire in Kalinda’s hut, chatting with
her as she went about roasting coffee and preparing dinner. An exceedingly kind and warm-
hearted  woman,  Kalinda  was  in  her  late  50s  and had four  adult  sons  and one teenage
daughter. She first told me about what I later understood was the central story of her life
when, one evening, our conversation came around to the topic of sons-in-law. With much
regret, Kalinda noted that she did not have a son-in-law yet and from there went on – by
way of explanation – to narrate her ordeal. But she also came back to this story on other
occasions; and while I have retained the structure of her original account, I have added some
details and clarifications obtained during those later conversations. 
Kalinda married Kalibab in 1974. In the following years, she made some money by
distilling arake and selling it at the market in Bako. When she had saved enough money, she
asked Kalibab to buy her a cow. This cow gave birth to several calves. Somewhere in the
mid-1980s, both this cow and her first daughter (which had grown up by that point) calved
in the same week. Since karta prohibited women from milking, Kalibab milked the cows.
He collected the milk in two separate calabashes. After two weeks, the calabashes had filled
up, and Kalibab took them to Woissabab, who was the head of Amen lineage at that time. As
toidi often do, Woissabab made Kalibab wait for a couple of days. But finally he called
together the Amen men, and, after he had blessed the milk, they drank it together. Kalibab
then  started  milking  Kalinda’s  cows  again,  and  again  he  collected  their  milk  in  two
calabashes. In those days it was common to seek not only the  toidi’s blessing, but to also
perform a mora kxaid. This meant inviting elders from the neighbourhood, who would bless
the cow in return. By this point, Kalinda was getting somewhat anxious to finally drink
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some of her cows’ milk; she also wanted to make butter and sell it in the market. She did
agree, however, that it would be good to get the neighbours’ blessing – though she also
asked Kalibab to only present one of the two calabashes to them, so that she could use the
milk from the other to make butter once the elders had provided their blessing. 
Then came the fateful day. Kalinda had been out in the fields weeding. When she
returned in the afternoon, she heard voices from Kalibab’s hut and went in to say hello.
Entering the hut, she saw that Kalibab had not heeded her request, but had presented both of
the  calabashes  to  the  elders.  In  a  sudden  rush  of  anger,  Kalinda  grabbed  one  of  the
calabashes and ran outside. She hid herself in the arxemi grove, fearing that Kalibab would
come after her to beat her. But Kalibab never came. 
Some two or three months later, Kalinda’s first cow suddenly died. Assuming that
Kalibab’s  anger  was  responsible,  Kalinda  asked  him if  he  had  ‘become sad’ about  the
episode with the milk. He denied that he had. But then the second cow died, and soon after
three calves. This really was a massive loss for Kalinda, and seeing her cattle perish she
made attempts to turn things around. Twice she sent mediators to Kalibab to enquire if he
had  not  after  all  ‘become  sad’,  and  to  entreat  him  to  state  how  she  might  apologize.
Moreover, the intestines of the dead cows were read by a man from the neighbourhood. As
Kalinda recalls, the dead cows, through their intestines – and through the man’s mouth –
spoke thus: ‘We are like his [Kalibab’s] granaries. But he curses us, so we go away.’ (This
makes reference to the then prevalent understanding that husbands are the real owners of
their wives’ property. The notion of granary indicates cattle as both a store of wealth and a
source of food.) Despite all this, Kalibab continued to claim that he had nothing to do with
Kalinda’s troubles. He was soon to be given the lie.
In 1991, Mutsi, Kalinda’s only daughter, who was around 13 years old at the time,
fell  ill  and died after a couple of weeks. At her funeral,  a sheep was sacrificed and the
intestines read. Speaking through the intestines, Mutsi announced that ‘father’s shorts will
be on mother’s shoulders.’ This must be understood against the background that in  karta
funerals close kin sometimes hold up clothes of the dead person while they dance. In other
words, Mutsi foretold Kalibab’s death. It was only at this point that Kalibab admitted to
having indeed ‘become sad’ about the episode with the milk. Soon after, a ritual to ‘cool
down’ his anger was carried out. 
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Asked about  these events,  Kalibab largely confirmed what  Kalinda had told me,
adding further details and explaining his own position. It was true, he said, that Kalinda had
entreated him to only present one calabash to the neighbourhood elders. But then again it
was not as if the elders were going to drink all of the milk. No, they would taste a little from
each calabash, and then they would say ‘that’s enough for us. They have called us, they have
shown us  bonshmi. May their cows give birth, may there be a lot of milk in their house.’
That was why he did not followed Kalinda’s request. Now, when Kalinda snatched away
one of the calabashes, Kalibab recalled, the elders had exclaimed, ‘Oy! What’s that?! She
makes us appear as if we had come to gulp down her milk (wom joymjoymde). Bad, that’s
very bad!’ In that moment, Kalibab had raised his eyes to the upper part of his hut’s centre
post,  and  had  muttered  a  curse:  ‘May  her  bones  [may  she]  remain,  but  may  all  her
possessions perish!’ If he had subsequently kept quiet about his curse – rather than admit to
it and give Kalinda the chance to apologize – it was because he had ‘wanted her to see’.
‘There was not a thing in her hands when she came from her relatives’, Kalibab explained,
making reference to Kalinda’s lack of possessions when marrying him. ‘What she got, she
got in my house, she got from my land.’ 
When Mutsi died, Kalibab came by, and the ritual to cool down his anger did lead
Kalinda’s livestock to multiply again, she explained. Yet, her ordeal was not over yet. For in
the following years, she suffered four miscarriages. ‘At that time, I was running from one
diviner to the next’ Kalinda recalled her quest for healing. ‘They asked for many things –
chickens,  money,  arake.’ For  a  long  time  it  remained  unclear  what  was  causing  her
suffering. But finally it was established that this time her troubles were coming from her
dead father. Years earlier, in a moment of mortal threat, she had implored his spirit for help.
But then she had forgotten about it and had failed to make an offering to thank him for
having protected her. So she took a sheep to the head of her father’s lineage. The sheep was
sacrificed,  and her  father  spoke through the intestines that  he was satisfied and that  he
would send her coolness. But then Kalinda had a fifth miscarriage. This time she went to see
Girano,  the  most  powerful  and expensive  of  diviners.  Girano would  hold  well-attended
seances at his house. Sitting behind a red curtain he would announce that there was a person
in  the  room  who  had,  say,  stolen  or  committed  adultery  or  polluted  a  sacred  stream.
Thereupon, or so it was hoped, some kind of force would ‘throw down’ (jax) to the floor the
one who was guilty of the named transgression. This allowed them to become conscious of
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their transgression and to subsequently go make up for it so as to be healed. But nothing
ever threw down Kalinda. 
It was around this time that Evangelicalism became locally known as a source of
healing. And so one day, after yet another inconclusive seance at Girano’s, Kalinda decided
that she might as well try out this new religion. Before she went off to ‘give her hand’, she
told her son Esias where she hid her money and to use that money for her funeral, should
she not survive. But survive she did, and soon after she gave birth to a healthy daughter.
Since that time, Kalinda has been amain.
Analysis
Kalinda left karta after a long period of suffering. We can summarize her understanding of
the reasons of this suffering as follows: The decimation of her cattle and the death of her
daughter resulted from her husband’s gomma, whereas her miscarriages – at least the first
four of them – resulted from her (dead) father’s  gomma. (She was uncertain what  gomma
stood behind the fifth miscarriage and explained that she never found out because it was
‘simply done away with’ [gurri negshaxe] by conversion to Evangelicalism.) On Kalinda’s
account, she incurred her husband’s gomma by snatching away the calabash. Given what I
have said about the importance of hosting and commensality, it will not come as a surprise
that to forcefully take away food from guests is  an extremely disrespectful act by local
standards. But not only had she disrespected the guests and by doing so had cast a bad light
on their host. She had also disrespected Kalibab in a very immediate sense. To snatch away
the calabash was like questioning his position as household head and owner of all things
‘under his foot’. It insinuated that she was ‘above’ her husband, but since in reality she was
not,  this  belittled  him.  Her  father’s  gomma,  in  turn,  hit  Kalinda  because  she  failed  to
reciprocate his protection. This is about disrespect, too. The protection a dead father extends
over his daughter is the same as a blessing, but blessings, as we know, are exchanged for
respect. So to not answer a blessing is an act of disrespect. In both cases, then, Kalinda
attributes her suffering to disrespecting her seniors. 
To analyse Kalinda’s case in more detail, I now propose to ask what led to her acts of
disrespect.  I  raise  this  question  for  the  cases  of  her  father’s  and  Kalibab’s  gomma
respectively.  Both of  these analyses  will  lead on to  more general  insights  on why Dell
people conceive of karta as ‘dangerous’. 
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(1) If we begin with Kalinda’s father’s gomma, it should be clear that there is no way
to say that Kalinda consciously refused to thank him for his assistance, i.e. that hers was a
deliberate act of disrespect. Indeed, in her own understanding it was precisely her lack of
consciousness which complicated her quest for healing. As she recounted to me, several
diviners had told her that there was surely something she had ‘forgotten’ (wal), urging her to
try to remember. But hard as she tried, she just could not think of what she might have done
wrong. It was only after a long time that it finally struck her that she had once implored her
father while being chocked by her co-wife in a fight. A diviner then confirmed that this must
have caused  gomma because while her father had evidently saved her, she had not repaid
him. Here, then, it is only in retrospect, that a certain act – or, rather, omission to act – is
identified as an act of disrespect.
This kind of retrospective ‘discovery’ of disrespect was apparent in several cases of
gomma that I learnt about. Typically it occurred where someone had been suffering from
illness or other afflictions for a long time. Why this should be so is easy to understand. As
we know, in this system the precondition for healing is to discover one’s wrongdoing and to
seek forgiveness for it. When faced with suffering, people first think through their recent
interactions.  If  they  realize  that  a  senior  may  have  felt  disrespected,  they  will  make
enquiries  as to whether  that was indeed the case and, if  so,  how they might apologize.
However, if suffering does not subside (think of chronic illness, for instance), there comes a
point  where  one  has  apologized  to  everyone  who  could  possibly  have  caused  one’s
problems.  At this  point,  the  quest  for  healing  necessarily  turns  into  a  quest  to  uncover
transgressions  that  one  committed  without  any  awareness,  especially  transgressions
committed against entities other than living humans. Kalinda’s case offers one example,
with her dead father being evoked as the entity that felt disrespected. In another case, the
explanation of a man’s protracted illness was even more arcane: A diviner suggested that the
illness  was due to  the man once having had sexual  intercourse  in  a  hut  located  near  a
granary in which there happened to be stored a spear that many years ago had been used by
someone to kill several people in a particular forest further up in the mountains. In this case
the gomma was thought to proceed from the (deceased) owner of that spear. Finally, there
were also cases where someone’s suffering was explained as the result not of their own
transgressions but of the transgression of one of their ancestors. 
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I argue that these kinds of explanations are one source of people’s sense of  karta
being ‘dangerous’. Such gomma cases – whether personally experienced or witnessed – lead
to a sense that one is not fully in control of one’s well-being. One may try to be respectful at
all times, and yet it is possible that one incurs gomma, for instance by violating a rule one
was not even aware existed, or by being harmed due to the transgressions of someone who
has been long dead.
(2)  If  in  her  father’s  case Kalinda’s  act  of  disrespect  occurred  unconsciously,  in
Kalibab’s  case  she  was  aware  from  the  beginning  that  she  had  acted  with  extreme
disrespect.  The  act  of  snatching  away  food  from  guests  was  too  extraordinary  to  go
unnoticed. Her consciousness of this is indicated by her escape into in the arxemi grove; it
also shows when, upon her  first  cow’s  death,  she immediately suspected that  Kalibab’s
anger was behind this.
So why did Kalinda snatch away the calabash? Let us begin by noting that her act
cannot be read as an expression of a general rejection of the cultural system she inhabited at
that time. She certainly did not question the need to present new milk to the lineage head. To
this day, everyone in Dell, whether alem, amain or Orthodox Christians firmly subscribes to
the notion that the ‘first’ (birra) of things (milk, crops, lambs etc.) needs to be offered up,
whether to the lineage head or the Christian God. Neither did Kalinda disagree that it would
be good to get further blessings by inviting the neighbours, though she also asked Kalibab to
offer only one calabash to them. It was when Kalibab blithely ignored this request, that
Kalinda ‘went crazy’ (bersaxe),  as she once put it.15 Seeing the two calabashes,  we can
assume, she experienced an acute sense of unfairness, a sense that Kalibab had gone too far. 
To explain Kalinda’s act, then, the real issue is to explain Kalibab’s behaviour. Why
did he simply pass over her request and present both calabashes? Two motives appear as
likely. Firstly, by presenting both of the calabashes to the neighbourhood elders, Kalibab
showed them greater respect than if he had only offered them one. Not only would this
generosity have contributed to his good name (nami). It would also have meant for him to
eventually be treated with lavish hospitality in return. In other words, Kalibab here used
Kalinda’s milk as part of his own project to build relations in which respect is exchanged
reciprocally.  A second conceivable motive is  that  Kalibab wanted to  put  Kalinda in  her
15 To say that one ‘went crazy’ is an expression people in Dell use to deflect responsibility; it suggests that
one acted impulsively, in the heat of the moment, rather than deliberately. At the same time, this phrasing
acknowledges that one’s act was wrong. At least in her retrospective rendering of the case, then, Kalinda
does not blame Kalibab. It was her who did wrong not him. 
57
place. Not budging an inch in  karta is part of the work that goes into reproducing social
hierarchy and thus securing respect. It is by showing juniors that one does not have to heed
their  requests  that  one  reminds  them of  who is  ‘above’ and who is  ‘below’.  While  we
cannot, of course, be entirely sure that this motive was at play when Kalibab presented the
two calabashes, it is clearly at play when he later denied to have cursed Kalinda. As he
himself explains, by making it impossible for Kalinda to seek his forgiveness – and to thus
overcome her affliction – he ‘wanted her to see’. That is, he wanted to teach her a lesson
about  her  fundamental  dependence  on  him,  to  make  her  see  with  painful  clarity  the
consequences of disrespect.
Kalibab’s refusal to forgive as much as his decision to use the whole of Kalinda’s
milk despite knowing that this would make her unhappy is far from idiosyncratic. Rather, it
conforms to a pervasive cultural logic by which people in  karta seek to take or withhold
things from juniors in order to further their own project of getting respect. At the same time,
it is not uncommon that this kind of behaviour eventually leads juniors to react defiantly –
and  that  such  acts  of  defiance  are  later,  in  moments  of  suffering,  identified  as  having
triggered  gomma.  This  kind  of  dynamic  was apparent  in  several  of  the  gomma cases  I
analysed. It is instructive to consider a further example, before moving on to a more general
discussion. 
In the late-1980s, Kalibab himself suffered from gomma, namely from the gomma of
his lineage head Woissabab, which manifested in a broken leg. Woissabab’s gomma hit him
because Kalibab had refused to attend a  dabba work party convened by Woissabab. The
reason  for  Kalibab’s  refusal  was  this:  While  he  owned  four  oxen,  his  older  brother
Woissabab, who was more interested in drink and dance than in work, had failed to acquire
even a single one. Woissabab therefore heavily relied on Kalibab’s oxen to plough his own
fields. In the months leading up to Kalibab’s refusal, Woissabab had called him twice to
attend a work party and bring along his oxen. But when Kalibab convened a work party of
his  own,  Woissabab  did  not  show  up  –  despite  dabba  labour  services  usually  being
exchanged reciprocally. A little later, Woissabab called Kalibab for yet another dabba. But
this time Kalibab said he was busy and could not come. Soon after, he broke his leg. The
elders who dealt with the case attributed his injury to his act of disrespect toward his lineage
head. Did Woissabab not come running to carry our rituals and offer blessings whenever
Kalibab called him? And was it then not Kalibab’s duty to work for him in return? The logic
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of the situation demanded that Kalibab agree with the elders’ analysis; and anxious for his
leg to heal, he apologized to Woissabab and promised to not fail him again. But, as Kalibab
explained  to  me  in  retrospect,  it  was  not  actually  true  that  Woissabab  ‘came  running’
whenever Kalibab needed his ritual assistance. On the contrary, Woissabab often pretended
to be busy, or said it was a bad day for carrying out a ritual or simply failed to show up
without any explanation. And this was part of why Kalibab was upset with him and had
refused to attend his work party. 
Two things came together, then, to spark Kalibab’s act of defiance. First, Woissabab
was constantly trying to take from Kalibab without giving anything in return. This in itself
would have been enough to anger Kalibab since, as I have mentioned, dabba labour services
are usually exchanged reciprocally.  The elders’ suggestion that Woissabab was under no
obligation to work for Kalibab because he already reciprocated through his ritual work,
appears  as  an  ad  hoc  explanation  for  Kalibab’s  broken  leg  rather  than  as  an  adequate
rendering of established understandings of dabba exchange. It may be that Woissabab had
some general sense that he had more of a right to Kalibab’s labour than vice versa. But it is
also extremely likely that Woissabab was quite aware that to constantly rely on Kalibab’s
labour without reciprocating in kind was to rather push things. However, it is precisely this
kind of pushing which is typical of seniors in Dell. It is about trying to see how far the other
will  go  along  –  about  testing  the  other’s  limits  of  obedience  while,  at  the  same time,
extracting  things  from  them,  be  that  milk,  labour  power  or  something  else.  Second,
Woissabab also angered Kalibab by failing to turn up when asked to carry out rituals. This is
part of the logic of withholding things – especially blessings – from those who are in need
of them. The point of this sort of withholding is to make the other ‘beg’ (miks) for a while
before  one  eventually  gives  in.  Begging  is  considered  a  form  of  bonshmi,  and  so
withholding things is a strategy to get respect. This strategy is often employed by lineage
heads, but it also has a much wider currency in karta. 
In the karta form of conflict resolution, for instance, it is common for the wronged
party to initially show themselves unforgiving, utterly opposed to the idea that the wrong
they have suffered could ever be redeemed. Then the offender, or the mediator acting on
their behalf, needs to ‘beg’. This is done through displays of extreme humility – prostrating,
clutching the other’s knees, using extravagant honorifics, putting stones and grass on one’s
head and other forms of self-abasement. Eventually, the victim will come by a little, though
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this means nothing more than that they start making outrageous claims for compensation.
These  claims  get  reduced  through  further  ‘begging’;  often,  indeed,  they  are  eventually
dropped altogether – the debt having been settled in the currency of respect. 
Withholding something to ‘make others beg’ is also a fixed part of the karta way of
marrying. At various points in the marriage process, the wife-givers vehemently refuse – to
let  the girl  go,  to  agree to  talk about  bridewealth,  to  accept  the amount of  bridewealth
offered – and their refusal is only overcome through extensive begging. Likewise, when a
man seeks to establish fictive kinship with a woman, she will – despite desiring the relation,
too – repeatedly refuse even hearing the mediators he has sent her. He then has to send them
again and again. Not least for the expenses the man thus incurs this is an expression of
respect, which the woman will ultimately answer by consenting. More examples could be
given, but the point should have become clear. Begging is considered a form of respect, and
to get respect people exploit situations in which they possess what others are in need by
making them beg for it. 
Now, it is important to understand that this is a culturally established mode of acting.
And it would be mistaken to think that those who are put into the position of having to beg
do so only grudgingly. On the contrary, up to a certain point, people value begging others, as
is evident from the fact that it is often done with relish and visible enjoyment. This is so not
only for the instrumental reason that through begging they can obtain what they need –
healing, blessings, wives, forgiveness instead of compensation claims, and so on. Treating
others with respect, begging included, is also valued in itself because it constitutes you as a
good person. 
Yet, there are limits to this, and that is why I have said ‘up to a certain point’. There
comes a moment when things tip over, when juniors stop going along because they feel that
their senior has gone too far. What has been generative of respect up to this point – the
practice of withholding or making demands – thereafter generates disrespect. When Kalibab
makes demands on Kalinda’s cows’ milk and on her patience, he conceives of her yielding
to these demands as an expression of respect. But he takes his demands to the point where
Kalinda feels treated unfairly, and this leads her to be disrespectful to him. Similarly, when
Woissabab postpones rituals in order to get his junior kin to beg him, this is to a certain
point productive of respect, but can, as in Kalibab’s case, eventually lead to defiance. 
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So  how  does  all  this  matter  for  understanding  people’s  sense  of  karta being
‘dangerous’? Three points can be made. Firstly, when it is blessings that are being withheld,
for instance when a lineage head refuses to carry out rituals, or when someone refuses to
grant forgiveness to allow another person to be healed, then there is a very immediate sense
of a difficulty to obtain blessings. Secondly, I have suggested that seniors’ tendency to push
juniors regularly creates tensions. Such tensions however are seen by Dell people as the
source of all suffering. And it is due to seeing how seniors’ relentless quest to get respect
from juniors leads to tensions that people come to perceive  karta as fraught with danger.
Thirdly, one has to assume that there are often enough cases where people, when having the
reasons of their suffering diagnosed, are pointed to acts which they carried out in situations
where they felt that a senior was acting unfairly. The fact that it is nonetheless they who is
ill, leads to a sense that it is very hard to do right in this system. If we add to this the earlier
insight concerning explanations for illness that point to acts one was unconscious of, there
emerges a sense of karta as a system in which it is hard not to be hit by gomma. As we will
see  in  the  following  chapter,  it  was  this  general  sense  of  danger  combined  with  acute
experiences of suffering that led many people to leave karta and become amain.
1.4 Conclusion
This  chapter  has  examined  karta,  the  cultural  formation  which  Dell  people  collectively
inhabited until the 1990s and which has since then lost many participants, first and primarily
to Evangelicalism, more recently also to Orthodoxy. The chapter has offered an account of
the  role  that  respect  plays  in  karta,  arguing  that  bonshmi is  the  key  objective  value
structuring  ideas,  practices  and  institutions  in  this  cultural  formation.  We  saw  how  an
ideology of social hierarchy is based on the idea that seniors have the power to bless or
curse juniors, and how juniors need to show respect to obtain blessings and to thus be well.
We also saw how the institutions that constitute karta feature a great deal of commensality
and how commensality mediates respect – by drawing people into respectful interactions,
but also by producing social harmony, and by creating the very relations in which respect
can be cultivated. Closely connected to this latter point, we also saw the high value placed
on kinship and the various institutions through which people are able to create it. As with
commensality, kinship’s primary value is perceived to be its affordance of respect. In the
second part of the chapter, I turned to the question why, if karta is good for respect, so many
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people  stopped  participating  in  it.  Here  we  learnt  that  gomma –  suffering  caused  by
disrespecting a senior – was the key reason for most people to leave karta. Starting from an
in-depth discussion of one case, I sought to discern reasons for people’s sense that karta is
‘dangerous’, meaning: prone to usher in gomma. I argued that it is the relentless striving for
respect which is invited by this system that creates the tensions which people in Dell regard
as the source of all  suffering.  In the next  chapter we will  see that  one of the principle
attractions of Evangelicalism has been its promise to afford a world with less gomma. But
we will also see how the realization of such a world has come at the cost of respect. 
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Chapter 2. In Search of Blessings: Evangelicalism, Flourishing and the 
Question of Respect
2.1 Introduction 
In 1984, Baza had been ill for years. His body was covered in ugly wounds, and so repulsive
was their stench that even his closest kin avoided coming near him. ‘There were nothing but
flies buzzing around me!’ Baza recalled during an interview in 2016. ‘I couldn’t work. I was
just at home. My people wouldn’t eat with me. I lay in one part of the hut, and they ate in
the other.’ He had seen many diviners, some as far as Maale, to find out what gomma was
responsible  for  his  suffering.  But  while  he  faithfully  carried  out  the  measures  they
prescribed, his health did not improve. Apparently the diviners were unable to discern the
true cause of his illness. It therefore hardly surprised Baza that Western medicine did not
work either. He had been to the hospital in Jinka several times and had received treatment
for tuberculosis. ‘They gave me more than 60 injections’, he recalled incredulously (and
perhaps with some exaggeration), ‘but the medicine didn’t work… And how should it have,
if we hadn’t discovered the gomma?’ 
It was the tip of a neighbour that finally saved Baza. Did he not know about the miks
eja (‘prayer house’) in Grashangama, his neighbour asked him, making reference to a small
evangelical church that for some time had been established in a place one hour away. Baza
was hesitant at first. How could he possibly get involved with people who ‘ate together with
manna (lower caste people)’? Was he not a xantsa, a ‘pure’ (nytsu) Aari? And what would
his father, a powerful lineage head, say to this? But eventually Baza agreed and, with his
father’s consent, asked his neighbour to call the Evangelicals. 
‘I agreed that he should call them, and Abba Addayo [the church leader] and some others
came and prayed over me. When they prayed there was shimma (coolness). So I started
attending  their  church.  The  first  time I  went,  I  was  afraid  to  come close  to  anyone
because I still had these stinking wounds. But they told me to sit next to them, and later
we slept under the same blanket.’ 
Before long, Baza’s health improved. He continued attending the church in Grashangama
and was baptized in March 1985. Over the following years, a few other people from Dell
converted, and in 1991 there were nine of them. To avoid the long walk to Grashangama,
they established their own church in an unused hut in Baza’s compound. This marked the
beginning of the rise of Evangelicalism in Dell. While numbers increased only slowly at
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first, conversion picked up in the late 1990s. During the time of my fieldwork in 2016/17,
about 60% of the population of Dell were amain, and numbers keep growing. 
When one starts to enquire into the reasons for this massive growth, one quickly hits
on the issue of  gomma.  As we saw in the last chapter, people in Dell have traditionally
explained suffering as the result of disrespecting seniors. Your failure to show proper respect
makes seniors ‘sad’ (ateri), and this produces gomma – a negative energy, which harms you
or your children or property. The vast majority of people explained that they had converted
in response to experiencing gomma. Especially early converts recalled in a manner similar
to Baza’s that prior to their conversion they had been ill for a long time, and that they had
spent a great deal of time and wealth trying to discover the gomma responsible for this. As
we learnt in the last chapter, to be healed one needs to find out whom one has disrespected
and ask for their forgiveness (negane). But sometimes illness persists, and this means that
there is undiscovered gomma. For such cases, Evangelicalism’s great promise was that by
converting people could be healed without having discovered the gomma: Jesus’s unlimited
forgiveness (negane) would ‘simply clear it away’. In later years, when Evangelicalism had
established itself in Dell, people converted rather more quickly and for afflictions less grave
than the one reported by Baza. Yet, gomma remained the central trigger for conversion, and
this is true to this day. 
Now, the question what causes conversion is different from the question what leads
people to stay with their  new religion.  Significantly,  however,  the issue of  gomma also
emerged as central when I asked people why they had remained  amain after having been
healed. For one thing, they explained that if they reverted to karta (traditional practice), the
gomma they had escaped through conversion would ‘get’ (jed) them again. But people also
highlighted the relative absence of gomma as a more general condition among Evangelicals
– and a highly attractive one at that. ‘There isn’t a lot of gomma in Evangelicalism’ was a
typical statement, the positive correlate of which was the notion that ‘in Evangelicalism,
there’s a lot of blessing’ (amain gir  anʒe bedebeda). By this my interlocutors meant that
they enjoyed good health, that their children grew up well, that their cattle multiplied, that
their crops gave good yields and so on. In their eyes, this condition of flourishing contrasted
markedly with what they had experienced while still participating in karta. As one mid-aged
woman put it, ‘our children used to die like flies, but since Evangelicalism has come to our
land, they no longer die like this.’
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Questions 
Dell people’s engagement with Evangelicalism, the above material suggests, is primarily
driven by a concern to better realize the value of blessings. Faced with difficulties obtaining
blessings  through  karta,  people  converted  to  Evangelicalism;  and  a  sense  that
Evangelicalism  effectively  affords  greater  blessings  is  what  accounts  for  its  lasting
attractiveness. 
Against  this  background,  the  present  chapter  raises  two  sets  of  inter-related
questions. First, what does it take to realize blessings through Evangelicalism? How does
this differ from realizing blessings through karta? What kind of change in practice does this
require? And what accounts for people’s sense that to be amain is to live in a greater state of
blessing?  Second,  what  is  the  effect  on  respect  when  people  realize  blessings  through
Evangelicalism  rather  than  through  karta?  In  the  previous  chapter  we  saw  the  close
connection  that  exists  in  karta between  being  respectful  and  receiving  blessings.  Does
Evangelicalism de-couple blessings  from respect?  Literature on African Christianity  has
repeatedly pointed to ‘breaking’ with kin as a precondition for healing (Meyer 1998: 329),
and  ‘breaking’ would  seem to  involve  some  form of  disrespect.  Moreover,  the  rise  of
Evangelicalism is one of the major changes that took place during the very period in which
people say they saw respect decline. So does Dell Evangelicalism, and its particular way of
realizing blessings, contribute to the ‘decline of respect’ that this thesis seeks to account for?
Before I summarize the answers this chapter provides, I would like to indicate that
the question whether Evangelicalism in Dell contributes to a decline of respect can be seen
as part of a broader anthropological debate, namely whether Christianity is conducive to
‘individualism’. Depending on the ethnographic context – and reflecting the many meanings
of ‘individualism’ (Lukes 1973) – this question has been discussed with different emphases.
In the Melanesian and Amazonian contexts, the debate has primarily centred around the
topic of in/dividual personhood (Robbins 2002, Mosko 2010, Vilaça 2015). In the African
context,  by contrast,  it  has  more strongly focussed  on social  dis/connection,  i.e.  on the
question  to  what  extent  converts  strive  –  and  Christianity  allows  them  –  to  liberate
themselves  from  traditional  obligations  and  dependencies,  and  to  thus  disentangle
themselves from the social web in which they are placed. Some scholars have presented
material supportive of this thesis (Van Dijk 1992, Meyer 1998, Van de Kamp 2011, Van
Wyk 2014). Others, contrarily, have pointed to what Joel Robbins (2009b) has called the
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‘social productivity’ of Christianity (Haynes 2017, Scherz 2014, Jones 2009, Lindhard 2010,
Englund  and  Leach  2000).  Naomi  Haynes,  for  example,  has  shown  that  Copperbelt
Pentecostalism, far from being ‘socially corrosive’ (2017: 6), embeds people into ties of
dependence, and that the possibility to form such ties is one of its key attractions (ibid.: 72).
Against this background, this chapter is also interested in examining ethnographically where
the case of Dell fits into the debate about individualism. 
Arguments
I begin by offering more information on the history of Dell Evangelicalism and on some of
its central doctrines. Here we learn that to secure God’s blessing, Evangelicals need to avoid
sin, and that a key form of sin is causing or experiencing ‘sadness’ (ateri). The quest for
blessings, it turns out, is above all a quest to avoid sadness, and the remainder of the chapter
examines how this affects respect. Section 2 argues that the concern with avoiding sadness
comes with a re-definition (or ‘trans-valuation’ [Laidlaw 2011]) of what constitutes proper
respect.  Respecting seniors remains important,  since seniors get sad if  disrespected.  But
making juniors sad is sinful, too, and to avoid this, seniors are asked to be humble and to not
push juniors around. Respect  among Evangelicals  thus becomes something one owes to
everyone and should  seek from no one,  and this  suggests  that  Evangelicalism does  not
contribute to a decline of respect in Dell. Section 3 complicates this impression. I show that
the quest to secure blessings leads to a reduction in commensality since commensality – and
especially feasting – is seen as a ready source of sin. Many Evangelicals struggle with this
reduction in commensality because it  means that there are fewer occasions for being in
respectful interaction with each other. Here, Evangelicalism is felt to undermine respect, and
for some people this is a reason to revert to karta. 
As far as the debate on individualism is concerned, this chapter suggests that Dell
sits mid-way between the above sketched poles. On the one hand, people’s engagement with
Evangelicalism is not properly described as a deliberate project of dis-connection – greater
independence from others is neither a goal for converts, nor is it advertised as desirable by
the church. On the other hand, Christianity does introduce a measure of individualism to
Dell by pushing people to sacrifice relational activities wherever these threaten to lead into
sin. Social disconnection,  I argue,  here enters through the backdoor,  in the wake of the
project to better realize blessings.
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2.2 Situating Dell Evangelicalism
There are three main churches in Dell, located in the southwestern, eastern and northern part
of  the  kebele  (see  Map  2).16 These  churches  all  belong  to  the  Ethiopian Kale  Heywot
Church, which with a membership of around 6.7 million is Ethiopia’s largest evangelical
church.  Two of  these  churches  have around 200 adult  members  each;  one of  them has
around 450 adult members, and this was the church I usually attended. This latter church is
the oldest one in Dell and grew out of the one founded in 1991 by Baza and his eight fellow
believers. As the hut in Baza’s compound became too small, the congregation, in 2002, built
a tin-roofed house next to Baza’s compound. Five years later they bought land and built an
even larger tin-roofed house with a capacity for about 250 worshippers. 
Figure 6. A Sunday Service in Dell’s largest evangelical Church
16 Since 2014, there have also emerged two small Pentecostal churches, Mulu Wengel and Assemblies of God.
They have only very few members so far, and I will therefore not deal with them in this thesis.
67
The fact that the churches in Dell pertain to Kale Heywot reflects the mission history of the
area. As Donald Donham (1999: Chapter 4) has described in detail, Evangelicalism was first
introduced to this part of southern Ethiopia when the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) opened
a mission station at Bako in 1954 (see also Fargher 1996). Throughout the South, SIM co-
operated with native evangelists, who went out to plant churches. These churches, which
became self-governing as soon as the first few locals had been baptized (Haustein 2011: 13),
belonged to Kale Heywot, which had been founded by SIM in 1956 (Donham 1999: 93). 
In  1961,  a  new missionary  couple  arrived  in  Bako.  They were  accompanied  by
Addayo, a young man from Welaita (150km to the northeast), where Evangelicalism had
had a strong foothold since the 1930s. Addayo lived and studied with the missionaries for
some years, before he set out to Grashangama, a place 2.5 hours north of Bako in order to
‘open up’ that area. It was this church that Baza attended during the late 1980s, and it was
from Addayo that Baza and the others first learnt about Evangelicalism. Some years after
setting up their own church, they also sent one of their own to study at a Kale Heywot bible
school in Jinka. Upon his return in 1998, this man became their magabi or pastor. 
A Gospel of Separation?
Founded in 1897 in Toronto, SIM was an interdenominational faith mission with roots in
North American fundamentalism (Donham 1999: 84). Fundamentalism was a reaction to the
rise of liberal theology and emphasized the verbal inerrancy of Scripture as well as the need
for believers to separate themselves from the sinful ways of the world, such as smoking,
drinking or dancing (Marsden 1977: 215). As Donham has argued perceptively, in southern
Ethiopia this anti-modernism ‘switched signs’ and became a radical rejection of ‘tradition’
(1999:  95).  The very renunciation  of  alcohol  amounted  to  a  rejection of  much of  local
practice,  in  which  beer  was  ubiquitous.  But  the  missionaries  and  evangelists,  and  the
churches that developed under their guidance, also preached a more general separation from
all things ‘traditional’, which were denounced as ‘the work of the Devil’ (see also Freeman
2002: 77)
Accordingly, one of the first things Baza and other converts learnt was the need to
‘abandon’ (gar) karta. This meant no longer participating in lineage rituals, not sacrificing
animals, staying away from diviners and other ritual experts, and disobeying taboos, such as
the one that women may not milk cows, or that one has to present new milk to the lineage
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head before  one is  allowed to  consume it  oneself.  They could  safely  discontinue these
practices, Baza and the others were told, because as  amain  they no longer depended on
seniors or ritual experts for their blessings but only on God (sabi, berri). 
The emphasis on ‘separation’ as well  as the idea that one no longer depends on
seniors could seem to indicate that Evangelicalism here promotes individualism, in the form
of disconnection and independence from others. This, indeed, is the track Donham takes in
writing about conversion in 1970s and ´80s Maale. Here, too, people pointed to gomma (or
gome as it is called in the Maale language) as a reason for conversion. However, Donham
suggests that the real driver of conversion in Maale was the attempt of genealogical juniors
to  liberate  themselves  from the  ritual  authority  of  their  seniors,  so  as  to  become more
independent in political and economic terms (1999: 116f.). He makes this argument based
on the observation that it was above all juniors who flocked to Maale churches and that
these people highlighted the benefits of having emerged from under the authority of their
seniors.  As one man quoted by Donham (ibid.:  117) explained,  in  the past  they had to
present their honey to the lineage head, but now they were able to eat it on their own: ‘With
something  as  good  as  this,  why  should  we  kill  ourselves  [attempting  to  keep  the  old
taboos]?’17
Now, I have no reason to doubt the validity of Donham’s analysis for the case of
1980s  Maale.  Indeed,  in  Dell  too,  people  sometimes  speak  about  the  value  of  being
independent of the lineage head and other traditional authorities. It is also true, however,
that this is a rather minor point for them, and that it is not given a lot of weight in local
evangelical  discourse.  On  the  contrary,  if  only  we  go  a  little  further  in  examining  the
doctrine of Dell Evangelicalism, we quickly come upon teachings that complicate the image
of conversion as a matter of gaining independence. This becomes particularly clear when we
ask what it takes for Evangelicals to obtain God’s blessing. To enjoy God’s blessing, the
most important thing is to avoid sin (darilsi). For if you sin, God becomes sad (ateri) and
his wrath (sabite gami)18 leads you to experience illness or other ‘obstacles’ (goha). God
acts in this way because he is a loving father who wishes to give his children the chance to
recognize their sins and to ‘turn around’ (mat) before it is too late. One turns around by
17 Naty (2005) has made a similar argument for the case of conversion in Zomba, a late 1980s Aari place.
18 While amain speak of ‘God’s wrath’ (sabite gami) to describe the source from which suffering emanates,
they continue to speak of ‘gomma’ to describe the suffering caused by sin/transgressions. They will, for
instance, ask ‘what gomma is this?’ when enquiring about someone’s illness, and this means ‘what sin has
lead to this illness?’
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confessing (buts) one’s sins and asking God’s forgiveness (negane), and this allows one to
once again enjoy the health and prospering that is God’s blessing.
Given that blessings are predicated on avoiding sin, what do these Christians mean
by sin? There are, of course, a great many things one could list here, and none of them are
particularly surprising – theft,  adultery, not paying one’s tithes, cursing and so on. What
stands out about Dell, however, is that Evangelicalism here conceptualizes sin primarily in
terms of ‘sadness’ (ateri). This is so in two senses. On the one hand, sin is commonly said to
result  in ‘sadness’. Not only does God become ‘sad’ when people sin. But to say that one
has made someone ‘sad’ is also the common way to say that one has sinned against them.
(Accordingly, confessions made in the context of conflict resolutions always end with the
formula ‘I have made you sad, I have made God sad. May you, may God forgive me.’) On
the other hand, sadness is not only the result of sin. Making others sad is a sin, too – as is
becoming sad oneself. As we will see in the following, sadness is among the sins that Dell
people are most concerned with; it is on the avoidance of sadness that local evangelical
doctrine places its main emphasis. 
The emphasis on the need to avoid sadness in some ways echoes karta. Indeed, one
could be tempted to say that not much has changed at all: In karta it is by making seniors
sad that you come to suffer. In Evangelicalism you suffer for making God sad – and since
God becomes sad when you make other people sad, your suffering still results from making
others sad. Yet, there is a crucial change: In karta it is only by making your seniors sad that
you suffer, whereas in Evangelicalism you suffer for making anyone sad – whether senior or
junior, whether kin, non-kin or stranger. 
All in all then, to obtain blessings, Dell Evangelicals need to avoid making others
sad. Just what this means in practice, of course, remains to be examined. But we can already
note that the concern with avoiding sadness is a hint that the church in Dell is animated by
relational  concerns  rather  than  by  an  emphasis  on  ‘breaking’  with  others.  Greater
independence hardly seems to follow where a person’s flourishing remains predicated on
not  making  others  sad.  The  following  section  substantiates  this  claim.  Through  the
discussion  of  a  conflict  resolution  between  affines,  I  bring  out  normative  evangelical
understandings of proper respect and show how the concern with avoiding sadness grounds
an ethics of humility and mutual respect. 
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2.3 ‘Making Yourself Heavy Isn’t Respectful’ – Respect Redefined
‘I tell you, this guy is difficult! He eats earth, he doesn’t listen to anyone!’ It was a morning
in June 2017. Heavy rain had soaked the land during the night, but now a fresh breeze was
driving away the clouds and the green, undulating hills and the ochre mountains bordering
them on the western horizon stood out sharply as if viewed through a magnifying glass. As
we skidded down muddy paths, descending from Dell in the direction of Gob, Johannis told
us about his father-in-law, Solomon, toward whose house we were headed. Next to Johannis
(and myself), there was his father Berobab, who like his son had been  amain for several
years,  and Abraham, a man in his  mid-40s,  who had long served the church in various
positions.  About  two  years  earlier,  Johannis  had  married  Solomon’s  first  daughter,
Salamnesh. Failing to get pregnant at first, Salamnesh had recently given birth to a healthy
daughter, but had had to get caesarean section at the hospital in Jinka. Her tardy pregnancy
and the need for surgery suggested that something was wrong. Hence, Johannis had called
on Abraham some days earlier and asked him to accompany him and his father to Solomon’s
house,  so  that  they  and  their  affine  could  ‘take  confession  together’ (kikin  nisa  tey).
Solomon was an unruly character, Johannis explained, and this was why he had asked the
help of Abraham, who was known as a skilful mediator. 
Solomon received us in a neat little yard in front of his house, and after a bit of
small-talk,  Abraham  calmly  explained  the  purpose  of  our  coming.  He  summarized
Salamnesh’s pregnancy and birth related problems and concluded that, ‘maybe there’s some
small thing of sadness (ateraterdinda rej), maybe Gash  [respectful address] Solomon has
become sad or there has been some sadness in the house of Berobab… So you should speak
to us from your stomach, truly speak from your stomach.’
Berobab rose to speak first.  He announced that there were two issues which had
made him sad. First, when they had jointly visited Salamnesh at the hospital, Solomon had
insinuated that Berobab and Johannis were keen to eat the food provided by the hospital for
Salamnesh. ‘He made us look as if we [were so poor we] didn’t have any food at home!’
Second, Berobab complained that, returning from the hospital in the evening, Solomon had
not invited them to sleep over, although his house lay half-way between Gob and Dell. To
these complaints Johannis added a third one. Some weeks earlier he had met Solomon in the
market and they had greeted by shaking hands and touching shoulders. Dell people associate
this greeting with Northern Ethiopians, and consider it more egalitarian than customary Aari
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greetings,  like  kissing  someone’s  knee  or  bowing.  In  this  case,  however,  Solomon had
slightly pushed down his shoulder, Johannis reported, so that Solomon’s shoulder touched
his own shoulder from above. ‘He belittled me, and this really made me veeery sad’, he
concluded, dramatically lengthening the ‘very’ to reveal the full extent of his sadness. 
Quite unlike the unruly character that he was supposed to be, Solomon had listened
quietly and now calmly responded to the allegations. All he had suggested at the hospital, he
explained, was that Johannis and Berobab buy some extra food for Salamnesh, since the
hospital food was of poor quality. On the way home, in turn, he had not abandoned his
affines. Rather, the two had entered their relative’s house in Gob; and since it was getting
dark, Solomon assumed they would sleep there and had hastened home because the area
around Gob was dangerous at night. Concerning the shoulder-issue, he said he could not
remember it in detail but in any case had not had the intention to belittle Johannis. 
When Solomon had ended, Abraham rose to speak. He said that from what he had
heard, Solomon had not done anything wrong. He had done well to think of Salamnesh’s
health; and it seemed that Johannis and Berobab had abandoned him rather than the other
way round. Finally, and turning to Johannis, Abraham asserted: 
‘Solomon is your wife's father. But your wife's father is like your own father. It's not
good to greet him in the shoulder-way. You should lower yourself and say, “father-in-law,
how art though [using the plural].” If you greet him as if he were your equal, he won't be
happy. You didn't respect him. It's from your side that there was a lack of bonshmi, not
from Solomon's.’
Abraham then asked Johannis and Berobab to seek forgiveness from Solomon. Afterwards,
Solomon asked us to come inside, where, apologizing that his wife had not prepared coffee,
he offered us some bananas. Before long, we were on our way home. 
Analysis (1): On Respecting Seniors
When I discussed this case with Abraham some days later, I learnt about the background of
the tensions between the affines. Solomon was rather well-to-do and had apparently taken
issue with his daughter marrying into a poor man’s house. Berobab did not have a lot of land
to begin with; but he had also rented out some of it in order to get money. Therefore he
could not give Johannis a good field when Johannis married. Concerned that his daughter
should go hungry, Solomon lent his new son-in-law a field free of charge. But this generous
gesture, as well as Solomon’s initial hesitancy about the marriage, had given Johannis and
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his father the sense that Solomon was looking down on them for their poverty. During the
conflict resolution they sought to prove this by referring to the episode in the hospital and
the shoulder-issue.
Figure 7. After the conflict resolution Solomon and Berobab hug to show their
reconciliation and Abraham speaks a blessing over them.
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Their move to initiate a conflict resolution with Solomon, then, appears as a gambit
to have their sense of humiliation recognized and to get more respect from Solomon. For
had Solomon been found to be in the wrong, his daughter’s troubles would have appeared as
God’s attempt to correct Solomon. And to avoid further harm for his daughter, he would
henceforth have had to treat his affines more respectfully. Salamnesh’s troubles, it seems,
were used by Johannis and his father in an attempt to seek greater respect for themselves. 
Their  attempt  did  not  go  well,  though.  Solomon  convincingly  refuted  their
allegations  and  left  little  doubt  that  he  had  not  demeaned  them  in  any  tangible  way.
Moreover, Johannis’ point about greeting backfired. He had obviously assumed to have a
right to be treated as an equal by his father-in-law. However, Abraham authoritatively tells
him that this is not so, and that, indeed, he ought to show Solomon special respect. 
Abraham’s explanation – ‘your wife’s father is like your own father’ – references a
more general emphasis of the local church on the need for people to respect their seniors:
for children to respect their parents, wives to respect their husbands, younger brothers to
respect older sisters and so on. This was repeatedly stated. One sermon, for instance, centred
around 1 Peter 5:5 (NIV)19 ‘In the same way, you who are younger, submit yourself to your
elders.’ Another  time,  I  accompanied a group of  church  leaders  on their  bi-annual  tour
through people’s houses aimed at seeing ‘how they were walking together in the Lord.’ In
each house, one of the leaders addressed some opening remarks at the assembled household.
These were built around Ephesians 6: 1-4, the first part of which states:  ‘Children, obey
your parents in the Lord, for this is right. “Honour your father and mother” – this is the first
commandment with a promise – “so that it may go well with you and that you may enjoy
long life on the earth.”’ 
‘Honour  your  father  and  mother,’  of  course,  is  among  the  first  principles  of
Christianity. It is therefore not surprising to find it emphasized in Dell. At the same time, the
need to honour or respect one’s parents (the Aari bible uses bonshmi for both ‘honour’ and
‘respect’) has also been recognized in pre-Christian times. Just as Paul tells the Ephesians,
so karta asserts that you need to respect your seniors, ‘so that it may go well with you and
that  you  may  enjoy  long  life  on  the  earth’ (and  not  be  hit  by  gomma).  Against  this
background,  the question arises  as  to  what,  if  any,  is  the difference between  karta and
19 English bible citations follow the New International Version. 
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Evangelicalism in terms of the respect asked of juniors? Does becoming amain put limits to
the respect one is expected to show to seniors? 
Clearly, some such limits are introduced by Evangelicalism. These mainly concern
traditional authorities and the taboos and obligations associated with them. In karta, to not
fetch water from a sacred stream is no less a form of respect than presenting first milk to the
lineage  head  or  providing  labour  services  to  the  king  and  the  ritual  experts.  In  the
evangelical view, however, this is idolatry and hence prohibited. Lineage heads or ritual
experts may take offence at no longer being respected and they may become sad about their
dwindling followership.  But in  this  case the concern to have no other gods before God
overrides that with avoiding sadness and justifies disrespect. 
In many other cases, however, the concern to avoid sadness is given precedence and
respect remains mandated  – even if it rubs uneasily against other evangelical principles.
The following two examples illustrate this. 
My first example relates to Daud, a young amain man who got married. Two days
after the wedding night, I was present when he anxiously held council with his father and
older brothers. During the two previous nights, Daud had been unable to consummate his
marriage, and in Dell, erectile dysfunction is commonly understood as the result of having
disrespected a senior.  On the first  morning after  the wedding night,  there had therefore
already been a round of confessions in the family. But apparently the problem lay outside of
the family. And so on the second morning, the men started to think about who else could
have become sad. In the course of the discussion, Daud’s father pointed out that they had
not sent elders to the bride’s father’s brothers to ask their consent to the marriage. Among
Evangelicals, only the bride’s father is asked for his consent. But according to the  karta
way, elders need to be sent to all of the bride’s patrikin. This has to be done on several
consecutive days, and on each day the elders deferrently clutch the knees of the respective
household head and endure his (ritualized) ranting and raving until he finally consents to the
marriage.  Now, Daud’s bride was from an evangelical  family,  but a  few of her father’s
brothers were alem. When Daud’s older brother, who is a leader in one of his church’s small
groups, heard that no elders had been sent to these alem people, he stated that, ‘If they were
amain it wouldn’t be an issue for them. But since they are alem this can make them sad.’
And he went on to suggest that elders should be sent to them right away. 
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Daud’s nuptial problems, then, are attributed to the (assumed) sadness of his bride’s
alem relatives over not having had their knees clutched and their consent begged. Daud did
not  consider  it  necessary  to  send  elders  to  honour  them  in  this  way  because  Dell
Evangelicalism generally disapproves of this practice as ‘showing  karta’ (kartanem dau).
Clutching the knees of extended relatives is a karta thing and if Evangelicals were to do it,
this would suggest to onlookers that they had not properly ‘abandoned  karta.’ But if the
church rejects  this  practice,  then why should God hinder  Daud from consummating his
marriage? The answer must be that ‘not making sad’ is more important than ‘not showing
karta.’ To paraphrase the thinking that  stands  behind Daud’s brother’s  proposal  to  send
elders to the bride’s alem relatives: If they get sad unless they are begged, then let them be
begged – after all, it is just a customary form of showing respect and does not amount to
idolatry. 
The  primacy  of  avoiding  sadness  is  also  visible  in  my  second  example,  which
concerns  Kalinda.  Some  months  after  Betsinda’s  death  (cf.  Chapter  1),  Kalibab  asked
Kalinda to brew beer for the upcoming  shishi  memorial feast. This was a real source of
anxiety for Kalinda because Evangelicals are prohibited to make alcohol. But she also knew
that Kalibab would give her a hard time if she refused his demand. Kalinda therefore asked
a church leader about the matter. He told her that it would be fine and indeed necessary to
comply with her husband’s demand. For one thing, she had not come up on her own with the
idea to brew beer, and as long as she did not drink any of it, there was no sin. To disrespect
her husband’s wishes, however, would be a sin, and was hence to be avoided. 
I also learnt about several cases where an  alem husband prohibited his wife from
attending church on Sunday and instead asked her to work with him in the fields. Regular
church attendance and abstaining from work on Sundays are very important for amain. But
in these cases the church took the position that the primary duty for these women was to
obey their husbands, and that not coming to church would not be a sin.
As these examples highlight, Evangelicalism in Dell places high value on respecting
seniors.  Limits  to  this  exist  but  are  few.  Beyond the  issue  of  idolatry,  the  principle  of
avoiding sadness dominates other religious concerns. Daud ought to show an otherwise not
sanctioned  form  of  respect  to  his  bride’s  alem relatives.  Kalinda  ought  to  honour  her
husband by obeying his request to brew beer, even if brewing beer is otherwise prohibited to
Evangelicals. In neither of these cases do juniors appear as particularly ‘individualized’ or
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‘independent’ from seniors. Rather, the concern with avoiding sadness reaffirms the need to
respect  those  ‘above’ and  buttresses  the  kind  of  dependencies  Dell  people  have  long
recognized. 
Analysis (2): The Humble Senior
And yet, something fundamental has changed. To see this, let us go back to Johannis and
Solomon. Remember that Johannis complained about having had his shoulder pushed down.
This suggests that Solomon tried to bring some hierarchy to their greeting and that he was
perhaps not entirely happy with being greeted in the ‘shoulder-way’. But the fact that they
greeted by touching shoulders at all is remarkable – at least from a karta viewpoint. After
attending the conflict resolution at Solomon’s, I asked several of my  alem acquaintances
how  they  greeted  their  father-in-law.  To  these  men  it  seemed  inconceivable  to  touch
shoulders. They explained that in the first months after marriage you avoided your  baisi
completely to show your fear (bashi) – jumping helter-skelter into a bush if he happened to
cross your path – and later you kissed his knee. As one young man confided, ‘when [my
father-in-law] looks at me, I get scared. So I cast my eyes down and keep quiet.’ But among
Evangelicals, it was not uncommon for young men to greet their father-in-law by touching
shoulders. Similar shifts were observable in other relations. Mother’s brothers were kissed
on the mouth rather than on the knee. And older siblings addressed younger siblings with
the respectful ‘Amtsha’ (for women) or ‘Gash’ (for men) rather than to call them by their
first  name.  During our conversation about  the case of Johannis  and Solomon,  Abraham
explained this change as follows: 
In  alem they kiss the knee. In  amain we don’t do that. We say ‘we are one in Father
Jesus’. One shouldn’t say, ‘I’m heavy, you are small’. ... If I tell you to kiss my knee, I
make  you  little,  I  make  myself  heavy.  Instead,  we greet  each  other  by  hugging,  by
touching shoulders.  In  alem,  the senior  says,  ‘I’m heavy,  you’re a  nephew,  you’re a
younger brother, you’re a woman. I’m a heavy person, you don’t reach up to my shoulder
so you kiss my knee.’ This is because they like to make themselves heavy…’ / J: But
didn’t you also say that the bible asks us to show bonshmi to our seniors? / Yes, in amain
we don’t say, ‘don’t show respect’. It’s good if you do! ... But making yourself into a
heavy person isn’t respectful (bonshmi daki).
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Abraham here reveals the understanding that it is not only juniors who owe seniors respect
but that seniors also ought to respect juniors. This is implied by his suggestion that to ask a
junior to kiss one’s knee is to belittle them. And it becomes explicit in his final sentence,
where he suggests that it ‘isn’t respectful’ for seniors to make themselves heavy. At the same
time, Abraham also offers a more specific account of what being respectful would mean for
seniors.  In  relation  to  their  juniors,  he  suggests,  people  ought  to  ‘not  make themselves
heavy’. This means that they should not in any way emphasize their superiority; they should
avoid  self-aggrandizement,  especially  where  this  involves  belittling  others.  To  this
corresponds another frequently voiced idea, namely that seniors should ‘make themselves
small’ or ‘lower themselves’ (mata jintem tokso). This is also the expression that the Aari
bible uses to translate ‘humility’, and humility indeed seems like a good gloss for the kind
of respect that Dell Evangelicalism demands of seniors. 
The notion that seniors, too, ought to be respectful, stands in stark contrast to karta
understandings, where seniors ‘bless’ or ‘help’ (kelsh) juniors, but where the term ‘bonshmi’
would never be used for describing what seniors do to juniors. The demand for seniors to be
humble constitutes one of the most significant changes introduced by Christianity to Dell,
and therefore requires a little more analysis. What exactly does it mean for seniors to be
humble, and how does this new demand come to affect people’s practice? In the remainder
of this section I make two points, relating to humility as a virtue and as an institutionalized
value respectively. 
To approach my first point, let me offer a further vignette, which is from the same
day as the conflict resolution.  On that day,  Abraham had told me to come to his house at
dawn, so that we could all walk to Solomon together. I found Abraham somewhat anxious.
His wife Sara had fallen ill during the night and had asked him to take her to the hospital in
the morning. Abraham thought this was unnecessary. Like other dedicated Evangelicals, he
assumed that if you are ill because you have sinned, confession is necessary and sufficient to
be healed. But if God wants to test your faith, as he tested Job’s, no medicine in the world
will cure you. So really, going to the hospital was a waste of money and Sara’s request
showed that she did not fully trust in God. It was a sign of ‘weak faith’ (imnet lanxmi). At
the same time, to not take her to the hospital would make his wife sad, Abraham reasoned.
This was both problematic in itself and would have been especially troublesome on this
particular day. John 9: 31, he explained, left no doubt that you could not serve God if you
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were in a state of sin. Hence, if he made his wife sad, he would not be able to lead the
conflict resolution, as Johannis had asked him to do. This would mean disappointing those
who had requested his help. Not only had he given them his word. The bible also stated that
church leaders ought to be ever ready to drop their own affairs and ‘run’ to assist others.
(And this was something he and others contrasted with the desire of lineage heads to be
begged  lengthily  before  agreeing  to  carry  out  a  ritual.)  Faced  with  these  competing
demands, Abraham finally decided that his oldest son had to miss out on school that day to
take his mother to the hospital. Thus, Abraham avoided making his wife sad and was able to
lead the conflict resolution. 
Abraham,  then,  effectively  put  back his  own interests  behind those  of  his  wife,
paying for what in his understanding was useless – and doing so despite being notoriously
short of money. Moreover, he put back his own concern with being ‘spiritually strong’ and
accepted that his wife decided for the less virtuous option of going to the hospital rather
than  to  trust  in  God.  This  kind  of  ‘putting  back  one’s  own interests’,  I  suggest,  is  an
important part of what it means for seniors to be humble. Especially in the case of domestic
relations, it marks a profound change. Though certainly not devoid of affection, it seems fair
to say that domestic relations in Dell have traditionally been marked by a great deal of
struggle, with men trying to retain as much of the household income for themselves, and
constantly putting their wives in the position of having to beg them (e.g. to give them grain
from the granary or money to buy salt). Indeed, when I later that day told Kalibab and his
wives about the episode with Abraham, Kalibab prided himself with a mischievous smile
that he had never in his life given his wives money to go to the hospital.20 Abraham, by
contrast,  did  not  only  pay  for  his  wife  to  go  to  the  hospital.  More  generally,  he  had
organized their domestic life so that she did not need to beg him. She could take grain from
the granary on her own; and he had also given her a key to his ‘box’ (satin), which is where
men in Dell store their money. A rather striking move even by evangelical standards, this
was to allow her to take money for purchases if he was not around. For Abraham all this
followed from his aspiration to not give his wife reason to become sad and to live up to the
ideal of being humble. 
20 Kalinda and Mangeshinda confirmed this and went on to tell me how, when he was still a little younger,
Kalibab would beat them and how they would wrestle on the floor. As Mangeshinda recalled, ‘one time he
stepped on my spine and used his foot like a mortar. My back hurts to this day!’ 
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Humility, then, could be described as a virtue that Abraham seeks to cultivate. He
deliberates about his actions in the light of this value and seeks to shape accordingly his
everyday  practice  as  well  as  his  response  to  novel  situations  such  as  the  dilemma
encountered on the day of the conflict resolution. In doing so he often goes beyond what the
run-of-the-mill Evangelical in Dell would do, and this makes him appear as an exemplar in
many people’s eyes. I will say more about evangelical self-cultivation and exemplarity in
Chapter 4. But here I want to note a second way in which the evangelical value of humility
comes to shape people’s practice: Humility is also a value that structures – or is ‘built into’ –
evangelical institutions, and to participate in these institutions is to be pushed to act in a
humble way. Let me illustrate this by going back to Solomon once more. 
Remember that the allegations levelled against Solomon turned out to be false, and
that Johannis was found to have been lacking in respect toward his father-in-law. This is
why Abraham told Johannis and Berobab to seek Solomon’s forgiveness, which the latter
granted without further ado. The swiftness of this stands in marked contrast to karta conflict
resolutions.  As described in  Chapter  1,  the  aggrieved party  here  at  first  pretends  to  be
irreconcilable. They need to be ‘begged’ through extravagant displays of self-abasement,
such  as  prostrating  or  placing  grass  on  one’s  head,  before  they  eventually  agree  to  a
settlement. This often involves compensation, and in any case the offender has to provide
drinks or food for everyone involved in the negotiations. Pushing others to ‘beg’, of course,
is a typical instance of ‘making oneself heavy’ and irreconcilable with evangelical humility.
Legitimate  and  expected  in  the  karta case,  ‘making  beg’ therefore  does  not  feature  in
evangelical conflict  resolutions.  Here,  contrarily,  forgiveness is  to  be granted freely and
without delay. 
In people’s own understanding to grant forgiveness swiftly is simply ‘how it’s done’.
That  is,  evangelical  conflict  resolutions  are  encountered  as  a  fixed  cultural  form,  as
something that has its own logic and is not up for negotiation. This does not necessarily
mean that it feels easy for everyone to act according to this logic. Nor  does it mean that
Evangelicals never attempt to ‘make themselves heavy’. Yet, there is a clear expectation that
they act  humbly,  and those  who do otherwise are met  with public  disapproval.  Church
leaders critique them and others consider them as ‘hard-stomached (norti zami, the local
equivalent of cold-hearted). Also, in more than one case someone’s illness was attributed to
their earlier failure to grant forgiveness freely, and this brings home with great clarity the
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message that to realize blessings through Evangelicalism you need to be respectful of others
(see Chapter 4 for an example). Successful participation in evangelical conflict resolutions,
in brief, is predicated on showing humility. 
Similar  observations  could  be  made  for  many other  evangelical  institutions.  For
instance, where the  karta  way of marrying is replete with possibilities for wife-givers to
demand special respect from wife-receivers – by becoming angry, not granting consent to
the marriage, making outrageous demands for bridewealth etc. – the evangelical marriage
process is swift, calm and non-antagonistic. More generally, the established forms of local
evangelical social life do not make room for the kind of practices through which Dell people
have traditionally sought respect: withholding what others are in need of, acting in a loud
and threatening way, making unrealistic demands and so on. It is in this sense that humility
is  built  into evangelical  institutions,  and that  to  participate in  these institutions  is  to  be
pushed to be respectful of others, irrespective of who they are. 
Summary
In the context of a discussion of Appiah’s (2010) work on moral revolutions, James Laidlaw
(2011) draws our attention to what he calls ‘trans-valuations’. By this Laidlaw refers to
processes whereby existing values are given a new meaning and the changes that can result
from this. In Appiah’s case, this happened to the value of honour. Previously at the base of
practices like duelling in Britain or foot-binding in China, honour, when redefined, led to
the sudden demise of these practices. This was because those who had previously engaged
in these practices  now understood that  it  was  dishonourable  to  maintain them. Laidlaw
suggests that, 
‘[b]ehind this may well lie a point about ethics that applies more generally than just to
honour. The same kind of trans-valuation can be done with other values, such as purity,
courage,  beauty,  friendship,  or compassion.  It  can always be discovered that courage
really  requires  – or  ‘real  courage’ requires  – something quite  different  from existing
conventional understandings’ (Laidlaw 2011, not paginated). 
Evangelicalism in Dell,  I  suggest,  has affected such a ‘trans-valuation’ for  the value of
respect. Whereas in karta respect is something one owes to seniors and seeks from juniors,
in Evangelicalism one owes respect to everyone and should seek it from no one. In terms of
the terminology introduced in Chapter 1, we may speak of a shift from directional to mutual
recognition  respect.  This  changed  understanding  is  reflected  in  evangelical  institutions,
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which in turn lead to changes in people’s practice. All in all, respect remains central – not
only in ideological terms but also in people’s own outlook. Being respectful, after all, is key
to  enjoying  God’s  blessing.  Against  this  background,  Evangelicalism  in  Dell  does  not
appear to contribute to a decline of respect or a rise of individualism. The next section
complicates this impression.
2.4 ‘What’s the point in just eating?’ - Respect Undermined
As mentioned before, I often spent the hour after dark by the fire in Kalinda’s hut, chatting
with her as she prepared dinner. I greatly valued these conversations since Kalinda was an
acute  observer  of  life  in  Dell  and seemed to take pleasure  in  sharing her  thoughts  and
observations. One Sunday evening, Kalinda commented on an event that had taken place in
church that day.  Toward the end of the service,  some five or six couples with newborn
babies had been asked to come forward. There had then been a short ceremony in which a
church leader gave a name to each of the babies, asked the parents to raise them as devout
Christians,  and finally  prayed for  God’s  blessing.  The whole  thing  had been over  very
quickly, Kalinda commented, going on to recall with nostalgia the karta naming ceremonies
in which she had participated prior to her conversion in the late 1990s. Three or four months
after you had born a child, Kalinda told me, the lineage head and his wife would invite you
and the other lineage members to their house. The floor would be covered with aromatic
leaves and reeds, as is common on holidays, and the toidi’s wife would have brewed beer. 
On that day, they treat you with a lot of  bonshmi! ‘She has born a child for us! Our
lineage is getting bigger, it’s getting bigger!’ they would say. Everyone is very happy…
Our toidi takes the child. He tickles it. ‘How shall we call it?’ he asks playfully… Later
we all sit together, we drink beer, we drink coffee, we eat boiled maize. The whole day
we chat and smile. … But in amain they don’t even eat a single xorxor (fried dough ball;
a synonym for cheap food)!
Kalinda’s  critical  observation about  evangelical  naming ceremonies  points us to a  more
general  fact:  compared  with  karta,  Evangelicalism  in  Dell  involves  significantly  less
commensality. To some extent this is because of the rejection of animal sacrifice. While
sacrifice (which is always followed by feasting) is central to lineage rituals like the one
described by Esias in Chapter 1, it obviously has no place in evangelical religious life. Here,
food only appears in the form of the monthly Eucharist – a morsel of bread and a mouthful
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of honey water. But the relative reduction in commensality is also evident when it comes to
evangelical social institutions like funerals, weddings, or conflict resolutions. Only think of
the above case. Solomon offered us some bananas, but soon we were on our way home.
Karta conflict resolutions, by contrast,  invariably are followed by sociable drinking, and
more often than not people end up in one of the bars in the main village. 
Everyone  in  Dell  would  agree  with  the  observation  that  there  is  relatively  less
commensality among Evangelicals. In fact, we will see that this is something the church
explicitly values. Nonetheless, for many Evangelicals this is an aspect of their religion they
sometimes struggle with. As Kalinda’s comparison between karta and evangelical naming
ceremonies suggests, she experiences the latter as involving less bonshmi than the former.
This is easily comprehensible, given what we know about the link between commensality
and  respect  (cf.  Chapter  1).  Eating  together,  after  all,  has  traditionally  been  the  most
important context for people to create and cultivate respectful relations. 
Despite  her  misgivings  about  the  lack  of  commensality,  it  is  inconceivable  for
Kalinda to ever abandon her religion. There is much in Evangelicalism for which she is
grateful, notably the emphasis on mutual respect and the greater state of blessing in which
she feels she has lived ever since converting. For other people, however, the austere nature
of Dell Evangelicalism is a reason to revert to  karta. These are above all men, especially
wealthier and more senior men. As I gradually discovered, a good number of the older alem
men in Dell had at some point converted to Evangelicalism, but had left again after they had
been cured of the affliction which had motivated their conversion. These men explained that
they had found Evangelicalism ‘unsatisfying’ (dassegayinda). They enjoyed drinking beer
with their peers, dancing  guzza or participating in a  siri  feasting group. And contrary to
women  and  more  junior  men  they  also  had  the  resources  for  such  practices.  But  as
Evangelicals, all of this had been prohibited to them, and so they had eventually decided to
revert to karta. 
Against this background, the reduction of commensality in amain can be said to play
a  two-fold  role  in  the  overall  decline  of  respect.  First,  a  more  general  decline  of
commensality is one of the things people point to when they talk about declining respect.
Given that 60% of the population are  amain,  the evangelical reduction of commensality
clearly contributes to the overall decline of commensality. Second, reduced commensality is
a  key  reason  for  senior  men  to  prefer  karta (or  Orthodoxy,  cf.  Chapter  5) over
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Evangelicalism.  This,  however,  contributes  to  religious and social  heterogeneity – some
amain, others alem or Orthodox – which for Dell people is an expression of reduced ‘unity’
and figures in their accounts about a decline of respect (cf. Conclusion).
Given  that  the  evangelical  reduction  of  commensality  has  a  negative  effect  on
respect, it is important to find out what motivates this reduction. Significantly, we will see
that it is the very same concern as the one discussed in the previous section. As I go on to
show now, the reduction in  commensality  is  a result  of  the quest  to  avoid sadness  and
gomma and to secure God’s blessing. My starting point for this discussion are evangelical
funerals. 
Funerals and the Perils of Feasting
Compared to karta funerals, evangelical funerals are remarkably calm and short affairs. One
of the first differences one notes is the absence of wailing. Those who arrive at the funeral
compassionately shake hands with the dead person’s closest kin,  and then sit down and
quietly wait for the service to begin. Sometimes alem relatives arrive wailing. But there are
ushers  placed at  the  entrance  to  the  compound.  ‘Stop your  crying,  this  is  not  a  day of
sadness!’ they try to shush them. The service opens with a prayer, which everyone listens to
with their eyes closed. Then, clad in colourful silk robes, bodies gently swinging back and
forth,  a  choir  performs  two  songs.  Neither  mournful  nor  happy,  these  songs  radiate
composure and quiet confidence,  and people listen to them silently.  After a sermon and
another prayer, the coffin is buried just outside of the compound. Back inside the compound,
platters with food are handed around. Everyone grabs some handfuls and chats for a while,
but soon the platters are empty and people start  leaving, and only close kin and nearby
neighbours stay behind for the night. 
If you think back to my description of a karta funeral in Chapter 1, you will note a
number of differences.  Here I  want to focus on the issue of food. In my description of
Betsinda’s funeral, we saw that affines brought along food which they gave to the kin of the
dead person. This is also done among Evangelicals. In karta, the affine’s gift is reciprocated
in kind on the same evening. But in the evangelical case, the food given by the affines goes
unreciprocated.  Evangelicals  mark  this  difference  by  saying  that  theirs  is  kelshi (help),
whereas what is given in the karta case is jaxi (from jaxken, ‘to throw down’). ‘Jaxi’ also
describes a deposit in a rotating savings association; and this points us to the underlying
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expectation that something will be returned. But in the evangelical case there is to be no
return. Why not? Pastor Petrus explained things as follows: 
‘Jaxi means you give something and later it’s returned to you. But this doesn’t help, you
see! If you eat what you gave, what does that help [the host of the funeral]?... So in order
to  not  bring further  sadness  to  those who have become sad about  the death of  their
relative, we don’t do this.’
Petrus’s explanation needs to be understood against the background that karta funerals mean
considerable expenditure for the dead person’s close kin. To be sure, their exchange with the
affines is neutral – they return to them an amount of food or drink roughly equal to the one
received;  and from this  the  affines  feed  their  followers.  But  the  close  kin  also have to
provide food for their own extended kin group and for visitors who do not come as part of a
group of affines. Kalibab vividly affirmed that, ‘it’s really a very big problem if a person of
your house dies. It finishes your grain! Maybe they die in the rainy season [when grain
reserves are low]. Then you have to borrow or buy from the market.’ In evangelical funerals,
by contrast, the food provided by the affines is distributed among everyone. Hence close kin
do not have to provide a lot of their own. 
Petrus’s  reasoning  that  this  is  ‘to  not  bring  further  sadness’ to  the  bereaved  is
familiar to us. It is particularly important in the funeral context, though. This is because,
ideally, people should not become sad about someone’s death. It is God’s sovereign decision
to take life, and sadness suggests one’s non-acceptance of this decision. Of course, in reality
people do get sad – on the third day after the funeral kin actually unite to formally ask God’s
forgiveness for this. But the inevitability of sadness in the context of death makes it all the
more important to not give any further reason for sadness. To do so would be to ‘trouble the
one who is troubled already’, and this for  amain is a sin. In the case of funerals, then, a
sense of economic burden is identified as a source of – or an experience akin to that of –
sadness. And the aim to avoid this results in less food: only affines give, but not the kin of
the dead.
There  is  a  more  general  pattern  here.  Over  the  past  years,  there  has  been some
institutional  change  in  the  church,  which  was  driven  precisely  by  a  concern  with
unburdening people from obligations that might make them sad. To begin with, the church
has developed new rituals for marriage and thanksgiving at graduation from college. In both
cases, the older form takes place at home and requires the host to provide food for a large
number of invitees. The new form takes place in church, involves fewer people and requires
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much less  food.  The older  form is  deemed better  because  a  greater  number  of  people,
including  alem,  will listen to the service held on the occasion.  And those who have the
means tend to opt for this older form, which is also the more prestigious one. But for less
affluent people, this older form was economically burdensome and linked to a lot of worry
about incurring shame for letting guests go hungry. The new form was designed with the
express aim of unburdening these people. 
Figure 8. Food is passed around at an evangelical funeral
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A  second,  very  telling  example  of  institutional  change  concerns  Christmas
celebrations. From 1991 to 2005, the congregation bought one or two oxen each year, which
were eaten together in church. During the first five years, people contributed according to
their means, some 50 Cents, others five Birr and the richest people up to ten Birr. But in
1996  it  was  decided  that  every  household  would  pay  the  same  amount  because  some
(presumably wealthier) people had been unhappy with the previous mode. This was done for
some years, but then discussions flared up again. On the one hand, there now were poorer
people who felt burdened by the contribution that was asked of them. On the other hand,
some people  remarked  enviously  that  while  every  household  paid  the  same amount  of
money,  larger  families  consumed  a  greater  share  of  the  meat  than  families  with  fewer
children. In response to these unholy sentiments, church members in 2005 decided that they
would  better  stop  eating  meat  altogether.  As  one  man  who  witnessed  the  discussions
recalled, ‘We said, “It’s this meat that is turning into an obstacle for us. But we shall not trip
over such a worldly thing. Let the meat go.”’ In the following years, Christmas celebrations
saw church members eating roasted grain together. But then this too was dropped for being
identified as a cause of ill-feelings: some had complained that while they brought along
wheat or barley, others only brought roasted maize, which is much cheaper. Since this time
Christmas has been celebrated without any commensality in church. 
Now,  those  who were  already  part  of  the  church  when there  was  still  meat  for
Christmas, have very fond memories of this. And more generally it is important to note that
Evangelicals  in  Dell  do  enjoy  eating  together.  Also,  inviting  others  to  food  is  clearly
considered a good thing, just as jealousy (nixmi) about food is unambiguously a bad thing.
However,  what  the  above  examples  suggest,  is  a  readiness  to  sacrifice  commensality
wherever it threatens to lead people into sin – and a pervasive sense that commensality does
so rather easily.
We can substantiate this by returning to the funeral. We saw that there is less food in
evangelical funerals, and that this is an effect of the concern to ‘not bring further sadness’ to
the bereaved. For some Evangelicals this relative lack of food is rather deplorable. But from
the  official  viewpoint  it  is  explicitly  valued.  This  has  to  do  with  another  aim  behind
evangelical funerals: that they be over quickly! 
In the last chapter I described the lengthy wailing, dancing and chanting witnessed at
Betsinda’s funeral. Several times it appeared as if the coffin was about to be removed from
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its hut. But then there was yet another round of dancing. Finally, Betsinda was only buried
when it had almost become too dark to see – anything other would have counted as a lack of
respect toward her. Afterwards, people drank and ate, there was more dancing, and everyone
slept over in the same compound. Evangelical funerals, by contrast, begin at around two
o’clock in the afternoon, the burial takes place in plain daylight, and people are on their way
home before it gets dark. That people should go home quickly was a great concern. In fact,
the service was typically opened with the phrase, ‘we don’t have time, so let’s get started’. A
key  reason  for  this  was  Evangelicals’ observation  that  karta funerals  were  a  common
occasion  for  adultery  as  well  as  illicit  sex among the  unmarried.  To avoid  this,  it  was
important to get done with the funeral quickly, and this in turn required that there only be
little food. ‘You see’, Petrus explained to me, echoing a widespread notion, ‘when there’s
food, our people don’t go home until it’s all been eaten.’ 
Indeed, for everyone to only get some handfuls of boiled maize was not only good
because it caused people to leave quickly. If people had the chance to gorge themselves
(possibly even on meat), Petrus went on to explain, they would sooner or later also start to
call for alcohol – and where there was alcohol, there would soon also be adultery, fighting
and murder. 
On this account, then, feasting easily leads to sin. This view, which was widespread
among  my evangelical  interlocutors,  has  some resonance  with  Diego Malara’s  findings
among Ethiopian Orthodox Christians in Addis Ababa. In the view of these Christians, 
‘rather  than  placating  fleshly  desires,  satiety  augments  them.  Being  satiated  and
consuming meat “makes the body hot” …, increasing sexual desire. Eating too much and
too often is also associated with an increase in aggression and ensuing conflict … my
informants pointed out that the eruption of fights among common acquaintances often
coincided with feasts and other occasions of intense commensality.’ (Malara 2018: 25)
As Malara notes, similar views have long been common across Orthodox Northern Ethiopia
(cf. Levine 1965: 80f.). In Dell, however, the problematization of feasting only came up
with Evangelicalism. As I have shown in the previous chapter, traditional thought accords
high value to feasting, considering it as a means to achieve social harmony rather than as a
source of  problems.  While  feasting does in  practice sometimes lead to  conflict,  this,  in
karta, is not given weight on the ideological level. Indeed, it would be possible to argue that
it  is  precisely  the  risk associated  with  feasts  which  makes  them powerful  (cf.  Nahum-
Claudel 2016: 10): If they could not degenerate into disrespect and  gomma, the bonshmi
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generated in successful feasts would not be noteworthy and valuable. For Evangelicals in
Dell, however, this is a risk one should not take. At least from the church’s point of view, it
is more important that people avoid sin than that they cultivate respectful relations through
commensality. And contrary to Malara’s Orthodox Christians, who deal with the dangers of
feasting not through abandoning it altogether but through alternating it with fasting (2018:
26),  Dell  Evangelicalism rather  pushes  in  the  direction  of  a  more  general  reduction  of
feasting – of cutting down commensality to the bare minimum. 
Apart from the risk involved in feasting, its decline also has to do with the fact that
local Evangelicalism does not recognize any need for what in the traditional understanding
is a key function of commensality, namely to relate people. In the  amain understanding,
conversion makes a person part of the family of God, and the relatedness that exists among
believers is much stronger than any tie that could be created through a worldly means like
food. This understanding, in fact, has led the local church to prohibit the different kinds of
‘fictive  kinship’ which  people  in  Dell  have  traditionally  aspired  to  create.  As  I  have
explained in  the  previous  chapter,  such relations  were  created  through the  exchange of
livestock  and  feasts  and  were  valued  for  the  respect  they  afforded.  But  to  create  such
relations, the church argues, runs counter to the message that people are already related in
Christ. 
Taken together, it is the notion that commensality readily leads to sin, on the one
hand, and the view that there is no positive need for commensality to relate people, on the
other hand, which motivates the reduction of commensality in Dell Evangelicalism. This
reduction means less of the kind of interaction people perceive as generative of bonshmi. It
is in this sense that Evangelicalism – unwittingly – contributes to the decline of respect. 
2.5 Conclusion
At the outset of this chapter I quoted a woman saying that, ‘Our children used to die like
flies, but since Evangelicalism has come to our land, they no longer die like this.’ As this
quote suggests, Evangelicals in Dell have a palpable sense that their religion affords them
greater flourishing. To be amain, these people feel, is to lead lives more richly blessed and
less prone to be undermined by  gomma.  This chapter has largely been a study of what it
takes to lead such lives. In other words, I have explored what these Christians take to be the
conditions  of  possibility  for  enjoying God’s  blessing.  This  analysis  brought  to  light  the
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importance of being respectful of others, so as to not make them sad and incur God’s wrath.
However, we could also ask what accounts for people’s sense that they have really achieved
a greater state of blessing – one in which children no longer die like flies, where there is less
illness and disaster. 
One  conceivable  answer  here  could  point  to  objective  improvements  in  the
population’s health level. Though still minimal, health services have improved over the past
two decades, and child mortality in particular has decreased due to state-led vaccination
campaigns. Yet, illness, misfortune and death have obviously not disappeared from Dell, and
so more is required to explain why people feel that being  amain means enjoying greater
flourishing. My suggestion here is that this sentiment is related to the greater social harmony
which the evangelical  concern with avoiding sadness has helped to produce.  Of course,
people do not always live up to the ideal of being respectful to everyone. Yet, Evangelicals
have a vivid sense that  life  among them – in  the household,  among neighbours,  in  the
church – is much more peaceful and marked by mutual attentiveness than among alem; and
this  is  an  emic  observation  that  it  is  hard  to  contradict.  The  confinement  of  seniors’
relentless  quest  for  respect  in  particular  reduces  what  has  traditionally  been  a  frequent
source of conflict. Greater social harmony, however, means less of the tensions that Dell
people  have long considered  the  root-cause of  all  suffering.  And so it  may be less  the
objective  improvements  in  living  conditions  that  account  for  people’s  sense  of  greater
flourishing than the fact that there is less of that which people think contravenes flourishing.
These perceived improvements notwithstanding, engagement with Evangelicalism is
also felt to have come at a cost. The final section of this chapter showed how the quest to
avoid  sin  led  to  a  reduction  in  commensality.  One of  the  most  important  practices  for
entering into respectful interaction, commensality is also felt to carry a high risk of leading
to sin – to drunkenness, fighting and adultery, to resentment, jealousy,  or sadness about
burdensome  obligations.  Tracing  recent  institutional  transformations  in  local
Evangelicalism, we saw how commensality was sacrificed wherever it ran counter to the
project  of leading godly lives.  It  is  this  readiness  to  sacrifice commensality  and related
practices  which  makes  Dell  Evangelicalism a  factor  in  the  broader  decline  of  respect.
Phrased in terms of the debate on individualism, Christianity in Dell has an individualizing
effect inasmuch as its institutions do not lead to as much interaction and relatedness among
people as do karta institutions. However, if people overall spend less time socializing, this is
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not because social disconnection is valued per se, whether ideologically or by individual
Evangelicals. Rather, a measure of disconnection here appears as a collateral effect of the
broader project to secure God’s blessing. Individualism, we might say, enters in the wake of
the quest for greater flourishing. 
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Chapter 3. Respect’s Rival: Economic Development and the Quest for 
Reputation
3.1 Introduction
On a hot and dusty afternoon in late February 2017, I was sitting with Kalibab in the shade
of his house. We had just completed an interview on the decline of siri feasting groups, and
now Kalibab was pensively letting his eyes wander across the sunburnt country. The end of
the dry season was near and there was an atmosphere of anticipation, with everyone waiting
in the wings to start sowing as soon as the first rains arrived. From the opposite hill the
sharp cracks of a bull-whip cut through the air as our neighbour Lanksa prepared his field. 
Pointing to Lanksa, Kalibab commented that until two or three decades ago people
did not work much at this time of the year. After the main harvest in January, they rested
until  Easter,  and work only really  started in  late  April.  In  those days,  the land had not
‘warmed up’ yet, and excessive rainfall meant they could only plant one crop per year not
two. ‘But’, Kalibab went on to assert in more general terms, it was also true that, ‘in the past
we just didn’t know how to work! Our stomachs were all we cared about. We didn’t make
plans to grow, we didn’t think about showing change.’ It was a familiar discourse, and so I
pressed Kalibab a bit on whether their economic lives had really changed as substantively as
he  and  others  had  repeatedly  suggested  to  me.  Slightly  exasperated  perhaps  with  my
inability to see the obvious, he responded passionately: 
Look, Juli, I don’t sleep any more! When the cocks crow four o‘clock, there are many
thoughts up here in my head. I think. I really think a great lot. What am I going to plant
this year? On this field, what do I plant, and what on that? I think, ‘do this’, ‘do this and
that!’ I lie awake. Do I plant maize on this field and afterwards wheat? Or garlic and then
peas? What about that field over there? What work do I assign the women and children
today? The oxen haven’t grown very fat yet. But I want to sell them at Easter, so I need
to rent some pasture. ... To get money, to show change, I think and think. I lie awake. If
you don’t think like that, you don’t obtain any gabinti (development). These days, if you
don’t think, you’re useless.
If what keeps people awake at night tells us something about their deepest concerns and
aspirations,  gabinti  would seem to be of utmost importance to Kalibab.  Indeed, the desire
for gabinti was one of the most widely shared concerns among people in Dell and cut across
religious, generational and gender cleavages. A term that literally translates as ‘growth’,
gabinti on a first level means ‘economic growth’ or ‘growth in wealth’. Beyond an increase
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in  wealth,  the  term also  denotes  a  process  of  ‘change’ (okmi),  an  advancement  from
‘backwardness’ to ‘modernity’ (zemenawinet). To capture this broader meaning of ‘gabinti’,
I translate the term as ‘development’. 
As Kalibab and others suggested to me, their concern with gabinti was a relatively
recent phenomenon. This claim is well supported by other data, which permit to date the
origins of the local engagement with development to the early 2000s. 
Like elsewhere in southern Ethiopia, the 1990s in Dell were a time when traditional
practice  was  in  full  swing  (cf.  Freeman  2002:  44  for  Gamo).  After  the  revolutionary
abolition of feudalism in 1974, wealth levels had risen as people had started to cultivate
more  land  and  livestock  was  no  longer  taken  away  by  Gamma landlords.  With  rising
surpluses, traditional institutions expanded. The number of feasting groups multiplied, and
during the 1990s even women joined these formerly all-male groups; funerals and weddings
got longer and costlier, celebrations to create fictive kinship abounded, and work groups
held lengthy feasts. 
Since the early 2000s, however, people’s investments of time, wealth and concern
have shifted significantly. They now prefer to buy modern goods like clothes, cell-phones
and tin-roofed houses as well as to re-invest surpluses into profitable activities like cattle
raising,  growing cash crops  or  building and renting out a  house in  Dell’s  main village.
Meanwhile, the community as a whole has worked hard to improve its infrastructure. In
2001, the ramshackle huts housing the  kebele administration were replaced by a spacious
tin-roofed house. Since the late 2000s, the school was expanded by several new classrooms
to accommodate the rising number of students – from a few dozen during the 1990s to 1039
in 2016. In 2014, the entire population of Dell, using hoes and spades, cleared a path to
connect the main village (itself only founded in 2010) to the nearest road. And in 2016,
kebele leaders bribed a dozer operator who was working on this road to make a detour into
Dell territory. This coup has allowed the main village to be reached not only by motorbike
but also by four-wheel drive truck. This, in turn, has stimulated some rich men to bring up
the  materials  needed  for  pouring  concrete  floors,  thus  setting  the  latest  trend  in  home
improvement. 
Since the early 2000s, then, Dell has undergone significant changes, as people have
shifted  their  investments  of  energy  from  expanding  traditional  institutions  to  pursuing
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economic progress in their personal lives and for the community at large.21 So successful has
Dell been at development, that in January 2017 it was ranked first among the 48 kebele of
South Aari district –  a success which, for the first time in its history, brought a group of
higher-level  government officials  and a television crew to Dell.  Far from being a mere
discourse or an ever elusive dream, development is something Dell people feel they are
making real progress in, something that has already transformed their land in significant
ways and that will do even more so in the future. How can we account for this? What has
motivated people to change their economic practice so profoundly and to take up the pursuit
of development? And in what way might this have contributed to what people lament as a
decline of respect? 
3.2 A Question of Power? Anthropological Approaches to Development
In the past few decades, anthropologists have mostly approached development in a spirit of
critique. There are two key reasons. Firstly, they observed that development initiatives often
do not achieve their stated aims of improving people’s living conditions. Indeed, scholars
have shown that such initiatives – whether large-scale state-led or participatory bottom-up –
can even increase suffering (Scott 1998; Cooke and Kothari 2001, Karim 2011). Secondly, it
was argued that while failing in its overt aims, development helps to expand state power,
turn  political  questions  into  technical  ones,  and  cement  global  relations  of  inequality
(Ferguson 1994, Li  2007,  Escobar  1995).  In  stressing issues of  power,  domination,  and
inequality, one could say with Ortner (2016), the anthropology of development has largely
been situated in the realm of ‘dark anthropology’.
Faced  with  the  need  to  explain  a  developmental  success  story  like  Dell’s,  this
intellectual tradition would advise to look for signs of coercion and resistance. If people
pursue development, the assumption would be, they surely must have been forced to do so.
This perspective suggests itself all the more for Dell given the broader political context: A
state with ‘entrenched habits of authoritarianism’ (Clapham 2017: 2), Ethiopia has since the
2000s fashioned itself into a self-designated ‘developmental state’, which forcefully pushes
for economic growth and transformation (Abbink 2017, Mains 2012). 
Indeed, when I first came to Dell, I was struck by the power of the state. Contrary to
what has been described for other African peripheries (e.g. Roitman 2004, Jones 2009), the
21 This mirrors the broader trend in Ethiopia, where GDP growth averaged 8.9% between 2000 and 2015
(Regasa et al. 2019: 2), making Ethiopia one of the fastest growing economies worldwide. 
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state in Dell is not ‘weak’ or ‘failing’ but strong and omnipresent – and always calling for
development. Most striking in this regard is the so-called cell, a state institution established
in 2007, which has since been people’s main interface with state developmentalism. There
are 16 cells in Dell, grouping together around 40 neighbouring households each. The cells
assemble on one morning per week at their respective meeting grounds, either to carry out
communal work (lemat), or to be ‘given education’ (timirt im). In the latter case, a local
state employee gives a talk on issues ranging from hygiene, family planning and agriculture
to the importance of education, saving and stopping ‘wasteful’ expenditure. Participation in
cell activities is obligatory, and absentees have to pay fines. Fines are also levied for non-
compliance with other demands of the local state apparatus. Failure to register a child for
school or refusal to buy government-provided seeds and fertilizer, conspicuous laziness or
the extension of a funeral or wedding beyond the permitted three days, all are subject to
fines – and sometimes garnished with a short stay in the local prison, a shed surrounded by
some square metres of unkempt grass and a wobbly bamboo-fence. 
Figure 9. Cells digging anti-erosion ditches in the context of communal work
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Given the strength of the local state apparatus, it is perhaps understandable why I
initially thought people’s engagement with development had to be explained as the result of
coercion  by  a  powerful  state.  This  also  seemed  to  suggest  itself  in  the  light  of  other
Ethiopianists’ writings, which emphasize issues of power and domination (Planel 2014, Di
Nunzio 2015, Emmenegger 2016). From the beginning, however, this perspective faced the
difficulty that this just was not the way Dell people themselves talked about development
and  the  state.  Much  as  I  tried  to  elicit  critical  comments,  no  one  seemed  particularly
interested in  development-bashing.  Even those who had recently paid a  fine or  spent  a
sleepless  night  in  the  local  prison  did  not  critique  development  per  se.  Rather  than
expressions of ‘resistance’, the acts which had got them punished turned out to be results of
particular circumstances: the need to keep a child at home to take care of a younger sibling
rather than opposition to school education; a dire lack of cash not a rejection of fertilizer; a
visit to a sick aunt rather than general refusal to partake in communal work and pursue
infrastructural improvement. In fact, most of my interlocutors spoke enthusiastically about
development and thanked the government for having ‘taught’ them about it. They suggested
that through development their land had usta – ‘improved’ or ‘become beautiful’. And many
a times I heard people exclaim with gratitude that ‘now good days have come to us!’
Of  course,  from the  perspective  of  a  hard-nosed  ‘power  functionalism’ (Sahlins
2008: 321), such statements could be discounted as just another indication of how state
power brings people to not only act in certain prescribed ways but also to think, feel and
desire accordingly (e.g. de Vries 2007). Yet, I worry that this would betray my ethnography.
To take Dell people’s enthusiasm about development seriously, then, we need an alternative
to power-based explanations. 
Anand  Pandian  (2008)  has  started  to  offer  such  an  alternative.  Based  on  his
ethnography from a south Indian community where development and more specifically ‘toil’
is taken as a form of ethical self-formation, Pandian argues that while 
‘development  can  be  identified  as  a  series  of  obligations  imposed  upon postcolonial
subjects by state agencies, economic compulsions, and social elites ... development may
also  be  understood  as  a  moral  telos  toward  which  individuals  and  collectives  direct
themselves through a critical reworking of their own natures.’ (2008: 164). 
The point is as simple as it is important: In some places, development may be part of a
broader ethical project and valued for helping to realize locally meaningful ends (see also
Miller  2015).  In  such  cases,  the  key  question  is  not  what  forces  people  to  pursue
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development but why they might wish to do so – what they value about development, what
motivates  them to  pursue  it,  what  they  find  attractive  about  it.  As  I  will  show in  the
following, it is this latter perspective which accounts best for my ethnography. 
In  a  first  step,  I  examine  the  motives  people  in  Dell  give  for  the  pursuit  of
development. I show that today’s quest to ‘grow’ economically is motivated by a desire to
‘grow’ one’s ‘name’. In a second step, I note that having a name has long been an important
value for people in Dell, but that it previously used to be realized through wealth in people
and  sponsoring  feasts.  I  go  on  to  argue  that  Dell  people  have  started  to  engage  with
development because they conceive of it as a better way to build reputation. This is because
the modern goods which development affords are associated with the Gamma (Northern
Ethiopians), and, indeed, are thought to turn their owners into Gamma themselves. Gamma,
however, are understood to be superior to Aari, and so to become Gamma means to gain in
reputation or name. As with conversion to Evangelicalism, however, the use of a new means
to better realize an old end came at a cost. In the final part of the chapter, I show how the
pursuit  of  name  through  development  draws  away  resources  from  kinship  and
commensality.  This  makes  it  more  difficult  to  cultivate  the  kinds  of  relations  and
interactions  in  which  respect  (bonshmi)  can  be  realized.  And  while  people  value
development as a means to build reputation, they are also keenly aware of the challenges
that it poses to treating each other respectfully. 
3.3 Building Name through Development 
One breezy Sunday afternoon, as I passed through the main village on my way home from
church, I came across my friend Aftamo. Aftamo was standing in front of a house, which he
had finished building a few days earlier. I invited Aftamo (who was alem at that time and
later became Orthodox) to have a drink in a near-by bar and thus learnt more about his
house. Aftamo explained that this was not a house he intended to live in – he had already
built a corcora (tin-roofed house) for himself some years ago – but that it was to be rented
out. As was true for many of the other 30 or so houses that made up the village, someone
would establish a small bar in it and Aftamo would receive a monthly rent of 200 Birr.
Picking up on this fact, I playfully observed that he was soon going to be ‘eating a salary’
(damos its; a local idiom for any kind of regular cash income, carrying connotations of ease
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and wealth). Yes, Aftamo said, there would be a salary, to be sure. ‘But’, he added after a
slight pause, 
‘above all  this  house will  be of  use for  my name.  You see,  now already people  are
talking, “Aftamo has built a house, Aftamo has built a house! He must be wealthy or
what? He is wealthy!” But only wait until someone has opened a bar in it. On market
days a great many people will pass by. When it rains, people will enter my house. They
will drink something, they will look around. “Whose house is this?” they’ll ask. In the
evening, when they get home, when they get back to their land, they will tell their people,
“I was in Dell today, I was in the house of  Gash Aftamo”. They will speak my name.
Only wait and see how they’ll speak it!’
For Aftamo, the key point about his house is the name it will afford him. It may have some
economic benefit in bringing him a rent income. But what really matters is that it has got
people to talk about him admiringly – and that it is likely to elicit even more admiring talk
once people from more distant areas come to notice it. 
Aftamo’s account is typical. ‘It’s good for your name’, was an answer I heard many
times when asking people about their motives for pursuing modern goods like tin-roofed
houses. This is not to say that this was their only motive or the only explanation I got.
Sometimes people would point to the comfort associated with a certain good, or they would
talk about the security it afforded. Tin-roofed house are good because they do not burn down
as easily as straw-thatched huts. And if you own a motorbike, the townsman who has rented
it from you will come to pick you up and bring you to the hospital if you are ill. Yet, such
idioms of comfort and security hardly abounded. And even where people did mention such
advantages, talk usually came around to the topic of name before long. 
A concern with name was also driving Doba when I caught up with him one day on a
narrow path in the middle of Dell. Doba was sweating profusely under the weight of three
pieces of timber and gratefully accepted my offer to carry one of them. He explained that he
had been going back and forth all day between his compound and Arki area, where someone
was selling timber for house construction at 15 Birr a piece. I knew Doba as someone who
never missed out on a traditional wedding, funeral or shishi, where one would see him for
days on end, happily drunk, playing woissa pipes with a group of friends, or stomping his
feet frenetically in a round of guzza. He was not the first one to come to mind when thinking
about people keen to ‘grow’ and ‘show change’. But here he was, sweating away in the early
November sun and telling me about his plan to replace his hut with a tin-roofed house.
Asked why he wanted to have such a house, Doba’s concise answer was that he did not want
98
his age-mates to laugh about him (godi jintshaybish). He imitated how they had already
started questioning him: ‘You have some cattle, you have some money, so why don’t you
build a corcora, why don’t you show any change?’ And he added that, ‘they belittle you if
you live in a hut.’
Doba’s  reasoning is  somewhat different  from Aftamo’s.  While  Aftamo fantasizes
about the wave of admiration his new house is likely to trigger, Doba motivates his quest for
a tin-roofed house in terms of avoiding ‘laughter’ (jintersheri) and ‘belittlement’ (toksi).
Where Aftamo has his eyes set on fame or obtaining a ‘heavy name’ (detzminda nami),
Doba is trying to avoid shame (oshin). The underlying concern, however, is similar: Aftamo
and Doba are both concerned with how others think and speak about them, with how they
are evaluted by their peers and wider society. Both wish to be held in regard and to be
esteemed, rather than to go unnoticed or even become a laughing stock. In brief, both are
concerned  with  what  people  in  Dell  call  ‘name’.  And for  both,  this  concern  is  closely
intertwined with the pursuit of modern goods. 
Now, the pursuit of such goods is a key part of what people in Dell understand by
‘gabinti’; and other people (including women, see below) also motivated their  quest for
such goods in terms of name. Taken together this is a first hint that in Dell development is
driven by people’s concern with having a name – by their desire, that is, to not be laughed at
but to be admired and to be considered ‘great’ (gaesha). To substantiate this hypothesis, I
will now examine in more detail what people understand by gabinti and how exactly they
assess name. 
Climbing the Development Ladder
To understand what people in Dell mean by gabinti, it is useful to go back to the notion of
‘plan’ (ikid)  mentioned  by  Kalibab  in  the  introduction  to  this  chapter.  It  was  a  shared
understanding among my interlocutors that in the past people did not really make ‘plans’,
but that today – having been taught about this by the government – all but the incurably lazy
had ‘plans’. Their plans were something people frequently talked about among themselves. I
also  made  it  a  habit  to  ask  people  about  their  plans,  once  I  had  come to  realize  how
important this concept was to them. Take Mathos as an example. In his late 30s or early 40s,
Mathos was among the poorest people in Dell. He explained: 
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‘Right now, I don’t have a single lamb. But I have entered an  iqub (rotating savings
association).  When I  eat  the  iqub  [collect  the kitty],  I’ll  buy a lamb.  Then, growing,
growing, it becomes a sheep, it gives birth to lambs. When they have grown, I sell them
and buy a heifer. The heifer will calve. I grow the bull-calves... So I become a wakibab
(cattle owner). When I have four oxen, I sell two of them; two are for ploughing. From
this [money] I build a corcora. If you ask about my plan, this is my plan.’ 
Other people had similarly detailed notions of the steps they hoped to take next. What those
steps were depended on their current wealth level. Those who had managed to get some
oxen and a tin-roofed house, talked about how they were saving money to buy a plot of land
in the  main  village or  in  Gob or  Jinka,  and how they would then build a  ‘townhouse’
(katema eja) on that plot. Those who already owned such a house, in turn, planned to build
yet another house or to buy a motorbike, which they could rent out to someone in town. Yet
further  up  the  wealth  ladder,  people  aspired  to  join  the  small  group of  those  who had
managed to set up a diesel engine flour mill in Dell or a neighbouring area. And the five or
six men who had accomplished this, in turn, all talked about wanting to be the first to buy an
Isuzu truck. In all cases, people – in a way similar to that of Mathos – spoke about how they
would save income (such as rents from houses, or money gained by operating a flour mill,
or gains from selling produce) through an  iqub  or by purchasing livestock, and how they
would do so until they had accumulated enough wealth to carry out the next step in their
plan. 
What we have here, then, is an understanding of development as a series of ‘value
transformations’  (Munn  1986)  that  lead  to  ever  more  valuable  assets.  These  value
transformations are pursued over the life course. One starts out as a teenager with nothing
but one’s own labour power. A handful of onions grown in the corner of one’s father’s field
bring some first cash, and after a while one may be able to buy a lamb and thus lay the
foundation  for  further  livestock.  After  marriage,  and  obtaining  their  own  field,  men
concentrate  on  saving  wealth  to  build  a  tin-roofed  house  in  their  compound,  which  is
gradually  furnished  with  chairs,  a  table,  and  eventually  a  solar  lamp  and  a  mattress.
Meanwhile they save to move up to the next rung of the development ladder, which is to
build  a  townhouse;  and  from there  they  seek  to  acquire  further  rent-generating  assets.
Women, in turn, strive to ‘grow’ by investing money (gained through small-scale trading or
selling produce) in sheep or saving it in rotating savings associations; eventually this wealth
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is  transformed into different  kinds  of  clothes  and household utensils.  Lack of  resources
prevents most women from moving up much higher on the development ladder. They are
clearly desirous to do so, however, and toward the end of my fieldwork the first few women
had managed to build their own small tin-roofed house in their husband’s compound. 
If development amounts to a ladder that one climbs over time, the magnitude of
one’s  name mainly  depends  on  how far  and  how fast  one  climbs  this  ladder.  Broadly
speaking, it is true that the higher up one is on the ladder, the greater one’s name. In Dell, it
is those men who own a mill, townhouses and a motorbike, who are considered to have the
greatest name, whereas those who live in a hut hardly have any name at all.22 However, it is
not only one’s absolute position on the development ladder that matters but also how one
stands relative to one’s age-mates. Consider Doba and Aftamo again. Doba faces the threat
of laughter because he is lagging behind his age-mates, many of whom have already built a
tin-roofed house. By contrast, a young man who has recently married will not face the threat
of laughter for not yet owning a tin-roofed house since it is normal for people to only build
such  a  house  some years  after  marriage.  Aftamo,  in  turn,  receives  a  lot  of  admiration
because he is ahead of his age-mates: while many have their personal  corcora, few have
moved up to the next level of building a townhouse, and thus Aftamo is ahead of the field.
In absolute terms, Aftamo is ‘smaller’ than the richest men in Dell, but the speed at which
he is climbing the development ladder earns him extra admiration. 
This  system of  assessing  reputation  based  on  developmental  progress  obviously
presupposes that people know about each other’s possessions. And this is very much the
case in Dell. I was often astonished by the detailed knowledge people had about such things
as the number of cattle someone owned, how many chairs of the most prestigious type they
had at home, whether or not they had already installed a ceiling in their townhouse (which
allows asking higher rent) or how much money they could expect to receive from a savings
association they participated in  (see Haynes 2017:  12 for  similar  observations  from the
Copperbelt). While this knowledge was most extensive for those who lived relatively close
by, people also worked to deepen their knowledge about the property of those living farther
22 In the next chapter, we will see that for those who ‘serve’ in church there is the possibility to build name
through being exemplary and highly engaged Christians. More generally, I do not wish to deny that in Dell
there also exist other metrics than development to assess reputation, and that when assessing any given
person’s reputation people will combine several of these. Yet, development is by far the most important
metric. This is indicated not least by the fact that when you ask someone about another person’s name,
they will spontaneously always respond by talking about how the other performs in terms of development
(rather than, say, how virtuous they are). 
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away. Whenever I walked with people through areas they did not pass through every day
(going to a funeral, for instance), they would take close notice of cattle, fields and houses,
asking each other or those whom they met on the path, ‘whose oxen is that one over there?’
or ‘who built this new corcora?’ or ‘what do you think how much he is going to get for
selling these beetroots?’.
The suggestion that Dell people wish to acquire wealth for the sake of building name
is unlikely to surprise anthropologists. After all,  the ethnographic record is full of cases
where people strive for wealth as a means to gain reputation. There is one important regard,
however, in which the case of Dell differs from what we are used to, when thinking about
the link between wealth and reputation. As we have seen, in Dell the most prestigious goods
are townhouses, motorbikes and mills – goods, that is, which bring rent and afford further
economic growth. This contrasts with systems where reputation is gained by putting wealth
to economically unproductive use – by giving it away, using it to purchase luxury goods or
destroying it (Veblen 2005: 52, Friedman 1994: 128f.; Mauss 1966: 12). To be sure, Dell
people do not use all of their wealth ‘productively’. To buy a mattress, a suit or a cellphone,
is  to  spend  wealth  on  goods  that  do  not  produce  further  wealth;  the  same  applies  for
replacing one’s hut with a tin-roofed house. But while to own such consumption goods is
part of what is required to build a name, a great name can only be built through the above
mentioned investment goods. Indeed, it would be outright detrimental to someone’s name if
they had sufficient resources to, say, build a townhouse, but instead spent this wealth on,
say,  furniture  for  their  own  house.  This  was  not  only  explicitly  suggested  by  my
interlocutors. It also manifested in the fact that while there were huge differences between
people  in  terms  of  the  investment  goods  they  owned,  there  was  much  less  difference
between them in terms of consumption goods. The clothes or the household furnishings of
the richest people in Dell hardly differed from those of people who lived in a tin-roofed
house but owned no further assets. In brief,  name in Dell  is not primarily built  through
conspicuous consumption but through investing in things that permit further growth. This, I
argue, is what drives development in Dell. 
There  is  one  exception  which  proves  the  rule.  Around  2006,  the  government
introduced a new institution to Dell: auctions (tsharata). Today, such auctions are regularly
held both in state contexts, such as in school at the end of the school year, and in evangelical
and Orthodox churches. During a  tsharata,  men bid for goods like a rope, a bucket, or a
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sheep. The atmosphere during such auctions is intense. A large crowd forms a tight circle
around the auctioneer. At first, many bid, but soon there is but a handful of men left, who
engage into a rapid and boisterous bidding competition. The winner steps into the circle,
takes out a conspicuously large bundle of 100 Birr notes, and counts off what he is due. This
is always a multiple of the market value: a rope worth 25 Birr may be sold at 400; a sheep
worth 1000 Birr may go for 5000. Asked about why they participated in auctions, everyone
was clear that this  was to build their  name. For instance,  Dauli,  one of Kalibab’s sons,
explained that while he did not even own a tin-roofed house yet, he already had something
of a name because he had once won in an auction against a much richer person, paying 800
Birr for a lamb that was worth no more than 200. ‘When I got home that night’, Dauli
recalled, ‘I looked at the lamb and thought, “Oy! For 800 I could have bought four of these.
But damn it, this is my name!”’ In the case of auctions, then, people use their wealth in
what, from their own perspective, is an economically unproductive way (which supports the
claim that they ultimately desire name not wealth). However, this does not contradict my
argument that the quest to have a name drives development in Dell. This is because the
money generated through auctions is used by the organizing churches or state institutions to
finance their own development, e.g. to build a new classroom. In other words, men here
gain a name through contributing wealth to the development of the community – it is their
desire to gain a name that drives communal development.23 
23 I did not see women bid in auctions. The women whom I asked about this said that even though they
found the idea thrilling, it was safer not to participate in auctions in order to not risk conflict with one’s
husband. Some time before my fieldwork, I was told, there had once been a woman who had participated
and won in an auction. This woman had afterwards been beaten up by her husband, who felt that she had
outshone him. This points us to the fact that while women strive for name, too, their striving is curtailed by
their husband’s expectation to always be ‘greater’ than them.
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Figure 10. During an auction organized by the local school, a successful bidder (right)
comes to collect the sheep he has just purchased
On Name and Respect
If development in Dell is to be explained as the result of people’s desire to gain a name, it
would be good to also know why they care to gain a name. There are two ways to answer
this. From a historical point of view, there is evidence that the concern with name is a long-
standing one, which predates the engagement with development. From this perspective, the
question  is  not  why  people  want  to  gain  a  name,  but  how  they  came  to  conceive  of
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development as a good means to this end. I will address this question in the next section.
But one can also answer the question why they care to have a name by noting the close
connection between this value and that other value which we saw Dell people care greatly
about, bonshmi. 
In Chapter 1 I  explained that  bonshmi  denotes a kind of respect that necessarily
expresses itself in concrete acts, like bowing, using honorifics, offering a chair, or ‘begging’
someone. To make this point I also noted that linguistically bonshmi is nothing one can have
– whether in the sense of ‘personal honour’ or ‘an attitude of respect toward someone’ – but
something that is  shown or received. By contrast,  nami cannot be shown or received. It is
nothing that one does, but something that one has or that one thinks others have. 
In  Chapter  1  I  also  noted  that  philosophers  who  have  written  about  respect
commonly draw a distinction between respect as attitude and respect as action (cf. Dillon
2016). Against this background, it would be possible to conceptualize bonshmi and nami as
two sides of the same coin of respect. On this account, bonshmi would be respect as action
and nami respect as attitude. To conceptualize bonshmi and nami as two sides of the same
concern – as two sub-values of an overarching value of ‘respect’ – would also seem possible
in light of the fact that they share the same disvalue: ‘belittlement’ or disrespect. An act of
disrespect is no less called ‘toksi’ than to cast aspersions on someone behind their back, i.e.
to question their name. 
If in this thesis I have decided to use the term ‘respect’ only for bonshmi, rather than
as a category that encompasses bonshmi and nami, this is because I wanted to follow Dell
people’s own usage. They clearly conceive of bonshmi and nami as two distinct values and
have no term that encompasses them. Nonetheless, it is helpful to note the close connections
between nami and bonshmi to understand why people care so greatly about their name. After
all, where people are desirous to be treated respectfully it does not come as a surprise if they
also desire to be held in high regard. 
3.4 Name in the Past
The desire to have a name is not new but also existed in the past. The ways to get a name,
however,  differed.  Based  on  my  interlocutors’  accounts,  two  main  ways  can  be
distinguished: having wealth in people and sponsoring feasts. 
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First, to have many wives, children, affines and fictive kin constituted someone as
‘great’. Such a person was referred to as a ‘father of children’ (jintsibab), or ‘a man with
many relatives’ (sosa kit  bedemibab),  or was simply said to ‘have many people’ (ed kit
bedie).  We can refer  to  this  as  ‘wealth  in  people’ (cf.  Guyer  1995:  84),  an  expression
apposite for its double-meaning. Suggesting a quantity, or wealth of people, it also points to
the wealth invested or expressed in people. Wealth is needed to marry several wives, to raise
a large-number of children, or to sponsor feasts to create fictive kinship. And so in Dell, as
in many others part  of Africa, people were a key form and index of wealth,  and thus a
source of name. 
Sponsoring feasts was a second way to gain a name. A person who excelled at this
was  admiringly  referred  to  as  an  edem  itsidab  –  someone  who  feeds  others.  The
phenomenon  is  well-documented  across  southern  Ethiopia.  Freeman  (2002:  Chapter  5)
writes  about  the  Gamo  highlands  were  men  traditionally  strove  to  acquire  a  series  of
increasingly prestigious  titles  by sponsoring  increasingly large  feasts.  And the  mid-20th
century ethnographers of the German Frobenius Institute considered ‘feasts of merit’ as one
of the three elements of a broader ‘meritorious complex’ (cf. Braukämper 2015) marking the
cultures of southern Ethiopia. It is true that traditional Aari culture had neither a system of
titles nor institutionalized ‘festivities on occasion of the possession of a certain number of
cattle, buffaloes or pigs’ (ibid.: 209). But the basic idea of magnifying one’s name through
sponsoring feasts is evident in traditional Aari institutions, too. 
Funerals are a good example. In Chapter 1 I described how at the death of a senior
affine, a man would prepare beer and invite others to follow him to the funeral. The more
beer he prepared, the more people he could attract and the longer he could entertain them at
the funeral.  Thus entertained,  the group would engage into boisterous dancing. And the
more it did so – the greater and longer the uproar it created – the greater their host’s name.
By the same logic, name was built through participating in a siri feasting group, offering a
feast to establish fictive kinship, or, indeed, by showing lavish hospitality to those coming to
attend one’s work party (dabba). As my neighbour Agero recounted:  
‘There used to be a man here in the area, called Gultzibab. Beer never disappeared from
his house. All the time he was preparing beer, and he often called for dabba. People came
and drank his beer and filled their stomachs. The beer was made from different types of
grain: maize, wheat, sorghum. It was very tasty. People spoke his name a lot, “he gave us
a lot of tasty beer, he hosted us for two days”, they said.’ 
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Like  people,  feasts  require  and  thus  index  wealth.  But  contrary  to  people,  feasts  are
ephemeral. To counter-act this and perpetuate their name, men who had sponsored feasts
displayed in prominent places the horns, jaws or skulls of the animals they had ‘fed’ to
others; placing the skull of an ox at the entrance of their compound, for instance, or tying
goat horns to the centre-post of the hut in which they entertained visitors. In the past, then,
no less than in the present, one required wealth to build a name. But the form wealth had to
take in order to  actually afford a  name differed.  Not tin-roofed houses or mills  made a
person’s name, not wealth in things, but wealth in people and sponsoring feasts. 
Now, it would be wrong to suggest that these older standards for evaluating name
have  completely  disappeared  from Dell.  They  are,  to  be  sure,  vehemently  rejected  by
Evangelicals and by the younger and more educated people. But older people, and notably
those who follow karta, still think that offering a feast and having many dependents is rather
good for your name. But even for these people, the newer standards have become dominant.
This is indicated not only by their gradual withdrawal from or down-sizing of traditional
institutions, which are felt to stand at odds with the pursuit of development and thus of name
in its modern form (see below). It also became evident in how they evaluated others. It was
a shared understanding among my  alem friends, for instance, that elders like Eaybab or
Wodibab did not have a name. These two men are both in their seventies,  have several
wives, countless children, and are rich in land, cattle, grain and money. Yet, as Betsi, a man
in his 40s explained to me: ‘Wodibab has a box full of money, he has many granaries, and
they are full even during the rainy season [a time of shortage], he has at least 14 oxen and 4
milk  cows.  But  he doesn’t  have a name.  Why? Because  he hasn’t  built  a  house in  the
village. He could easily do it, so why doesn’t he?’ And Alkemat, who is in his 60s, mused
about a recently deceased neighbour: ‘It’s too bad he didn’t build a tin-roofed house. You
know, had he wanted to, had he thought a little, he could easily have done so. But now there
is nothing to show his name.’ 
Name, to summarize, has long been an important concern for people in Dell. In the
past, however, the pursuit of name went through creating relations and sponsoring feasts,
not through modern goods; hence it did not entail development. So how did modern goods
become the standard for evaluating name? The question is essential. For while the quest for
name may explain people’s current pursuit of development, we also have to understand how
they came to think of development as a suitable and indeed superior means to the end of
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name in the first place. A good way to approach this question is to look at the history of that
modern good which for many in Dell is the epitome of development: the tin-roofed house.
3.5 Becoming Gamma Through Gamma Goods
The first  attempt  to  build  a  tin-roofed  house ended in disaster.  Banti  was the  son of  a
wealthy  farmer,  who  had  been  one  of  the  few  locals  to  own  land  prior  to  the  1974
revolution. His father had given Banti several fertile fields, and he had also made money by
trading honey between Maale and Gob. Already quite wealthy in his mid-30s, Banti, around
1982, began to make preparations to build a corcora. It was an unheard-of move. No one in
Dell owned such a house, and the only people known to do so were Gamma. Starting under
Haile Selassie, some of the northern landlords had built tin-roofed houses in Jinka and Gob,
which people from Dell had seen when going to town. Kalibab, for example, recalls how as
a teenage boy his father sent him to Jinka, to pay taxes to their landlord Zerfo. ‘He lived in a
big tin-roofed house, even the kitchen [house] was a corcora!’ Kalibab told me, still visibly
impressed  half  a  century  later.  But  corcoras’  exclusive  association  with  the  Gamma
notwithstanding, in 1982 Banti assiduously bought roofing sheets in Jinka, transported them
to Dell by horse, and finally built his house in 1983. He was to have only little time to enjoy
it, though, since after less than a year opposition formed. There had been a severe lack of
rain and people blamed Banti’s house for the drought. ‘When you build a tin-roofed house,
the land becomes white’ (corcora iksink, pitshana tsamtsamde), they said, linking the shiny
‘whiteness’ of the metal roof to the ‘whiteness’ of the scorched earth and the glaring sun.24
Soon, the community – with the kebele chairperson’s approval – required Banti to take his
house apart. This he did perforce, selling the roofing sheets to a  Gamma in Gob. It took
almost two more decades until the next attempt to build a  corcora was made. This time,
however, it was a complete success. In 2001, Ayro, a younger brother of Banti’s was elected
chairperson.  Soon after taking office,  Ayro energetically proposed to replace with a tin-
roofed house the ramshackle huts in which the kebele administration had resided so far, and
which had fallen into disrepair during the decade that the kebele had been administered from
Bako (cf. Introduction). He observed that a neighbouring  kebele had already built such a
house and reasoned that it would be bad for the name of Dell if they did not draw level. He
assembled people for communal work, and in a concerted effort the house was built. Some
24 Like many other languages, Aari’af only distinguishes the colours black, red and white. 
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weeks later, Ayro also built a  corcora  for himself, and soon others followed suit.  In the
following years, the number of tin-roofed houses increased exponentially, and in 2016 about
45% of married men owned one. During the same period, many other goods started to make
inroads, and the pursuit of development took off. 
So how can we explain this shift? How did people move from rejecting tin-roofed
houses to desiring them? My argument is in two steps. Let us begin by trying to understand
the rejection of Banti’s house. Recall that people blamed his house for a drought. Now, the
customary explanation for an excess of sun or rain relates to illicit sexual relations, either
incestuous or between manna and xantsa  (low- and high-caste).  This suggests that people
interpreted the house as a taboo-violation, as the crossing of a boundary that was not to be
crossed. To see why it should have made sense for them to think this way, two things need
to be known. First,  corcora were firmly associated with the  Gamma,  who were the only
people known to live in such houses. In fact, Dell people to this day refer to modern goods
at large as ‘Gamma things’ – a point which will become important below. Second, people
have long thought of the difference between themselves and the Gamma in analogy to that
between  manna  and  xantsa,  considering  the  Gamma  as  both  essentially  different  and
superior. If we take these two views together, we can understand why people should have
thought that building a tin-roofed house is like infringing a taboo – not all that different
from a manna having sexual relations with a xantsa. 
There is another way to put this. Bourdieu draws our attention to what he calls ‘sense
of  one’s  place’,  meaning  the  ‘practical  anticipation  of  objective  limits  acquired  by
experience  of  objective  limits  … which  leads  one  to  exclude  oneself  from the  goods,
persons, places and so forth from which one is excluded’ (1984: 471). In other words, a
sense of one’s place leads to the rejection of what one thinks one cannot obtain anyway. It is
the practical sense which makes people say ‘that’s not for the likes of us’ (1977: 77). Dell
people’s  rejection  of  Bantis’ tin-roofed  house,  I  argue,  can  be  seen  as  the  result  and
expression of such a sense of one’s place. For not only did they consider themselves inferior
to the Gamma. But – like the difference between manna and xantsa – the difference between
Aari and Gamma was considered set in stone, a fact of nature that could not be altered. As
we heard godmi Worka suggest in Chapter 1, ‘you can’t lengthen a thumb by pulling at it.’
Given the impossibility for an Aari to become Gamma, there was no point in pretending to
do so by building a  corcora.  School education, in fact, was rejected along similar lines.
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Going to school, people said, just did not lead anywhere, because it was inconceivable for
an Aari  to ever  do anything other than ‘dig in the mud’,  let  alone get  into government
employment. Education, like corcora, simply was ‘not for the likes of us’. The same idea
underlies  notions  like  the one that  wearing shoes  (another  quintessential  Gamma thing)
undermines ritual efficacy, so that shoes need to be taken off whenever carrying out rituals,
or the notion that Satan dwells in the engines of mills, making it dangerous to approach
these. 
I  have argued that  people  in  the  past  rejected  certain  goods because  these were
identified with the  Gamma; a rejection motivated in a language of harm – of tin-roofed
houses causing droughts, education being a dead end and shoes undermining ritual efficacy.
If this line of reasoning is accepted, the question arises as to how people came to pursue the
very goods which they had previously rejected. In asking this question, it is important to
note  that  the  earlier  rejection  did  not  mean  that  people  considered  Gamma  goods  as
worthless.  Contrary  to  18th century  Chinese  aristocrats  who just  could not  see anything
valuable  and  admirable  about  the  manufactured  goods  presented  to  them  by  British
diplomats (cf. Sahlins 1988: 10f.), Dell people did admire tin-roofed houses or mills. These
were  rirshdinda rej,  ‘admirable things’,  ‘things that  made you afraid’,  with fear (bashi)
being a local  idiom for the sensations  of awe and reverence experienced in the face of
something superior. The real question, therefore, is not how people came to perceive modern
goods as having value, but how they came to think it proper and desirable for themselves to
appropriate these valuables. 
My main argument here relates  to  the broader  political  changes  that  occurred in
Ethiopia during the 1990s and the sense of possibility these entailed in Dell.  As Abbink
explains, one of the ‘core principles instituted by the post-1991 government in Ethiopia...
was  ethnic-based federalism’ (2011:  596).  This model  made ethnic identity  the basis  of
politics, institutionally recognized the identities of previously non-dominant peoples, and
asserted the equality of all ethnic groups (ibid.). After a long time during which Orthodox
Christian groups from the North had dominated the rest of the country,  presenting their
culture as  the pinnacle of civilization,  ethnic federalism encouraged previously subdued
ethnic groups to cultivate their own cultures and languages. 
Interestingly,  people in Dell  understood this  discourse of ethnic federalism as an
invitation and encouragement to ‘become Gamma’. Former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi
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himself, as was explained to me, had told them, ‘Aari, become Gamma!’ (Aari jetta Gamma
matkate).  At first view, this could be dismissed as a misunderstanding – people simply had
not grasped the new message of ethnic equality. But this is not so. People did pick up the
notion that all groups are equal (yekka); only that they understood ‘equality’ in one sense
rather than another – as ‘ontological equality’, rather than as ‘equal worth’ (Turner 1986: 34;
cf. Robbins 1994: 33). 
A notion of equal worth of Aari and Gamma is absent to this day. There continues to
be a pronounced sense of inferiority, and I was often struck by how readily my interlocutors
described  themselves  in  comparison  to  the  Gamma  as  ignorant,  backwards,  lacking  in
cleverness, and even in hygiene.25 What did change, however, was the perception of the
nature  of  the  boundary  between  the  two  groups.  Where  this  boundary  was  previously
deemed  insurmountable,  the  message  of  equality  and  the  government’s  purported
encouragement for Aari to become Gamma ushered in a sense of possibility. Ontologically
equal to the Gamma, Aari could in principle become Gamma themselves. Crucially, it was
precisely through the consumption of modern goods that Dell people understood they could
achieve this transformation. This understanding makes sense since, as noted above, goods
like trousers, tin-roofed houses or mills are considered as ‘Gamma goods’. 
From what I have said so far, it may seem clear why to become Gamma should have
been  attractive  to  people.  It  is  important,  however,  to  distinguish  two  reasons.  A first,
frequently given reason is voiced by Kxaukibab, a man in his early 70s. During an interview
on the changes he had witnessed during his lifetime, Kxaukibab said with real gratitude:
‘In the past, we Aari didn’t have a name. The Gamma belittled us, they laughed at us. But
now development has come to our land, and we have grown our name. We wear good
clothes, we live in tin-roofed houses. Now Aari become Gamma. So who is to belittle us
now? Truly, good days have come to us!’
On this account, to ‘become Gamma’ through modern consumption means to improve one’s
name vis-à-vis the ‘real’ Gamma. This must be understood against the background that the
Christian Northerners who had conquered the area around the turn of the 20th century as well
25 In the same vein, Evangelicals, harking back to Genesis 9: 18-27, explained to me that the Aari were
descendants of Ham, and the Gamma of Shem. Since Ham had laughed at his father, Noah, when finding
him drunk and naked, God had blessed Ham’s descendants ‘only with mud’. But Ham’s brother, Shem,
had respectfully covered his father’s nudity, and so with God’s blessing the Gamma were able to wear at
all times the white  gabi  (a vestment associated with Orthodox Christians) and to work ‘by pen’ or ‘by
money’ rather than to ‘dig in the mud’. 
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as their descendants had looked down on local people for their low level of material wealth
and technology – for sleeping on the floor rather than on a bed, for wearing clothes made
from sheep skin or plant materials, for going bare-foot. To acquire clothes, a mattress, a tin-
roofed house and so on is therefore thought to make one more respectable in the eyes of
these Northerners. It means to have a name where one did not use to have one.26 
At the same time, consumption of ‘Gamma things’ also helps to magnify one’s name
within  the  community  of  Dell.  Gamma  being  deemed  ‘greater’ than  Aari,  to  ‘become
Gamma’ is  to  gain  in  status.  Of  course,  not  everyone  who  owns  a  pair  of  trousers  is
immediately considered a Gamma. Rather, it were only the wealthiest people in Dell whom
I actually heard being referred to as having ‘become Gamma’. And in any case it is certainly
less a matter of  being or not being than of being  more or less Gamma – the transition is
continuous,  not dichotomous.  Yet, while not everyone may actually progress very far at
becoming Gamma, everyone has to reckon with the fact that ownership in modern goods is
now the dominant standard for assessing name. In being associated with the purportedly
superior Gamma, modern goods are more prestigious than traditional uses of wealth coded
as ‘Aari’. Hence, to invest in the latter is suboptimal from the point of view of name. 
 
3.6 The Conflict between Respect and Reputation
Dell people’s quest for development, I have argued, is driven by their desire to have a name.
But  how  exactly  do  they  pursue  development?  We  have  seen  their  understanding  of
development as a series of steps that lead to ever more valuable and profitable assets – so
what do they practically do to take these steps, to move from one rung of the development
ladder to the next? And what are the consequences of working toward name in this way,
rather than in the old way? We know from Chapter 1 that feasts and kinship are important
for bonshmi. So what happens to bonshmi if feasts and kinship are no longer important for
building name? In this final section, I examine these questions by, in turn, taking a closer
look at economic production and consumption. 
26 At this point my argument has some resonance with Sahlins’ (1992) and Robbins’ (2005) argument on
‘humiliation’ as a cause of economic take-off (cf. Introduction). Note, though, that there is an important
difference. On my reading, Sahlins and Robbins suggest that through humiliation people first come to hate
their old values and then adopt new values in their place. In Dell, however, the old value of nami has not
been questioned or replaced. Rather, all that people did here was to take up a new, and in their view better
way to realize this established value. 
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Rationalizing Production
As a way into this analysis, let us return to Aftamo, whom we have met above marvelling at
his new townhouse. To build this house, Aftamo had relied on the labour of a group of four
men from Gayl, an area further into the highlands that is known for its poor soils and harsh
living conditions. The men were experienced and skilled builders, and Aftamo had settled
with them on a fixed price of 3200 Birr. The four men were assisted by two young men from
Dell, charged with menial tasks, each of whom Aftamo paid a daily wage of 90 Birr. The
work was completed in two and a half days. Aftamo explained to me that he could also have
built the house by way of dabba. This would have meant slaughtering two sheep, preparing
bread, brewing beer and Karibo (a sugary drink preferred by Evangelicals), and ‘begging’
(miks) his neighbours and relatives to come and help him. There was nothing wrong with
dabba, Aftamo said. On the contrary, it was a highly enjoyable affair with plenty of eating,
drinking and joking. But then again you always had people whose ‘main plan [was] to fill
their  stomachs’,  rather  than  to  work,  and  so  work  often  dragged  on  for  longer  than
technically necessary. Moreover, Aftamo explained, building the house by way of  contrat
was cheaper than calling for  dabba.  The value of the two sheep and the grain used for
making food would have come to no less than 4200 Birr, exceeding the 3650 Birr he had
ended up paying to the cash labourers. 
Aftamo’s decision to draw on cash labour rather than on  dabba,  reflects a wider
trend of change in Dell. Together with mol’a, a second type of co-operative labour, dabba in
the past accounted for roughly half of economic production, the other half being carried out
by domestic groups. This is suggested by my interviews on how production was organized
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Donham (1994: 123) offers similar numbers for 1970s
Maale. Dabba was used for a variety of tasks, from clearing forest, to ploughing, weeding
and harvesting, to building and thatching huts. Depending on the amount of work,  dabba
lasted  for  one or  two days,  and there would be  around 12-15 people.  My interlocutors
suggested that they on average participated in someone’s dabba once every two weeks, and
that they themselves called for dabba twice a year. At present, however,  dabba has all but
disappeared: It is no longer used for agricultural production, and in the domain of house-
building it is increasingly superseded by cash labour. 
This is all the more surprising for the high value that used to be placed on dabba for
being an enjoyable form of working together. Contrary to  mol’a, work in the context of
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dabba was  less  tightly  controlled.  There  were more  frequent  and longer  breaks,  during
which people would sit in the shade of a tree, drinking beer and ‘smiling together’; after
work the group would move to its host’s house to drink more beer and dance guzza. Due to
this festive character, being called – or, as people put it ‘begged’ – to attend someone’s
dabba was something invitees were happy about. And as Gamibab asserted,  ‘you called
above all those whom you liked’. At the same time, to convene dabba placed an obligation
on the host to attend in return the dabba of those who had worked for him. Thus, dabba was
a form of economic production that regularly brought together a group of neighbours and
relatives, provided an occasion for affectionate and respectful interactions, and reproduced
relations among the participants. 
So what explains the decline of  dabba? People’s own explanations for this trend
usually echoed Aftamo’s reasoning: dabba requires a greater expenditure of time and wealth
than alternative forms of production and therefore appears wasteful. Some also mentioned
the issue of obligations. Betsi, for instance, asserted, ‘If I call you for dabba today, you will
call me for  dabba tomorrow [in the future]. But maybe I have another plan on that day. I
want to go to the market, or I need to weed my garlic. So if you call me, it’s a problem.’
This latter explanation points in the same direction as the former:  dabba  is economically
disadvantageous because it hinders you from attending to your own economic projects and
bringing  them  to  fruition.  As  people  often  explained  to  me,  these  days  everyone  was
pursuing a greater variety of economic projects – trading, cattle raising, and growing cash
crops had come on top of cultivating grain. This required an amount of ‘running’ (hass)
back and forth between projects which was incompatible with being bound to a cycle of
dabba exchanges (or, for that matter, to the fixed schedule of a mol’a work group). 
Dabba has declined, then, because people have come to perceive it as economically
wasteful – a perception they did not have in the past. This shift in the evaluation of dabba
needs to be understood against the background of the shift in how reputation is assessed. As
long as sponsoring feasts was one key way to gain name, dabba harmonized with the end of
building reputation. By showing lavish hospitality to your guests – using a variety of grain
to produce tasty beer and hosting them well into the evening – you showed your generosity
and readiness to ‘feed’ others. In fact, the very act of convening dabba benefited your name:
not everyone could afford to convene dabba and hence doing so indexed your wealth. But
with  the  shift  in  how name is  assessed,  dabba has  turned  into  a  sub-optimal  mode  of
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production. For one thing, it is more expensive than cash labour. It thus wastes wealth that
could otherwise be saved so as to eventually move up even higher on the development
ladder. For Aftamo, the next step will be to improve his townhouse, in order to ask a higher
rent. But such improvements cost money. So saving wealth by using cash labour allows
Aftamo to make this step sooner than if he relied on dabba. Indeed, dabba can presently be
outright  detrimental  to  one’s  name.  This  is  because in  many people’s  eyes,  to  convene
dabba is an index that you are more concerned with eating than with ‘showing change’:
Why would you not use the cheaper alternative (cash labour), if it was not because you
‘only thought about your stomach’?
Significantly, the shift from dabba to cash labour is more than just a shift from one
mode of realizing name to another. It is also a shift from a mode of economic production
which at the same time realizes bonshmi, to one that does not. I have described dabba as an
occasion for socializing, for eating and drinking, dancing and joking, and thus for being in
respectful interaction. And to invite each other reciprocally is part of cultivating respect, too.
Cash labour, by contrast, does not produce bonshmi. Not only is there no commensality and
no staying-together after the end of work. But cash labour does not produce any lasting
relations,  either,  because  it  does  not  lead  to  mutual  indebtedness.  The  cash  fully
recompenses the labour, and no obligation is on the patron to work in the future for those
who worked for him today. The shift from dabba to cash labour, then, means a shift from a
form of economic production which co-realizes the values of bonshmi and nami, to one that
is only connected to the value of nami but does not afford bonshmi. 
At present, people like Aftamo therefore face a trade-off which they would not have
faced  in  the  past:  either  they  get  their  work  done  in  a  way  productive  of  respectful
interactions but with little benefit to their name, or they get their work done in a way that
supports their project to build a name but that does not produce an occasion for respectful
interaction. The decline of dabba shows that people have increasingly decided for the latter
option. But this does not mean that this choice is unproblematic for them. On the contrary,
dabba frequently featured among the things the disappearance of which people lamented. 
Other changes in the realm of economic production were perceived to feature in the
decline of respect, too – not only because they reduce occasions for respectful interaction
but also because they sometimes lead to outright disrespect and conflict. The following case
illustrates this. 
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The tensions between Kalibab and Kalinda erupted noisily one evening in May. It
was the main planting season and the busiest time of the year. Kalibab had returned at night-
fall, hungry, tired, and his legs caked in mud. More than an hour had passed since, and, too
tired for conversation, he had sunken deep into his chair, sullenly listening to the radio’s
transmission of a melancholic flute’s losing battle against atmospheric noise. And still no
sign of Kalinda and the coffee. Kalinda finally appeared at half past eight, balancing a bowl
with roasted grain and a coffee-pot, from which she hastily poured Kalibab a cup. But rather
than to speak his usual blessing over the coffee, Kalibab declared that he could not drink
any of it, because his ‘stomach had become very hot’. What was the matter with Kalinda, he
asked with barely suppressed rage. Had he not paid bridewealth for her? Had her father not
told her to quickly serve her husband coffee, whenever he came home tired from work? And
had her  father  not  also  told  her  to  bring  him water  to  wash his  feet?  Had she  simply
forgotten all of this, or did she take pleasure in seeing him hungry and dirty? This was not
the first time she had been so slow, he said, pointing to several instances during the past
weeks where he had had to wait  an inordinate time for his  coffee or food. Menacingly
rapping his knuckles on the table, Kalibab warned her to, ‘watch out, or you or one of the
children is going to fall ill and say “yiiii, yiiii” [whine with pain].’ With downcast eyes,
Kalinda waited for some moments after Kalibab’s eruption had ended. Then she turned to
me, and – putting me in the position of a mediator – acknowledged that she had indeed
failed in her domestic duties today and in the recent past, and that she was very sorry for
that, ‘for he is my husband, and so I should treat him with bonshmi.’ But, she went on to
explain with desperation, she was in a difficult situation and could not really do much about
it. This year, she had rented a field from her sister’s husband to grow garlic. She urgently
needed the money to buy clothes. ‘Because if you don’t have good clothes, if you don’t have
three of this type and three of that, but always go in your same old clothes, people laugh at
you. The other women at church would laugh at me.’ Since Kalibab did not give her any
money or clothes, she had to see to this herself. But she could only go to work in her field
after she had finished the day’s work assigned to her by Kalibab. This usually meant that she
only got to do her own work in the late afternoon. Coming home after dark, she still had to
tether her livestock for the night, and only then could she start preparing coffee and dinner.
Thus she ended up failing to bring her husband his coffee in time.
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It is only in the last few years that some women have started to rent fields and work
‘for themselves’ (jinte mataken). This innovation is driven by women’s increased need for
cash, which in turn hangs together with the growing importance of consumer goods like
clothes for being esteemed. As Kalinda’s case shows, this brings women into conflict with
their husbands. Most husbands wish to control and exploit their wives’ labour power for
their  own purposes  and expect  to  be treated  deferentially  at  all  times.  This  means  that
women like Kalinda now face a constant value conflict between cultivating their name and
showing their husband the respect they know he deserves.
From Eating To Saving
In their quest for development, Dell people have remodelled the production side of their
economic lives. Among others, they now work longer hours than in the past, grow more
cash crops, sow two crops of grain per year instead of one, engage into new activities like
trading  livestock  or  operating  a  mill,  and  cut  production  costs  through  new  forms  of
organizing  labour.  But  the  quest  to  gain  a  name  through  development  also  affects
consumption practices. We have already seen that people now buy goods they did not buy in
the past. Beyond that, many now consciously strive to ‘save’ (sud) wealth rather than to ‘eat’
(its) or otherwise ‘destroy’ (kais) it.
My friend Ankshi is a good example here.  A teacher at the local school,  Ankshi
earned 1800 Birr per month. He also had two fields in which he grew food for his family as
well as cash crops; on the weekends he went to trade sheep, and he was constantly on the
lookout  for  new business  ventures.  So intense  was  his  desire  to  grow, he  told  me one
evening when I visited him for dinner, that he often lay awake at night, twisting his mind for
ways to ‘grow’ even faster. At the same time, Ankshi was someone who enjoyed going to
one of the bars in the village to have some bottles of soft-drink with his friends, and to tell
one of the funny stories that he always seemed to have down pat. But an evening at the bar,
Ankshi explained to me, easily cost him 60 or 70 Birr, and that was clearly too much. He
had therefore decided to join an iqub (rotating savings association) where he would have to
deposit 500 Birr per week. This meant that he simply would not be able to afford to go to
the bar, because it would take him his entire salary and some more to pay 500 Birr a week,
and if you failed to pay your contribution there was a high fine. 
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Ankshi, then, used  iqub  as a technique to keep himself from spending money on
purposes that undermined his ‘growth’. It is important to note, however, that to go to the bar
for Ankshi is not a desire he disapproves of. To drink and socialize with his friends is a
value for him, no less than development. Yet, of these two values, the latter is apparently the
more important one for him, and he is ready to sacrifice the bonshmi involved in socializing
with others at the bar for the name he can gain through economic advancement. 
During the time of my fieldwork,  iqub were hugely popular in Dell.  Apart  from
unmarried youngsters, almost everyone I knew (men and women alike) participated in one,
and  it  was  not  uncommon  that  people  challenged  themselves  by  entering  an  iqub that
required a slightly higher contribution than they felt they could easily afford. This was not
only valued as a means to restrain one’s appetites so as to keep oneself from eating wealth.
But to have hardly any cash at home was also considered a good thing because it meant that
if others asked you to lend them money, you did not have to lie or to openly refuse their
request. 
   Figure 11. An iqub at its fortnightly meeting in the compound of its convenor
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Next to  iqub, people in Dell also valued Evangelicalism as ‘good for saving’. This
should not come as a surprise given my account in Chapter 2. There we have seen that
evangelical  institutions  involve  much less  commensality  than  karta  institutions;  and we
have learnt about the concern to quickly get done with things like funerals so as to not give
people the chance to sin. I also showed that evangelical institutions continue to be reworked
in  order  to  make  them  less  costly  to  prevent  people  from  ‘becoming  sad’.  To  be  an
Evangelical, then, means having relatively more time and wealth available for the pursuit of
development. Next to Evangelicalism’s affordance of a world with less gomma, this relative
inexpensiveness was widely perceived as another attractive feature. For a few people it was
even the  main  reason for  conversion  (cf.  Freeman 2012b).  Just  as  in  the  case  of  iqub,
however,  the  possibility  to  save  wealth  through  being  amain  comes  at  the  expense  of
commensality and bonshmi, as I have shown in the previous chapter.
A final way in which the quest for development and name has affected consumption
in Dell relates to  karta. As I have briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, if one examines how
karta has changed over the past ten or fifteen years, one above all sees that it has become
less costly. Funerals, for example, though having maintained their overall form, now involve
much less  expenditure  or  destruction  of  wealth.  It  used  to  be  a  required  expression  of
respect for the dead to trample down their fields, to cut down the arxemi grove surrounding
their compound, to break bee-hives, and to spill grain from the granaries. During the Derg it
also became common to borrow guns from the  kebele  administration and to fire multiple
rounds of shots. None of this is done any longer in Dell. One reason for this is that funerary
destruction  was  prohibited  after  being  identified  as  a  ‘harmful  traditional  practice’ in  a
manual  released  by  South  Aari  district in  2006.  Significantly,  however,  several  people
suggested that this prohibition had been quite welcome. With the government’s sanction,
they no longer had to fulfil obligations which they had already come to perceive as wasteful.
If  some  institutions  have  been  down-scaled  and  become  less  expensive,  other
institutions have disappeared more or less completely because people are no longer ready to
invest wealth in them. Siri feasting groups are a prime example. A siri consisted of 12 to 16
people, usually men, sometimes also women. They would meet every six to eight weeks.
Each time, a different member acted as host. He (or she) had to provide two fat sheep, as
well as beer and bread. People stayed together for five or six days, eating, talking, resting. It
was a rule that you were not allowed to do any work during this time; in case of failure to
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comply with this, you had to pay a small sheep or alcohol as a fine (which was jointly
consumed).  Siri  was  highly  valued  because  it  created  kinship-like  relations  among
participants and afforded multiple expressions of bonshmi. It also was good for one’s name
to eat in a siri because it both showed one’s wealth and one’s readiness to host others. The
memory of siri invariably brought a glitter into people’s eyes. Yet, while there were perhaps
20 or 25 such groups during the 1990s, there was only one left when I did my fieldwork.
Siri, people explained, simply was too costly and time-intensive and, like dabba, something
that indexed an excessive concern with one’s ‘stomach’. Siri,  in brief, now is bad for your
name. Under the pull  of development,  feasting groups have been sacrificed for building
reputation. 
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter took off from the observation that over the past 15 or so years, people in Dell
have  embarked  on  an  avid  quest  for  development.  The concern  with  ‘growing’
economically,  both personally and as  a  community,  is  now a top concern,  and this  has
entailed significant changes in how people use their time and wealth. The chapter sought to
offer an explanation for this profound engagement with development and to examine how it
has affected respect. I argued that power-based explanations do not really fit the case of Dell
because people embrace development as something positive rather than try to resist it. The
amount of energy ploughed into the pursuit of development cannot simply be explained as
an effect of coercion. I then went on to ask what motivates people to pursue development.
Here it became clear that progress at development is deemed essential for ‘having a name’,
and that this is a key aspiration for people, not least because it forms part of what it means
to be respected. But the discovery that people pursue development to build their name threw
up a further question: given that people previously evaluated name on the basis of wealth in
people and sponsorship of feasts, how did they come to take development and wealth in
modern goods as the standard for assessing name? I argued that people have engaged with
development in a quest to realize the value of name more fully than had been possible in the
past,  when they  felt  that  they  did  not  have  a  name vis-à-vis  the  Gamma.  Moreover,  I
observed  that  the  understanding  that  consumption  of  modern  goods  turns  people  into
Gamma comes with possibilities for gaining a greater  reputation inside of Dell.  Having
offered an explanation for how people came to take up the pursuit of development, I went
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on to point out the troubling consequence of this: the emergence of a value conflict between
reputation  and  respect  –  between working to  be  highly  regarded and working to  be  in
respectful  interaction  with  others.  I  showed that  people  increasingly  opted  in  favour  of
name, but that they were also keenly aware of how this undermined respect. Indeed, as we
will see in more detail in the next chapter, the quest for development, beyond drawing away
resources from kinship and commensality, also comes with a rise in aggressive competition,
envy,  greed  and other  social  ills.  As such,  development  does  not  just  contribute  to  the
decline of traditional forms of respect but also poses a threat to specifically evangelical
conceptions of this value. It is to this threat and Evangelicals’ defence against it that I now
turn.
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Chapter 4. Defending Respect: An Evangelical Critique of Economic 
Development
4.1 Introduction
For some moments the sound of the softly falling rain was all there was to be heard. Then,
taking a deep breath, Adamo launched into the final bit of his prayer. ‘Lord forgive us!’ he
supplicated, ‘these are times in which things of the flesh are all we think about. Oh God,
forgive us! We steal your time and don't go out to work for you. Forgive us for having
abandoned your work! We are people filled with sin. Throwing you down to the ground we
pass our days. And we are afraid when we look ahead. When your fight comes upon us,
God, what are we to do?’ 
When the last words of the prayer had died away, silence settled over the dimly lit
hut, interrupted but for the occasional remorseful sigh. On this day in May 2017, some 25
women and men had assembled to  celebrate  the  Friday morning service  in  their  budin
(group). One of five small groups of Dell’s largest evangelical church, this  budin brought
together believers from Makibot area. For some years it had had its own meeting place in a
spacious hut, built on a small piece of land owned by the group. 
Stepping into the centre of the circle formed by the attendants, Adamo, a gentle, soft-
spoken man in his mid-30s, looked around for a moment and then laid down his unopened
bible  on  the  pulpit.  One  of  the  small  group's  five  main  leaders,  Adamo  had  been
commissioned with leading the service that day. ‘I will not use the bible today,’ he said in a
calm voice, ‘but will speak to you plainly.’ Looking around the group he continued: 
‘Last night, as we leaders had our meeting in here, a chunk of the wall came off. That
made me think if it wouldn't be better to close down this place altogether. What's the
point of going on like this? How many times have we said we'll build a new hut, or even
a tin-roofed house. But so far we've only managed to clear away the grass [from the new
building site]. And I'm sure it’ll have grown back by the time we get out to work again…
These are days when land is scarce. So wouldn't it be better to give this land to someone
who will use it for growing grain? We started this place in the hope of making more
people from Makibot area believe, and to grow into a full church one day. Today, many
people in this area are believers. But when we call for God's Work, hardly anyone turns
up. The other day, I thought about blowing the turumba (horn used by local government
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officials  to  call  people  for  communal  work)  and shouting,  'Makibot  Small  Grouuup,
Tomorrow Six O'clooook,  Everyone Come To Woooork!'  But  this  is  the  way of  the
government,  not  that  of  the  church.  We don't  force  anyone  to  come;  we  should  be
desirous to do God's Work. So whose problem is this? Probably of us leaders. If we went
out and worked, then surely others would follow our example. But we don't even come to
sleep over [on Thursday night before the Friday service]. We sleep at home. We throw
God down and just sleep.’ 
At this  point,  one  of  the other  leaders,  who had been absent  from the previous  night's
meeting, blurted out ‘You don't know my problem. My wife is ill and I had to go to the
market [to sell something] to be able to buy medicine.’ Unperturbed, Adamo went on with
his harangue for some time, before he closed by saying: ‘All we think about these days is
our own gabinti (‘growth’, development). But if you go to the market, and you know there'll
be a church event later that day, you may have to sell for five Birr, what you had hoped to
sell for ten. What kind of days have come upon us that all we think about are things of the
flesh? May God forgive us!’ 
***
The scene witnessed in the small group that rainy Friday morning was by no means unusual.
On the contrary, the notion that people were overly concerned with development or ‘things
of the flesh’ (wa rej)  was frequently voiced by  amain (‘believers’)  in Dell.  There were
several occasions, for example, when a preacher urged congregants to not care so much
about  their  clothes,  and to  ‘come to church without  even having washed your face.’ In
prayers people bemoaned that they no longer took time to think about God because all they
did was to ‘run around’ in pursuit of wealth. Repeatedly I heard God being asked to help
people overcome their ‘addiction to money’ (Birrite sus). And materialism and greed were
also  common  topics  in  private  conversations  among  dedicated  Evangelicals.  On  such
occasions, people cited bible passages that urge not to worry about the material side of one’s
life, but to focus on seeking God. Particularly popular were Matthew 6: 19-21 – on not
storing up treasures on earth but in heaven – and Matthew 6: 26-34 – on trusting that God
will feed and clothe you, just as he does with the ‘birds of the air’ that ‘do not sow or reap or
store away in barns’, and the ‘flowers of the field’ that ‘do not labour or spin’. 
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Evangelical Christianity and Economic Development
Dell Kale Heywot’s critical stance toward the quest for economic development is rather
unusual when compared to other ethnographic accounts of Christianity and economic life in
Africa. 
For some time now, there has been a lively debate concerning the extent to which
different  forms  of  Christianity  –  particularly  from  within  the  evangelical  spectrum  –
contribute to  economic progress  in Africa.  Several  scholars  have presented cases  where
churches contributed to development by preaching frugality, hard work, rational planning,
entrepreneurialism and individual accumulation (Maxwell 1998, Berger 2008, 2010, van
Dijk 2009, Freeman 2012a, 2012b). In other cases, scholars have doubted such a positive
influence.  Writing  about  Ghanaian  neo-Pentecostal  churches  preaching  the  Prosperity
Gospel,  for instance,  Gifford (2015) argues that  reliance on massive offerings and faith
rather than on hard work may mean that in reality no contribution to economic progress is
made. Yet others have pointed out that in impoverished urban and rural areas, where worldly
prosperity is  not  within reach, churches often focus less on prosperity  than on security,
healing and deliverance (Maxwell 2006: 420, Englund 2011, Hasu 2012, Jones 2009). How
much Christianity de facto contributes to the economic advancement of its followers, then,
is subject to ongoing debate and certainly differs between cases. What does not differ across
the cited ethnographic contexts, is local Christians’ sense that prosperity – elusive as it may
be – is desirable and worth striving for, even if only as part of a broader project of social
production  (Haynes  2013).  By  contrast,  we  have  hardly  any  ethnographic  accounts  of
African Christians who problematize wealth and the pursuit of economic development. It is
at this point, then, that my case differs. 
Against this background, my aim in the first part of this chapter is to understand why
exactly the church in Dell is critical of development. Here we will  see how the present
chapter fits into the broader concerns of this thesis: I show that the church is critical because
the  feverish  pursuit  of  development  –  and  the  antagonisms  that  are  its  result  –  pose
challenges to the church’s vision of a society marked by humility and mutual respect. In
other words, the evangelical critique of development appears as an attempt to push back
against the decline of respect. The second part  of the chapter asks what it  takes for the
evangelical defence of respect to be successful. I approach this question through people’s
own understandings of what makes Evangelicals ‘spiritually strong’, meaning ready to give
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up  on  development  where  it  conflicts  with  Christian  principles.  On  my  interlocutors’
account, experiencing God’s power and playing an active role in church are two key factors
for spiritual strength. I explain why this also makes sense from an analytical viewpoint, and
I  provide  evidence  that  these  factors  do  indeed  have  an  effect  on  people’s  economic
practice. I conclude by pointing to a further factor that allows some people to be strong
Christians:  The most  dedicated Evangelicals  in  Dell  can  realize through Evangelicalism
what others can only realize through development: a great name. For these Evangelicals
there is no conflict between being respectful of others and building a name, for it is through
the former that they achieve the latter. 
4.2 Evangelical Criticisms of Development
Let us go back to the scene from the introduction to start examining why the local church is
critical of development. The immediate trigger for Adamo’s harangue was a chunk of the
wall  coming  off  during  the  leaders’ meeting.  As  he  reminded  his  listeners,  they  had
repeatedly  made plans  to  build  a  new hut  or  even  a  tin-roofed  house.  But  due  to  low
working morale, none of this had materialized. The crumbling wall, therefore, appeared as a
tangible sign of people’s failure to do God’s Work. 
God’s Work (sabite woni) is something Evangelicalism in Dell puts high value on.
Everyone is expected to participate in the collective work carried out by the church and the
small groups on one morning per week respectively. This work can consist in freely helping
elderly  or  sick  people,  or,  as  in  the  present  case,  in  repairing  and  expanding  church
buildings. More commonly,  it  takes the form of cultivating church-owned land or doing
agricultural labour for paying clients. Next to people’s tithes, these are the only sources of
income for the church, which does not receive any funding from outside of Dell.  God’s
Work, then, is economically necessary. But it is also seen as an important expression of faith
(imnet). Indeed, it is said that ‘faith and work are one’ and that ‘there’s no faith without
work’. This is because to work for God is to honour Him as the true creator and owner of all
things. People’s labour power and time ultimately are gifts from God; and thankfulness for
this gift ought to move them – ought to make them desirous (uxim), as Adamo put it to the
small group – to return a part of what they have received.
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Figure 12. A small group harvesting wheat
For all its importance, however, God’s Work often was not very well attended. In Adamo’s
group, for instance, there were several occasions when work had been scheduled but then
failed to get very far because only a handful of people turned up. This problem also affected
the church. Tellingly, the overseer of the church's fields pointed out to me that, in reaction to
unreliable attendance of God's Work, they had started to look for less labour intensive ways
of generating income. A first step had been to plant eucalypti in one of the church's fields,
instead of using it for crops. As the overseer explained, ‘the trees grow on their own, they
don’t require much labour. They grow for seven or eight or nine years and then we cut them
down and sell them to people from town [for house construction].’ 
A related complaint by the church was that people failed to tithe correctly. In Dell,
amain are expected to give 10% of their  harvest  as well  as a  tenth of all  money made
through the sale of livestock or received as bridewealth.  They are also to  give the first
offspring of a cow or sheep. Contrary to the case of God’s Work, where lack of participation
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was directly visible, it was more difficult to assess the extent to which people did not tithe
properly. But it is sufficient to note that in the local understanding this was a real problem –
so real, indeed, that when Dell was hit by drought in 2016, people’s failure to tithe correctly
was singled out as the key reason for why God had decided to discipline them by way of a
drought. 
The widespread failure to attend God’s Work and to tithe properly was explained as a
result of people’s urgent desire to get ahead economically. During the drought, for instance,
one preacher imitated what people thought when their cow’s first calf was female: You think
about all the offspring this calf is eventually going to bear for, picturing how your cattle
herd will grow; you think ahead to the economic growth this calf is going to afford you, but
this desire for cattle eclipses the desire you should feel to honour God by giving this first
calf to Him. 
Or take the explanations members of the small group gave in response to Adamo’s
harangue. One woman avowed that she had been absent from God’s Work the other day
because  her  onion  field  required  urgent  weeding  if  the  onions  were  not  to  be  choked.
Another group member explained that he had failed to come because, hearing that the price
for garlic had gone up, he had rushed to the market to sell some. Hence, a first reason for the
church’s critique of the desire for development was the observation that the latter sometimes
makes people disrespect God, by keeping for themselves what they really ought to give to
Him.
Further fuel for the problematization of development was provided by cases where
Evangelicals sought to gain economic advantage through aggressive means. These included
borrowing money and then denying to have done so, or trying to increase the size of their
field by ‘eating’ from that of their neighbour (i.e. ploughing beyond the border). In one
extreme case, an amain man hired someone from outside of Dell to kill his brother's son,
Bashi. A few weeks earlier, Bashi had successfully sued him for a field, which had belonged
to Bashi’s father.  It  had been wrongfully appropriated by Bashi’s father’s brother,  when
Bashi’s father died. Now the brother hoped to get the field back by murdering its legitimate
owner. This case sparked a great deal of discussion, and for many epitomized how far things
had degenerated because of the current desire for wealth. 
On a related note it was critically observed that people who had suffered economic
damage because of someone else’s fault seemed less and less ready to forgive freely. In
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Chapter  2 we have already heard about the importance of forgiveness in the context  of
gomma. Forgiveness is also central to the economic ethics advocated by the church. It is so
important, indeed, that we should look at it in some more detail. 
To  begin  with,  consider  the  following  account  which  describes  how forgiveness
ought  to be practised in economic life. It was given by Abraham, whom we know from
Chapter 2 as a particularly virtuous Evangelical.
When I came to my field, four stray cattle were grazing on the crop. They had entered the
field on previous occasions, but this time they had all but finished my maize. I asked
around for the owner, but couldn't find out who it was. So, finally, I drove the cattle to the
kebele [administration]  to  have them confined.  The next  morning,  the  owner,  a  man
called Muli, alongside some elders came to my house. 'Gasho', I said to him [using a
respectful form of address], 'look at my crops. I wanted to raise my children from this
maize, but now it's all gone.' 'I will pay! I will pay!' he cried, 'I will plant a similar-sized
field and give you the harvest. Or what else are you going to eat?' But I declined, and I
also gave him the 60 Birr it had cost him to ransom his oxen from the kebele. 'God's Holy
Word tells us to not make others pay', I explained to him. 'In Matthew 5:13 it says that we
are the salt of the earth. If I asked compensation, I would be like savour-less salt, to be
thrown out and trampled underfoot. We are to be like a shining town on a hilltop, visible
from afar.' When I had said all this to him, Muli responded, 'May God bless you!'. …
Well, you see, that's what I want! When is is said, 'God bless you', you can sleep without
having eaten. God doesn't make me go hungry. He says, 'Do not worry!' He feeds the
birds that neither sow nor build a granary. So will He not feed us, too? 
Situations like the one faced by Abraham are far from unusual in contemporary Dell. As a
result of population growth and land scarcity, people now use every available inch of land. It
therefore happens much more easily than in the past (when there were wide stretches of
unused land) that livestock stray onto a neighbouring field or meadow, or that a fire set to
burn down shrubbery destroys crops in an adjacent field. Yet, as Abraham explains based on
his own example, no matter how great the damage you have suffered, you need to forgive
others freely. Indeed, in his own case, the very act of having Muli’s cattle confined at the
kebele was a departure from doctrine, which prohibits any form of ‘making others pay’. It
was for this reason that Abraham (who had seen no other way to identify the cattle’s owner
than having them confined) gave 60 Birr to Muli.
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The  emphasis  on  unconditional  forgiveness  is  a  striking  feature  of  Dell
Evangelicalism.  It  contrasts  with  cases  where  a  more  aggressive  way  of  dealing  with
economic  conflicts  is  promoted.  Van  Dijk,  for  instance,  writing  about  Botswanian
Pentecostal churches catering to migrants from Ghana, reports how a woman running a hair
salon boasted  about  firing  an employee,  whom she suspected  of  not  handing in  all  the
money received from her customers (2009: 108). This kind of self-assertive behaviour was
praised and demanded by pastors; and less self-assertive women were ostracised from the
church (ibid.: 109). Along similar lines, others have reported about practices of ‘spiritual
warfare’ (Van de Kamp 2011, Van Wyk 2014) or ‘dangerous prayers’ (Haynes 2017: 5), that
believers are encouraged to use against  those who stand in  their  way toward economic
prosperity.  In  these  cases,  firing  an  unreliable  employee  or  trying  to  assert  oneself  by
enlisting God’s power against others, are not only considered legitimate but are deemed
exhibitions  of  spiritual  strength.  In  Dell,  by  contrast,  the  opposite  is  true.  Here,  one
demonstrates faith through lenience and forgiveness, even if this comes at a considerable
economic cost. 
Yet,  not  everyone  in  Dell  was  ready  to  accept  this  cost.  My conversation  with
Abraham took place against the background of a couple of recent cases where Evangelicals
had demanded compensation. One man had suffered the death of his horse after it had been
kicked by another man’s horse. Arguing that without a horse he could not transport his
produce to the market, he demanded the other man’s horse in compensation (which is the
karta way of dealing with such a situation). In another case, a man lost an oxen because it
was gored to death by his neighbour’s bull. He demanded that his neighbour give him an
oxen because otherwise he would be unable to plough his field. In a third case, a man went
before the local government court to sue someone who had purportedly borrowed money
from him but who denied having done so. He argued that he urgently needed the money to
pay his contributions to an  iqub  saving association. However, this too was a violation of
doctrine, which prohibits taking others to court (see Sommerschuh forthcoming a). In all
these cases, then, people violated the principle of forgiveness because they feared that they
would  lose out  economically.  The occurrence  of  such cases  was another  reason for  the
problematization of the quest for development. 
A final reason concerns the telos of development. In Chapter 3 we saw that people’s
main motivation to pursue development is to increase their name – to gain other people’s
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admiration  and to  be considered  ‘great’ or  ‘heavy’.  But  this  aspiration  contradicts  Dell
Evangelicalism’s emphasis on humility. As we saw in Chapter 2, the church in Dell urges
people to value others above themselves. To strive to magnify one’s name, however, is to
strive to be on top of others. Moreover, to realize the value of name, wealth needs to be
displayed in the form of prestige goods. From the local evangelical point of view, however,
display amounts to boastfulness and is a sign of pride. It is also condemned as a cause of
sadness. Thus, in a service shortly before Christmas 2016, a preacher urged congregants not
to wear new clothes for the upcoming Christmas service, arguing that those who could not
afford buying any, would become sad if they saw others in beautiful new outfits. 
To  sum  up,  evangelical  discourse  in  Dell  features  a  critique  of  the  quest  for
development. This quest is blamed for a number of ills. These include failure to tithe and do
God’s Work, use of aggressive means to gain economic advantage, failure to forgive freely,
improper  concern  with  personal  greatness  and boastfulness.  Beyond this,  the  desire  for
development  is  blamed for  a  rise  in  envy and greed,  for  increasingly  strained relations
among neighbours and kin, and for people being less ready to help each other freely. All in
all, evangelical discourse identifies development as that which has made ‘love cool down’
(solmanem zaste) and ‘destroyed respect’ (bonshminem kaiste). This Christian critique of
development, I suggest, is one key factor in contemporary Dell which pushes back against
the decline of respect. How and with what success, I shall examine in a moment. Before
that, however, two qualifications need to be made. 
Firstly,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  Dell  Evangelicalism  has  its  own
understanding of what constitutes proper respect, and that this understanding differs from
traditional understandings (Chapter 2). Evangelicalism favours a mutual, not a directional,
version of respect; this means that everyone owes respect to everyone else, independent of
their social standing. The church also accords much less room and value to commensality.
Traditionally key to cultivating respect, commensality has been much reduced in evangelical
institutions  to  avoid  sin.  Therefore,  if  this  chapter  suggests  that  Evangelicalism in  Dell
currently pushes back against the decline of respect, this refers to the decline of respect as
far as evangelical understandings of proper respect are concerned. 
Secondly, while Evangelicalism may be critical of development, one has to note that
this critique is not absolute. The church in Dell does not advocate poverty as an ideal; it
does not tell people to give up on development altogether. As a matter of fact, the new use
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of wealth associated with development is  supported by the church inasmuch as modern
goods do not carry the dangers of debauchery associated with feasting. Moreover, when the
state first introduced the concept of development to Dell  in the early 2000s, the church
endorsed  it  as  something  that  was  opposed  to  what  the  church  also  opposed,  namely
traditional  practice  (karta).  If  the  church  is  more  critical  today,  this  is  because  the
increasingly feverish quest for development brings to the fore the above described tensions.
The  more  people  rationalize  their  lives  toward  the  end  of  development,  the  more
development  comes  into  conflict  with  what  is  asked  of  them  as  Christians.  It  is  not
development per se, then, that the church critiques, but people’s growing tendency to put
development above Christian values. 
So what are the consequences of this critique? How and under what conditions does
it come to affect people’s practice? Why do some people put their economic interests first,
whereas others, like Abraham, act according to Christian values? Phrased in more abstract
terms: in cases where people participate in two cultural formations that make contradictory
demands on them, what leads them to privilege the demands of one over those of the other?
It is important to answer this question in order to understand under which conditions Dell
Evangelicalism succeeds at defending respect against the onslaught of the market.
I  would  like  to  approach  this  question  by  picking  up  on  a  distinction  Dell
Evangelicals draw between ‘weak’ (lanxmi) and ‘strong’ (zami) believers. Essentially, being
‘strong’ means striving to put Christian values first, whereas being ‘weak’ means being less
committed  and  more  prone  to  depart  from  Christian  principles.27 In  people’s  own
understanding, there are two main factors that can make someone ‘strong’: experiencing
God’s wrath and serving in church. Looking at these factors in turn, I show that people’s
understanding also makes sense in analytical terms. This is because the factors they point to
involve  kinds  of  experiences  and activities  that  have long been theorized  as  leading to
heightened value commitment. 
4.3 Sources of Religious Commitment (1): Experiencing God’s Wrath
It was a bolt from the blue. Doing some work around his house, Girta suddenly passed out
and remained unconscious for more than an hour. When he awoke, he felt extremely weak
and asked his kin to take him to a clinic in the provincial capital. Numerous examinations
27 While this distinction may be more frequently employed by those who consider themselves as ‘strong’, I
also spoke to people who readily described themselves a ‘weak’.
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and 3000 Birr later, the doctors still had not found anything. Thus, Girta returned to Dell and
called some church leaders to ‘take nisa’, i.e. to confess before them. Alongside the leaders,
Girta called the representatives of his cell's28 women's group, for it was with this group, he
suspected, that his troubles originated. 
Some months ago, the women's group and Girta had agreed to work together by way
of  kotsa (share-cropping). Girta had provided a field and the women had provided onion
seeds and labour, and recently they had together harvested 14 large sacks of onions, half of
which belonged to the women. Girta had offered to buy their half (hoping to re-sell it at a
profit), and he had promised to pay 400 Birr per sack, i.e. 2800 Birr in total. It was agreed
that some days later he would meet the women in Gob (two hours’ walk away from Dell)
and give them the money. The women would then go on to buy a set of matching clothes for
themselves. The new outfit was to be worn on the next day's political holiday Gimbot 20
(‘Downfall  of  the  Derg’),  when  each  of  the  16  women's  groups  from  Dell  would
demonstrate their commitment to and success at development by parading around the main
village in new clothes. 
But meeting them in town on the appointed day, Girta said he would only give them
350 Birr per sack, since the price for onions had dropped. Angry about Girta breaking his
word,  the women declined and went  back to  Dell  empty-handed – although this  meant
having to endure the humiliation of attending the political holiday in their old clothes. After
the holiday, during the weekly cell meeting, the women brought up the case, insisting that
Girta  pay the promised 2800 Birr.  They also demanded that  he reimburse them for the
expenses they purported to have had for food and drink on their unsuccessful trip to town.
The cell leaders ruled that Girta should pay 1300 Birr as a reimbursement; and this he did
perforce. But he continued to refuse paying 2800 Birr for the onions, and instead proposed
that the women take their seven sacks (still stored at his house) and sell them on their own.
But when the women went to fetch the sacks, they discovered that Girta had emptied some
of their onions into his own sacks. He had done so because as the onions dry, they lose in
volume. But in the market one only gets the highest price for sacks filled to the point of
bursting. At this point the women said something like, ‘fine, we'll take the difference from
God’. And, indeed, a week later, God presented the bill to Girta – striking him unconscious. 
28 Remember that the cell is a state institution assembling households from the same neighbourhood. 
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This whole story emerged from the slightly rambling account that Girta gave to the
church  leaders  as  well  as  from the  explanations  provided by the  representatives  of  the
women’s  group.  The  church  leaders  listened  carefully.  After  Girta  had  finished  his
confession, they told him that if a Christian promises to pay 400 Birr per sack, that is what
he has to pay, no matter if the market price drops in the meantime. And to take away some
of  the  women's  onions,  of  course,  was  nothing  other  than  theft.  Here  then  lay  his
transgression and the reason for his illness. To the representatives of the women's group, in
turn, the leaders said that it had been wrong to demand reimbursement of their expenses for
food and drink (which had moreover been greatly exaggerated). This was nothing other than
asking compensation, and hence was a sin, too. The church leaders therefore proposed that
Girta should pay an additional 1500 Birr on top of the 1300 he had paid already. This would
complete the 2800 he had promised to pay, and it would change the status of the 1300 Birr
from compensation to partial payment. Girta agreed and both he and the women asked each
other and God for forgiveness.
Here we have a case where illness is interpreted as divine punishment for economic
misconduct. Girta tried to best his business partners, but soon after he fell ill, and this was
taken as the direct outcome of his sinful acts. Cases like Girta’s, I suggest, play an important
educative  role  in  Dell,  since  they  convey a simple  message:  You cannot  gain  at  God’s
expense! After the drop of the price for onions, Girta tried to rescue his profit margin by
reneging on his promise to pay 400 Birr per sack. Later, he tried to make up for the loss he
had suffered through the compensation payment by stealing some of the women’s onions.
But not only did God foil this plot. He also inflicted a heavy loss on Girta, who wasted 3000
Birr at the hospital to be healed of an affliction that only God could alleviate. This was a
loss much greater than the few extra Birr Girta could have made, had his plan worked out.29 
Note  that  a  similar  logic  was  at  play  when  the  aforementioned  drought  was
interpreted as God’s response to people’s failure to tithe correctly. The underlying message
here is that if people choose to keep the entirety of their harvest to themselves, God will not
give them  any harvest  next  time.  Again,  one  loses  much more than one could gain by
keeping the  10% for  oneself.  The same kind of  reasoning,  finally,  was  apparent  in  the
conversation I had with Abraham about his response to Muli’s cattle devastating his field.
29 As people were keen to note, this also happened to the man who had tried to kill his brother’s son. While
he was arranging the murder, someone had audio-recorded the conversation between him and the killer
and had informed the police. The man than spent an alleged 30.000 Birr in bribes to avoid being arrested.
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For one thing, Abraham suggested that he forgave freely because he trusted that God would
not make him go hungry. But a little later in our conversation, he also asserted that to take
compensation would have had devastating effects. Passionately Abraham explained that:
‘It was Satan who untied the cattle and drove them into my field. It was Satan who sued
for  my  grain.  So  if  I  took  grain  in  compensation,  that  grain  would  be  useless
(meyayinda). It would be food that doesn't satiate (mishayinda). And if I sold it in the
market, chances are a thief would take the money… So if I take compensation, hunger
will come to my house. But if I forgive, there will be no hunger.’
In short, Abraham here works with the assumption that economically the most rational way
to handle damage is to not seek compensation. From the doctrinal point of view – which he
here represents – there ‘really’ is no trade-off between economic well-being and being a
good Christian. Or, to employ Weber’s categories (1978: 24f.), what is value rational – to
tithe, to forgive, to not cheat others – is also instrumentally rational – in ensuring a good
harvest, economic recovery, or successful business. Put yet differently, evangelical ideology
here seeks to encompass development by suggesting that one can only attain the latter if one
excels at being a good Christian. 
Cases like Girta’s offer Dell Evangelicals a palpable representation of this message.
They are often talked about in the wider community, and in this way certainly have some
educative effect on everyone. It is plausible to think, however, that divine punishment above
all  matters  for  the  one  who  personally  experiences  it,  and  that  this  experience  entails
heightened commitment to following Christian doctrine.  This is plausible because it  has
long been theorized that a key way in which cultural ideas become subjectively compelling
is when they are communicated in moments of intense experience. Following Durkheim
(1974), scholars have mostly made this argument with regard to ‘effervescent’, i.e. strong,
positive,  enthusiasmic  kinds  of  experiences  (Turner  1967,  Joas  2000, Robbins  2015b:
220ff.). However, as value theorist Hans Joas argues, negative or ‘traumatic’ experiences
can also give rise to value commitment:  
‘[I]t is not just galvanizing experiences that give rise to value commitments. Experiences
of powerlessness also shape us profoundly. When we come up against our limits and
experience how little we can steer our fate or that of others, or when we become radically
aware of the finitude of our existence through experiences of illness, disability or the
inevitability of death, this too transforms our relationship to ourselves, the world, and our
values.’ (Joas 2013: 69)
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To suddenly drop  unconscious while otherwise in a state of good health, as happened to
Girta,  surely qualifies  as  such an experience of  powerlessness.  In  being interpretatively
linked to the notion of God's omnipotence,  this experience is likely to instil a profound
sense that it is important to obey God. 
This was a view that  amain themselves asserted. There was a common notion that
one of the reasons why there was more spiritual ‘weakness’ today – why people were more
ready to privilege developmental over Christian values – was that there were many who had
converted  ‘without  having  seen  a  problem’ (kalemi  shedkideyk).  In  the  early  days  of
Evangelicalism,  as  was  explained  to  me,  people  only  converted  after  long  and  terrible
illness.  This  was  due  not  least  to  widespread  opposition  to  Evangelicalism  and  social
pressure to first try out traditional means. Today, by contrast, people converted ‘for nothing
more than a common cold’. This was a good thing in principle, people asserted, but it was
also true that the earlier converts appeared to be much stronger in their faith than today’s
converts who had not personally experienced God’s power to harm and heal. 
Conversely,  there  were  cases  where  experiences  of  God’s  wrath  ushered  in
heightened  commitment  to  evangelical  values.  Milkias,  for  instance, at  one  point  had
suffered considerable economic damage because a fire set by a neighbour to burn down
shrubbery had jumped into his field and devoured his wheat.  Breaking with doctrine he
claimed compensation. Soon after he was affected by further mishap including the death of
two young children and a fire that destroyed his hut. His situation only improved after he
returned  to  the  church,  from  which  he  had  become  alienated  in  the  meantime,
acknowledging that it had been wrong to take compensation for the burnt wheat.  In the
following years he became a very dedicated believer and now leads a small group. He has
also recovered economically and is now rather well-to-do; and in his understanding this is
because he is now very meticulous in his observance of Christian principles. In Milkias
case, then, the experience of God’s wrath has led to a heightened commitment to leading a
righteous life. 
4.4 Sources of Religious Commitment (2): Serving in Church
The threat, and especially the personal experience of God’s wrath, is one important factor
that can move people to privilege Christian over developmental values – that is, to only
pursue  development  to  the  extent  that  this  does  not  undermine their  righteousness.  But
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Evangelicals in Dell also suggested that in order to be truly ‘strong’ in your faith, it was
essential to serve in church. Conversely, to not serve was seen as conducive to spiritual
weakness. As Tamrat, a man in his mid-20s admitted, ‘I'm not particularly strong [in my
faith]. That's because I don't serve. Once, I was asked to preach. But I was shy and it didn't
go well. Since then I haven't again become involved. But it is when you sing in a choir, for
instance, that you become strong.’ So how does serving lead to spiritual strength? And how
does spiritual strength influence economic practice? Before I turn to these questions, let me
briefly explain what is meant by ‘serving’. 
The church in Dell is a highly participatory one. Without any salaried staff, all work
is carried out by unpaid volunteers recruited from among the members. To work for the
church is  referred to  as  ‘giving  service’ (agelgilot iminti).  There  are a  great  number of
positions  in  which  people  can  serve.  To  begin  with,  there  exist  numerous  leadership
positions, including five for men, five for women and five for youths, and in each of the five
small groups one again finds such a 15-strong leaders' committee. On top of that, there are
leadership positions relating to overseeing fields and manual labour, and there is a group of
12 elders, who also have the status of leaders. Next, the church has six choirs consisting of
17 members each, and each small group has a further, slightly smaller choir of its own.
Singing in a choir is considered as ‘giving service’, too. There also exist offices relating to
tasks like preparing the church for a service, passing around the alms bag, washing the feet
of visitors, or cooking for leaders' overnight meetings; and all of these duplicate again at the
small group level. Finally, tasks like leading the service, leading a prayer or preaching are
given to different people each week, with a publicly displayed bi-annual plan announcing
people's names in advance. With some people serving in more than one position, there are
about 140 people who serve in the church or at small group level. This is almost one third of
the total church membership. 
I  will  now make  three  points  about  how serving  leads  to  ‘spiritual  strength’ or
heightened commitment to Christian values. A fourth and final point is offered after having
considered examples of how ‘spiritual strength’ can influence economic practice. 
(1) My first point concerns a frequently voiced notion that for their service to be
ritually efficient, servants need to be free from sin when they carry it out. Otherwise their
service will fail to achieve its intended result. For example, the prayer of someone in a state
of sin would not help a sick person because it is ‘like the sound of a cow's bell; it does not
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go up to heaven’. Likewise, if someone tried to preach after having sinned, the words would
not  come out  correctly,  or  they  would  fail  to  attract  the  listeners’ attention.  If  there  is
unconfessed sin among the members of a choir, God will not take notice of the songs they
sing in his  praise.  And if  there is  a sinner among the women who cook for the church
leader's weekly meeting, the food will be unsavoury.
The  notion  that  ritual  efficacy  presupposes  spiritual  purity  means  that  servants
frequently have to reflect on whether they have sinned. This thoughtfulness is institutionally
supported in  two ways.  First,  all  those who serve in  church  on a given day gather  for
confession before they take up their work. Commonly, such a gathering begins with one
person addressing God on everyone's behalf,  naming the various sins people tend to be
guilty of, and asking God's forgiveness. After this, everyone who is – or, through listening to
this list of potential sins, has become – conscious of having sinned, will confess individually
in front of the group. Second, servants assume that God is much quicker to retaliate upon
them than upon people who do not serve in church. God works in this way because he wants
them to become conscious of their sins quickly so that the efficacy of their service may not
be undermined (and so that they may not lead others into error by being bad exemplars, see
below). Based on this assumption, servants are quick to interpret any small mishap as a sign
from God. For example, one Sunday after the service, the choir assembled for confession. I
learnt that they felt their performance had not gone well; the guitar had sounded off-tune
and the singers had repeatedly been out of sync. Eventually, one female member of the choir
confessed to having been angry with her husband that morning because he had required her
to look after the cattle, which she felt was his job not hers. She did not confess this when the
choir met for confession before the service. It  may well  be that she only really became
aware of her anger when, in response to the failed performance, choir members were invited
to reflect deeply about what sins they had overlooked during their earlier confession. 
It is not only within church contexts but also in private life that minor problems are
understood as signs from God. Thus, one time a small group leader told me about having
had a cold over the past days. Reflecting about what he might have done to attract the cold,
he eventually remembered that some days earlier he had become sad about other people
from his group who had failed to show up for work they had previously agreed to carry out
together. He said that once he had confessed this to them, his cold disappeared.
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In being regularly led to reflect on and evaluate in Christian terms their conduct,
thoughts  and  emotions,  I  argue,  servants  develop  a  heightened  awareness  both  for  the
subtleties  of  what  counts  as  sin  and  for  their  personal  sinful  tendencies.  This  kind  of
awareness, however, is a precondition for anticipating and avoiding spiritual pitfalls, and
thus for leading lives that conform as closely as possible to religious principles. Below, I
will provide evidence that this heightened awareness has a restrictive effect on economic
action.  Before  that,  however,  two  further  ways  in  which  serving  in  church  fosters
commitment to evangelical principles need to be discussed. 
Figure 13. A choir leader preaches at an outdoor service
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(2) All servants in Dell, but especially those in a leadership position, are expected to be
good examples (kamsi) for others. The importance of leaders acting as exemplars is founded
on a long-standing local understanding that people imitate their leaders. This understanding
has been buttressed by Evangelicalism. As Esias explained based on Luke 17:2, 
‘Others look at us [leaders]. If we don’t do something, they will ask, “why should we do
it?” This means that it was through us that they were led into sin. But the bible says that
the one who causes another person to stumble should have a stone hung around their
neck and be thrown into the sea.’ 
It is a common understanding, indeed, that God will punish leaders with particular severity
if they lead others into sin through poor example. Hence, on a first level, the requirement to
act in an exemplary fashion is backed up by the threat of divine punishment. However, I
would  like  to  argue  that  exemplary  conduct  also  generates  a  more  ‘intrinsic’ kind  of
motivation to follow God's law.
To see this, one first has to understand what is locally meant by ‘exemplarity’. For
me, this became clearest through a comment Abraham made about the conflict resolution
between Johannis and Solomon, discussed in Chapter 2. Remember that Johannis was found
to have wronged his father-in-law, Solomon, and that he therefore had to ask Solomon for
forgiveness. To do so, Johannis stood up and said, ‘If you say I have done wrong, then may
God forgive me.’ Later, Abraham pointed out to me that ‘if you say’ is a phrasing often
employed by weak believers, which shows that they have not truly repented. Correctly, one
uses no conditional clause, but asserts outright, ‘I have done wrong, so may God forgive
me.’ A lack of repentance, Abraham noted, is also indicated when people furrow their brow
while asking for forgiveness. Similarly, a weak believer who has been offended often frowns
while saying to the offender ‘may God forgive you’. This reveals that they do not truly
desire to forgive. Such linguistic or physiognomic details, Abraham explained, were signs
that a person's ‘stomach hadn't cleared’ (norti uski; the stomach, as we know, is the seat of
the feelings). The other way round, there also existed signs indicating that someone acted
‘truly from the stomach’ (dofen norti girank); with a big smile, for instance, indicating a real
desire to forgive, or a soft, whisper-like mode of speaking indexing true repentance. 
Clearly, Abraham works with a distinction between acting out of inner conviction
and acting  without  such conviction.  He also suggests  that  there are external  signs  of  a
person's  inner  attitude.  Now,  one  conspicuous  characteristic  of  church  servants,  and  in
particular of leaders is what often appeared to me as a somewhat exaggerated or theatrical
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way  of  acting.  For  example,  during  funerals  these  people  would  exhibit  the  utmost
happiness and not allow themselves any expression of sadness; to show their humility they
would  often  speak  in  voices  so  low  that  they  were  barely  audible  (cf.  Sommerschuh
forthcoming  b);  physical  labour  for  the  church  was  carried  out  with  signs  of  great
enthusiasm, and offerings made with radiant joy. 
Against  this  background,  I  suggest  that  being  an  exemplar  in  Dell  is  –  beyond
scrupulous adherence to divine law – about manifesting in one’s acts the external signs of
inner conviction. It is about showing that one carries out a given act not because one is
forced to, but because one truly cares and desires to do so. In this way, exemplary servants
in Dell  do not  only represent  to  other  believers  the objective values  of  the evangelical
culture they jointly inhabit (Robbins 2015a, see also Humphrey 1997), They also show how
one should subjectively relate to these, namely desirously or in an ‘intrinsically motivated’
way. More importantly, yet, it may be argued that the performance of exemplarity does not
only index certain inner qualities but also produces these in the first place and reproduces
them over time. For servants in Dell, one could say, exemplary conduct achieves the same
thing that wearing a veil achieves for the women of the Cairo mosque movement studied by
Saba Mahmood. For these women, Mahmood argues, to wear a veil is not just a marker of
religious identity or a sign of piety but above all a ‘means by which one trains oneself to be
pious’ (2001: 214; emphasis in the original). As Mahmood notes, this is an old Aristotelian
idea (but see Laidlaw 2014: 75). One becomes just by acting in a just way. One becomes
humble and forgiving and a joyful giver by acting  as if one had all these qualities. And,
more generally, one becomes desirous to follow evangelical principles by acting as if one
was desirous. From this perspective, exemplarity may serve to represent the values of a
culture, but it is also relevant for the exemplars' own self-formation – instilling in them the
very values which they represent. 
(3) A third account of why servants may be more committed to Christian principles
than non-servants takes off from the observation that the former engage into intense spiritual
activity much more frequently and for much longer stretches of time.
The spiritual activity of people who do not serve in church largely exhausts itself in
attending  Sunday  and,  often  less  regularly,  Friday  morning  services.  There,  except  for
actively participating in the joint singing and ‘collective-personal prayer’30 of the first third
30 Following Haynes (2017: 64f.) this denotes a prayer style where people pray out loud, usually over a
common theme, but with everyone voicing their own thoughts.
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of the service,  they will  mostly listen to how others pray,  preach and sing.  Often these
people also sit rather toward the back of the church, whereas the atmosphere is more intense
toward the front. For servants, by contrast,  Sunday and Friday services – in which they
participate more actively – only make up parts of their total spiritual activity. And the most
intense religious experiences, it seems, are made in other contexts. 
To begin with, many of the strongly committed Evangelicals in Dell habitually rise
in the middle of the night to pray and sing with their families for 30 minutes to an hour.
These nightly prayer sessions have a particular atmosphere; it is dark and silent outside and
people are in that peculiar state of slowness and heightened impressionability that comes
with awakening from sleep. The boundaries of the self, so to speak, are lowered at this time,
and the prayers and songs are particularly heartfelt. 
Second, each of the different leader groups at church and small groups level meets
on one evening per week. They will get together around dusk, and there will be a roughly
three hour service in which everyone takes an active role. For long stretches, participants are
down on their knees and take turns at praying out loud. The service is followed by supper,
and then organizational issues are discussed. The leaders sleep over in their meeting place
and continue praying the next morning; on one day per month they fast and pray until lunch.
Like the nightly prayer sessions, these leader meetings are marked by a particular intensity:
for many hours, a small group of people interacts in a closed-off space and everyone is
highly involved,  singing,  praying out  loud,  or  responding to  other  people’s  prayer  with
hallelujahs.
This kind of atmosphere, finally, is especially sensible during the outings that leader
groups and choirs sometimes make to the top of Ager, a 3000 metre high volcanic peak that
affords stunning views of the surrounding mountains. Having spent the previous night in
prayer, a group will leave at half past four in the morning to reach the summit at sunrise.
Without food and water, they will spend the next hours praying out loud in the blazing sun. 
On all  these occasions where those who play an active role  in  the church come
together  for  prolonged  spiritual  activity,  key  religious  ideas  are  communicated.  What
matters to me at this point, however, is not the content of those ideas but the atmosphere in
which  they  are  voiced.  Clearly,  we  here  have  the  kind  of  ‘effervescence’ that  since
Durkheim has been considered a key way in which people come to subjectively identify
with  the  values  of  their  culture  (Turner  1967,  Joas  2000,  Robbins  2015b).  Thus,  if
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exemplary behaviour  is  one way in which servants  cultivate the desire  to put  Christian
values  first,  their  frequent  engagement  in  long  and intense  spiritual  activity  is  another.
Indeed, when I asked people how they felt after praying for many hours, a common reply
was that they felt a deep desire to avoid sin. 
4.5 Conquering the Spiritual Threats of Development: Church Servants and Economic
Withdrawal
I  have offered three reasons to support  Dell  Evangelicals’ understanding that serving in
church  affords  ‘spiritual  strength’.  But  how,  if  at  all,  does  this  ‘strength’ manifest  in
economic practice? In this section I offer examples that give a sense of the impact that
Evangelicalism  can  have  when  people  privilege  its  values  over  those  of  economic
development. The examples all concern church servants. I begin with an excerpt from my
fieldnotes from early August 2017. 
This afternoon I accompanied Mathos and Abraham to Mazenga's place, where the two
were to pray for Mazenga's ill daughter. On the way there, Mathos started talking to
Abraham about the micro-credit scheme offered by the district for the second or third
year in a row. Others in Dell had made good experiences with it. You borrowed 10.000
Birr, bought an ox, raised it for some months, sold it at a profit and returned the loan.
Mathos said he qualified for the scheme, since his household was among the poorest in
Dell. He had thought about it for some days, he said, but was doubting if it would be a
good thing for him to do. His main worry was that it would distract him from his church
work because an ox requires a lot of attention if it is to fatten quickly. Here, Abraham
jumped in, confirming his friend in his doubts. Additionally, he pointed to the danger that
the ox might die. In this case Mathos would be hard-pressed to repay the loan, and ‘a
believer shouldn't have debts’, Abraham said. Even if the ox did not die, there would still
be the worry that it might, which would only add to the urge to constantly check on it.
Having listened to this, Mathos turned to me, asking ‘who leads a good life, the rich or
the poor person?’ I said I was not sure and asked him what he thought about it. ‘The poor
person’, he answered, ‘for the rich man worries about fire or thieves, but the poor person
has nothing to worry about.’
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I remember being rather surprised by Mathos's decision against taking out a loan. He was
indeed among the very poorest  in  Dell,  having no more than half  an acre of low-yield
farmland to feed a family of eight. As Mathos explained in Chapter 3, he ‘didn't even have a
lamb’, let alone oxen. To be able to plough his land, he was the wakiwondab (plowman) of a
wealthy man, for whom he had to work ten times in return for the right to use his ox-plough
for his purposes nine times. Mathos's four sons were growing up and soon he would have to
start paying bridewealth for the oldest one of them. So a little extra money would have been
more than welcome. Indeed, we have seen in Chapter 3, Mathos aspired to acquire a female
calf, which would grow into a cow, give birth to calves and thus put Mathos on the road to
becoming a wakibab (cattle owner), who would not have to hire himself out to be able to
plough his land. Participation in the micro-credit scheme would likely have given Mathos
the money to buy the long-desired calf. 
Yet,  Mathos decided against participating – a step clearly motivated by religious
considerations. Local doctrine does not prohibit taking out loans. But Mathos anticipated
that doing so would focus his attention away from serving in the church. He is both a choir
and  a  youth  leader,  and  this  means  a  considerable  time-commitment  as  well  as  a
commitment to exemplary conduct. Raising cattle is commonly recognized in Dell to be
quite  time-intensive,  too.  Cattle  are tethered on a meadow and one has to  change their
location several times a day to make sure they get enough grass. This, Mathos feared, might
lead him to cut back on his work for the church. To paraphrase his thinking: Once you have
an oxen, like it or not, you will start to think about it a lot. Hence, if you want to avoid being
drawn into an excessive concern with ‘things of the flesh’, it is better to not invest in one in
the first place. As I have argued above, this kind of heightened consciousness can be linked
to the demand that people carry out their church service in a state of purity. 
Mathos was far from the only one who was reflective about the spiritual threats of
development and who decided to relinquish economic opportunities. This became evident,
for instance, when I collected data on kotsa – the share-cropping arrangement that we saw in
Girta’s case, where one party provides the land, and the other provides seeds and labour.
Overall  kotsa has  become  more  widely  used  over  the  past  decade  since  land  scarcity
requires many people to look for additional farming opportunities. Many people now grow
grain on their own land and get together with others by way of kotsa for growing cash-crops
like  onions  or  garlic.  Among church  leaders  and other  devout  Evangelicals,  however,  I
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found considerable reluctance to engage in  kotsa. As Girma, a choir leader in his late 30s
explained, 
‘It's no good. All it brings you is quarrelling and sadness. The field owner often starts to
secretly harvest before the agreed time and then denies it. Maybe you feel like suing him.
But that's bad. Or he terminates the agreement after only one year, and that also makes
you sad and leads to fighting.  So I have stopped working  kotsa.  It's  better to live in
peace.’
I  also  learnt  about  another  angle  from  which  share-cropping  had  recently  been
problematized and restricted. Since the mid 2000s, it had become common for individual
married  women  to  enter  into  kotsa arrangements  with  men.  This  innovation  –  women
formerly worked only for their husbands – had occurred in response to women’s growing
need for cash and their  husbands’ reluctance to  give them any.  By  share-cropping with
another man, a woman could earn her own money. However, in 2014, the church’s women
leaders  raised  the  issue  whether  it  would  not  be  better  to  prohibit  women from share-
cropping.
As far as I could ascertain, the immediate cause for this proposition was a case of
adultery between a man and a woman who had worked together in this way; and so avoiding
adultery was one of the arguments advanced. More fundamentally, however, the women
noted that while  kotsa was economically beneficial for them, it produced much domestic
unrest.  On the one hand, it  led husbands to complain about wives using their  time and
labour power for their own economic projects. This was wrong, husbands felt, because by
paying bridewealth they had acquired the right to their wife’s total labour power. On the
other hand, it prompted husbands to be even more stingy when it came to giving their wife a
share of the household income, arguing that this was no longer necessary since she now had
her own source of income. These male responses, in turn, easily made women angry and
thus led to quarrels between the spouses (see Kalinda’s case in Chapter 3 for an example).
Quarrels being sinful, the women leaders – aiming to attack the problem at the roots –
proposed to prohibit kotsa to women. The male church leaders agreed with this, noting also
that for women to pursue their own economic projects was an aberration from the Christian
principle that a wife is to be ‘below’ her husband. Since this time, the church’s official
position has been that individual women should not work  kotsa. (This does not concern
groups of women, as the cell group that worked together with Girta.) Here, then, we have
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another instance of committed Evangelicals deciding to relinquish an economic opportunity
that is felt to threaten pious living. 
Something similar occurs in my final example: Esias had married a few years ago.
On this occasion, his father, Kalibab had bequeathed him a meadow for his livestock. But
then Kalibab  had repeatedly  tethered  his  own cattle  in  that  meadow,  working with  the
traditional (and legally outdated) understanding that even if he passed on land to his sons, it
was still really his land. Esias could have challenged him on this by calling the elders who
had been present when his father bequeathed the land to him. Esias knew, however, that this
would make his father sad; and making others sad, of course, is a sin for Evangelicals. But
Esias also knew that he would get sad himself (which is sinfull too) if he kept seeing his
father's cattle on his meadow, finishing the grass he knew his own livestock needed. Esias
therefore decided to rent a meadow from a neighbour for his own livestock and to tell his
father that he could graze his cattle on Esias's meadow. 
The common theme in these cases, which all concern servants, is that the pursuit of
development has a potential to undermine faithfulness to Christian principles. In reaction to
this,  one  observes  a  tendency  to  withdraw from economic  life.  Given  the  necessity  of
making a living, this withdrawal cannot go very far (cf. Robbins 2004: 307 for a similar
observation from Urapmin). And the complete renunciation of all worldly wealth in favour
of a life in poverty clearly is not a goal advocated by Dell Evangelicalism. The critique of
development is not a categorical one; pursuing development is fine as long as it does not
result in sin.  Yet, people recognize that the pursuit of development can easily get out of
control. And it is in cognisance of this fact that the more committed Evangelicals in Dell
take precautions against being duped by their own desires. These precautions take the form
of withdrawal. Rather than fall into sin, these believers prefer to lose out economically.
World-fleeing Asceticism
One way of  linking these  findings  to  the  ongoing debate  about  the  role  of  evangelical
Christianity in development processes in Africa goes through Weber. When it is suggested
that the continent presently witnesses something akin to what Weber described in his thesis
on  the  Protestant  ethic,  this  argument  is  commonly  made  by  pointing  out  that  many
churches preach a gospel of entrepreneurship, hard work, self-assertion in the market place
and  avoidance  of  wasteful  expenditure  (cf.  Freeman  2015b).  These,  of  course,  are  the
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hallmarks of what Weber described as ‘inner-worldly asceticism’, and which he thought had
been paradigmatically expressed in Calvinism. But Weber also distinguished a second kind
of asceticism,  which he dubbed ‘world-fleeing’,  and which in  his  conceptual  scheme is
placed half-way between inner-worldly asceticism and mysticism. This sort of asceticism
concentrates on, ‘keeping down and […] overcoming creatural wickedness in the actor's
own nature’ and  ‘enhances  the  concentration  on  the  firmly  established  God-willed  and
redemptory accomplishments to the point of avoiding any action in the orders of the world’
(Weber 1946: 326, my emphasis; cf. 1963: 166). 
Dell Evangelicalism, I argue, leans toward the world-fleeing rather than toward the
inner-worldly variant of asceticism. This was already suggested by the anxieties about social
life as a source of sin and the resultant tendency to down-scale social events in length and
intensity (Chapter 2). It has now become evident that a similar tendency exists with regard
to economic life. Here, the concern with ‘keeping down creatural wickedness’ makes the
more committed amain desist from using certain economic opportunities – and in this way
acts as a limiting factor on their quest for economic advancement. In more general terms we
might say that where a church leans toward inner-worldly asceticism, its endorsement of
development  will  be  stronger  than  in  the  case  where  it  leans  toward  world-fleeing
asceticism. 
4.6 Conclusion
In Chapter 2 I suggested that Evangelicalism played a part in what Dell people lament as a
decline of respect. I argued that this was so inasmuch as the evangelical quest to avoid sin
led to a reduction in commensality. Indeed, one could say that Evangelicalism – in requiring
much  less  expenditure  for  feasting  than  karta –  also  (unintendedly)  contributed  to  the
decline of respect by helping development take off. This is an argument Dena Freeman has
made forcefully for the Gamo Highlands.  There,  Pentecostalism facilitated an economic
boom  because  converts  no  longer  faced  traditional  redistributive  demands  and  could
reinvest  the  money  they  made through a  newly  introduced cash  crop  (Freeman  2012b:
174f.). Over time, the fervent quest for prosperity that Pentecostalism had helped to create,
led to social problems akin to the ones observed in Dell: aggressive competition, use of
illegitimate means to gain economic advantage, envy, conflict and so on (Freeman 2015a:
162ff.). Freeman’s article does not contain information on whether the Gamo church now
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tries to remedy the problems it has contributed to create. But in Dell, at least, the church
does work in this direction. As I have shown in this chapter, the church here is much less
sanguine about development than evangelical churches elsewhere have been reported to be
– and this is directly related to the sense that development challenges the vision of a world
in which people are united in humility and mutual respect. Evangelicalism in Dell, in other
words, may have played a role in the decline of respect, but it currently is also one of the
strongest forces to push back against this decline. 
In the bulk of this chapter, I have aimed to understand under what conditions the
evangelical defence of respect succeeds. I approached this question by asking what leads
some believers to be ‘spiritually strong’. Based on Dell people’s own understanding, I made
two main points. First, I pointed to the importance of the concept of divine punishment. By
interpreting illness and other problems as the result of sin, local Evangelicalism effectively
communicates to people that there is no trade-off between obeying God and getting ahead
economically: God will take away what you have gained illegitimately. I have suggested
that it is particularly by learning this message the hard way, through experiencing God’s
wrath, that people come to appreciate the need to not sacrifice Christian values to the pursuit
of development. Second, I observed that Evangelicals in Dell attribute high value to serving
in church and that they conceive of serving as a way to cultivate ‘spiritual strength’. I gave
three reasons why their understanding also makes sense from an analytical point of view:
servants are stimulated to regularly evaluate their own conduct, thoughts and emotions in
Christian terms; by acting in an exemplary fashion servants (re)produce in themselves the
commitment they display to others; and servants make intense religious experiences of the
type that foster value commitment. As I showed in my final section, the commitment and
reflexivity cultivated in church has a tangible effect on economic practice, leading servants
to turn their back on economic opportunities if these threaten to lead them into sin. 
In  closing,  I  would like to  offer  a  fourth and final  point  why this  kind of more
restricted  economic  practice  is  possible  for  servants.  This  point  picks  up  from  the
observation made in Chapter 3, that people’s pursuit of development is motivated by the
aspiration to have a ‘name’. In other words, where people sacrifice Christian values to the
quest for development, it is not wealth per se which motivates their conduct but the quest for
reputation or ‘greatness’. This, however, leads on to the question whether there is not also a
way  to  build  a  name  on  the  basis  of  strict  adherence  to  Christian  principles.  Brendan
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Thornton, for example,  in an ethnography of Pentecostalism in the Dominican Republic
found that men who had previously built their reputation through aggressive masculinity
and  gang  life,  after  conversion  could  gain  ‘prestige/respect’ based  on  their  ‘ability  to
embody time-honored cultural ideals associated with the “good Christian”’ (2016: 190). 
Something similar can be said for the case of church servants in Dell. Especially
leaders have a high reputation. To begin with, this becomes visible  in the way leaders are
treated by others. Here one observes signs of respect typically shown to those ranking high
in the social hierarchy (cf. Chapter 1). For instance, when called to someone’s house to pray
for a sick person, leaders will be offered the best available chairs, they will be addressed in
the honorific plural, food will be prepared for them and they will be invited to wash their
hands before everyone else. The value of humility commands that leaders do not visibly
revel in this, let alone actively demand to be treated with special respect. But this does not
change the fact that they are being treated in an honorific way. Likewise, in church, leaders
sit in an elevated spot and on a large bench that is more impressive than the rickety benches
everyone else sits on; on certain occasions, like the monthly celebration of the Eucharist,
they wear impressive silk-gowns. Such gowns, which are locally much admired, are also
worn by the members of the first and the second of the six choirs (see above Figure 13).
And not only are those who occupy high positions in the church de facto marked out
as worthy of respect. They are also conscious of the recognition others grant them. One
instance  where  this  became particularly  clear  to  me was during the scene with Mathos
described above. Remember how after deciding to not take out the loan, Mathos commented
to me that it were the poor rather than the rich who led good lives because they did not have
to worry about thieves or fire. He then walked on in silence for some moments, before he
suddenly asserted that while there were men in Dell who were very rich, it  was church
leaders  like  him  and  Abraham  that  people  were  ‘really  afraid  of’  (gatsi  woken
bashebashdek). This assertion is significant because inspiring fear is locally taken as a key
feature of ‘great persons’: in awe of their achievements or faculties others take on a humble
attitude and speak admiringly about them. In the case of church leaders this reverence is
founded  on  the  feats  they  perform  for  others  –  resolving  conflicts  that  seem  beyond
resolution, healing those who seem lost, praying and preaching with a strength that moves
others to overcome their spiritual weakness. 
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I have explained above that the precondition for being allowed to serve in church is
to live in strict obedience to God’s law. It is also true that within the group of servants it is
the  more  righteous  who  serve  in  higher  positions.  To  be  elected  a  leader  one  has  to
demonstrate particular piety. The same applies for moving up into higher choirs, with choir
membership  being  decided  not  on  the  basis  of  the  quality  of  a  person's  voice,  but
exclusively in terms of the quality of their conduct.31 The implication of this is that gaining
reputation on the basis of serving in church presupposes strict adherence to God’s law. This,
in  turn,  means  that  for  those  who  serve  in  a  leading  position,  relinquishing  wealth  in
accordance with evangelical principles does not actually stand in contradiction to achieving
a great name. On the contrary, when someone like Mathos decides against taking out a loan
to  safe-guard  his  righteousness,  this  is  actually  the  precondition  for  continuing  to  be
admired. Were he to buy the ox and, as he feared, reduce his work for the church, he would
lose the esteem others now have for him.
For a sub-section of Dell Evangelicals, then, there is an alternative way to build a
name, which goes not through wealth but through righteousness.  These people,  in other
words,  can realize through Evangelicalism a value which other  people  can  only realize
through the pursuit of development.  Exemplary servants therefore do not face a conflict
between building  their  name and being respectful  of  others.  It  is  by being paragons  of
humility that they achieve greatness. Yet, not everyone can serve in church, and not every
servant can be a leader – just as not everyone comes to experience God’s wrath. If these
indeed are the factors that lead people to privilege Christian over developmental values, the
church’s defence of respect will continue to face challenges. At the same time, this chapter
hopes  to  have  shown  that  without  Evangelicalism the  chances  for  respect  in  times  of
development would be much bleaker. It is by holding alive the vision of a world in which
people  are  united  in  humility  and  mutual  respect  that  evangelical  Christianity  makes  a
difference in Dell. 
31 Choir  members  who commit  a  serious  sin  are  banned  from serving  in  church  for  a  couple  months.
Afterwards, they join the lowest ranking choir and only gradually move up as positions in higher choirs
become available.
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Chapter 5. From Fasting to Feasting: Reputation and Respect in 
Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity
5.1 Introduction
Headed by a  heavyset,  long-bearded priest  with  a  red  hat  and chanting  religious  songs
(mezmur), the Orthodox congregation slowly moved toward the centre of the market square.
It had rained the night before, but now the sky had cleared and a fresh wind was blowing
across the lush rolling hills and the main village's tin-roofed houses glistened in the April
sun. White  gabi vestments wrapped around their bodies, people wore headbands made of
palm leaves and some held dark-green reeds in their hands. Upon reaching the centre of the
market square, the 60 or so men, women and children formed a circle around a teenage girl,
who  was  beating  a  large  skin-covered  drum  (kebero).  They  intensified  their  chanting,
moving rhythmically, clapping and ululating. 
It  was  Hosanna  or  Palm Sunday  and the  procession  through  the  village  was  to
commemorate Jesus' entry into Jerusalem. Earlier that morning, the priest who had come
down from Saint  George church  at  Bako,  had preached about  Hosanna.  It  was the  last
Sunday before Easter, he had explained, and during the following week Orthodox Christians
were to respect a number of rules such as not making the sign of the cross or not shaking
hands with others. He had also explained that to remember Jesus's suffering, a person of
strong faith should go barefoot and refrain from having sexual intercourse. Finally, the priest
had  talked  about  the  rules  for  breaking  the  fast.  After  55  days  of  avoiding  all  animal
products, it was permitted to slaughter chicken after eight o’clock in the evening on Holy
Saturday and to eat meat after three o’clock on Easter morning. These details clarified, the
group had set out on its round through the village, beating their drum and chanting – and
impressing on-lookers with a sense that Orthodox Christianity had come to Dell to stay. 
The Emergence of Orthodoxy in Dell
Had my introductory scene been set  in  northern Ethiopia,  it  would have been the most
ordinary of scenes. For, there, Orthodox Christianity has been practised for many centuries.
In Dell, however, hundreds of kilometres to the south of the Orthodox heartlands, the image
of white-clad worshippers – so often associated with Ethiopia as a whole – is a novel one.
Here,  an  Ethiopian  Orthodox community  has  only  emerged since  2010.  In  that  year,  a
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handful of elders – followed by their wives and children – left  karta  (traditional practice)
and decided to become Orthodox. This move had not been prompted by proselytization.
Rather, the elders themselves reached out to deacons from churches in the towns of Gob and
Sinigal, inviting them to come up to Dell and teach them about Orthodoxy. For the purpose
of these classes, a meeting place was found in a house in the main village. Half a year later,
in  2011,  a  piece  of  land  adjacent  to  the  village  was  obtained  from  the  kebele  (local
administration) and a hut was built. Hut and ground were consecrated and dedicated to Saint
Gabriel  by a priest  from the largest Orthodox church in the provincial capital,  Jinka. In
2016, having grown in members and wealth, the congregation replaced the hut with a more
spacious,  tin-roofed house.  Like its  predecessor,  this  house lacks a  tabot32 and therefore
counts as a ‘prayer house’ (tselot bet) rather than as a full church (beta kristian). Presently
the Orthodox community – through joint agricultural work and the collection of tithes – is
striving to accumulate wealth to build an even larger, octagonal, cement floor house. This, it
is understood, would allow them to receive a  tabot and to become a full church. When I
counted in August 2017, the congregation had 73 adult  members (31 men,  42 women),
alongside 18 youths and numerous children. There has been considerable growth since the
original foundation in 2010, then, and during a return trip to Dell in September 2018, I
learnt that yet more people had joined the church. In short, Orthodoxy in Dell, though still
small when compared to Evangelicalism, is very much on the rise.
Questions and Arguments
This chapter aims to account for the rise of Orthodox Christianity in Dell. Why have some
people abandoned karta and become Orthodox? What makes Orthodoxy attractive to them?
And what sort of change does conversion mean? 
I argue that Orthodoxy is attractive because it allows for a fuller realization of two
values, which, as we know from previous chapters, are of key concern to people in Dell:
nami (name, reputation, respectability) and bonshmi (respect, respectful interaction).
In recent years, to not have a ‘religion’ (haymanot) has become a source of shame
(oshin),  a  damage to one’s name.  Conversion solves this  problem and makes one more
respectable in other people’s eyes. Indeed, to become Orthodox even contributes to building
a  great name:  Orthodoxy  is  associated  with  the  Gamma (Northern  Ethiopians),  and  to
32 The tabot is a wooden replica of the Ark of the Covenant placed in the innermost sanctuary of a church, 
which is only accessible to priests (cf. Boylston 2018: 52). 
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become Orthodox is to partake in their greatness. At the same time, Orthodoxy allows to
revitalize bonshmi, the decline of which, as we know, people in Dell deplore. Feasting (next
to fasting) is a key form of lay religious involvement in Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity
(Boylston  2018:  37,  Malara  2018).  Feasting,  however,  is  also  central  to  produce  the
relations and interactions that afford bonshmi. While the feasting associated with karta has
come under attack as an expression of ‘backwardness’ (cf. Chapter 3), Orthodox feasting
carries  the  seal  of  religious  legitimacy.  Orthodoxy,  then,  allows  people  to  cultivate
respectful interactions through feasting without endangering their name. 
By arguing that people take Orthodoxy as a way to better realize established values,
this chapter offers a final instantiation of my argument about values as drivers of change.
But with what sort of change are we dealing here specifically? In earlier chapters I showed
that  to  draw  on  new  cultural  means  to  better  realize  established  values  may  require
substantive changes in one’s practice. To what extent does this apply for Orthodoxy, too? Or
does participation in Orthodoxy require less of a change? The latter certainly is what most
literature on conversion to Orthodoxy would suggest. Scholars have repeatedly argued that
while Protestant conversion may be characterized by ‘rupture’,  conversion to Orthodoxy
allows for greater continuities with people’s pre-conversion selves or cultures (Winchester
2013:  13;  Carrol  2018:  89).  As  Freeman  (2018:  7)  notes  in  a  recent  summary  of  this
literature, Orthodoxy, 
‘often  encourages,  or  at  least  accepts,  the  inclusion  of  pre-Christian  practices  by
Orthodox Christians … Therefore, it is not surprising that most ethnographic examples of
Orthodox  Christianity  exhibit  what  its  scholars  variously  call  “hybridity”  or
“syncretism”.’
The findings of this chapter allow me to challenge this view. I show that converts – far from
trying to ‘syncretize’ karta with Orthodoxy – stress the need to discontinue  karta and to
strictly follow the rules of Orthodoxy, especially those on fasting. I show that this personal
and collective investment in discontinuity is necessary to successfully realize the value of
‘name’ through Orthodoxy: It is only by demonstrating that one has undergone a real change
that one gains the respectability Orthodoxy is hoped to afford. If Orthodoxy in Dell still in
some  ways  appears  as  continuous  with  traditional  practice,  this  is  not  a  matter  of
‘syncretism’ but a result of affinities between these two cultural systems. 
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In the following, I first offer some historical background information on Orthodoxy
in this part of southern Ethiopia. I then examine the reasons for conversion to Orthodoxy
and what sort of change conversion is thought to entail. Finally, I look at the social and
religious life of the Orthodox congregation. In the conclusion, I link my findings to broader
debates about conversion to Orthodoxy. 
Figure 14. The Orthodox Church in Dell
5.2 Historical Background 
Orthodox Christianity first came to Aariland in the wake of the region’s conquest by the
Abyssinian empire at the turn of the 20th century. The Northern soldier-settlers (neftenya)
were accompanied by priests, and during the 1910s, churches were established in newly
founded garrison towns like Bako (Naty 1992: 116, 88). However, it was not until the 1940s
that  efforts  to  Christianize  the  Aari  started  to  be  made (ibid.:  186).  These  efforts  were
motivated, firstly, by emperor Haile Selassie’s attempt to create national unity across ethnic
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lines. The need for unity had been highlighted by the Italian occupation (1935-1940), during
which some Southerners had collaborated with the Italians in an attempt to get rid of their
Northern oppressors. Secondly, Christianity was seen as a means to civilize the people of
the South, whose purportedly ‘savage’ customs, such as going naked, posed a challenge to
Ethiopia’s self-image as a civilized nation (ibid: 187-191; see also Donham 1986: 11f.). 
According  to  Naty,  the  1940s  saw  mass-baptisms  in  which  Aari  people  were
sprinkled with  Holy  Water,  received a Christian  name and were assigned a  neftenya  as
godparent. A key argument to promote conversion was that it would lead to greater equality
with Northerners. As one old man whom Naty (1992: 187) interviewed in the late 1980s
recalled: ‘They told us to wear clothes. The priests also said that the Amhara and Aari would
be like older and younger brother. They told us that the distinction between the Amhara and
Aari ended the day that we were baptized.’
Naty  does  not  specify  how widespread  or  effective  these  conversion  campaigns
were. For the case of Dell, however, it is clear that at least some people did indeed become
Orthodox. Several elders recalled that during their childhood in the 1950s, their fathers had
kept the Orthodox fast and had gone up to Bako for major Orthodox holidays. Some also
recalled that their fathers had been organized in a  mahber.  Common throughout Orthodox
Christian Ethiopia, such ‘associations’ meet on one day per month to feast in the name of a
Saint (Binns 2017: 240ff.; Boylston 2018: 39). Despite their engagement with Orthodoxy,
however,  these  people  also  continued  to  participate  in  lineage  rituals  and  other  karta
practices.  This resonates with Dena Freeman’s observation that  in the Gamo Highlands,
where  people  converted  some  time  after  conquest,  people  ‘continued  practising  their
traditional  rituals  and  customs  and  simply  added  on  a  thin  extra  layer  of  Orthodox
Christianity’ (2018: 7). For this period, then, the relation between Orthodoxy and karta in
Dell could be described as ‘syncretistic’.
By the 1960s, according to my interlocutors’ memories, their fathers had abandoned
Orthodoxy and no longer kept the fast or feasted in  mahber  groups. This corresponds to
Naty’s finding that most people stopped being Orthodox after a while. Naty suggests that
this was because the promised equality between Aari and Amhara failed to materialize. Not
only did Northerners continue to call Aari by the derogatory term ‘shankila’ (1992: 186).
Naty’s interlocutors also suggested that godparents made excessive demands for chickens,
sheep and honey (ibid.: 201), using godparenthood as an additional avenue for economic
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exploitation. Elders in Dell were unsure why their fathers had abandoned Orthodoxy, though
it is likely that they had concerns similar to the ones reported by Naty. In any case, it was to
take another half century before people in Dell once again engaged with Orthodoxy. It is to
the reasons for this recent engagement that I now turn. 
5.3 For Blessings and Name: Reasons for Conversion to Orthodoxy
In August 2017, the Orthodox congregation had 91 members. There were 18 unmarried
teenagers as well as 42 married women and 31 married men. Of these 91 members, only 20
had converted on their own initiative. These were all men, most of them above fifty years of
age  and  considered  ‘galta’  (elders).  The  remainder  of  the  congregation  had  become
Orthodox  in  the  20  elders'  wake:  There  were  eleven  younger,  married  men  who  had
followed their fathers into the church. The 42 women, in turn, had all converted when their
husbands had become Orthodox. (The higher number of women is due to polygyny.) And
the teenagers had converted in the wake of their parents. The reason for this ripple effect of
the 20 elders’ conversion is simple: all of those who today form the Orthodox congregation
had prior to their conversion followed karta. In the local understanding, however, it is not
possible to participate in karta if your husband or father does not do so either. Hence, when
the elders left karta, their dependents had to follow suit.33 This does not mean that the latter
have no genuine interest in being Orthodox. It does mean, however, that to explain the rise
of Orthodoxy in Dell, the main task is to explain why the elders converted. In the following,
I  show that  most  conversions  were  triggered  by  conflicts  with  lineage  heads,  but  that
concerns  about  ‘name’  were  what  really  motivated  these  elders’  engagement  with
Orthodoxy. 
Toidi-Troubles
As a way into this analysis, consider the following account of an episode which occurred
around 2008, two years prior to the foundation of the Orthodox church in Dell. The speaker
33 By contrast,  where the wives or  children of  a man had been  amain  prior to the man’s conversion to
Orthodoxy, they commonly remained so. In Kalibab’s case, for instance, his first wife, three of his married
sons, and three of his unmarried children had been amain prior to Kalibab’s conversion to Orthodoxy, and
they did not follow him into Orthodoxy. His second and third wife, as well as his first son, and four of his
unmarried children, by contrast, had participated in karta and became Orthodox when Kalibab converted.
(His second wife has since stopped following Orthodoxy. She now considers herself as being ‘on her own’
(gurri), i.e. neither amain nor alem nor Orthodox.)
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is Geshabab, the first convert from Dell, who at the time of our interview in 2017 was in his
mid-70s. 
After I had finished paying bridewealth for my new wife, we spent three days in a hut, as
is our custom. When we left the hut, I asked my toidi (lineage head) when we could come
to  do  the  anza-kash (ritual  through  which  the  bride  becomes  part  of  her  husband's
lineage). At first he said he was too busy. So I begged him and begged him, and finally he
told me a day. But the next morning he sent a messenger to tell me that the anza-kash had
to be postponed because he had to go elsewhere. This happened several times. It was
very bad! I wanted to plant wheat in my field in Gedir [located to the west of Dell,
beyond a stream], but in our  karta it’s taboo to cross a stream until the  anza-kash has
been done. Also, the bride is not allowed to work. Finally, Askalbab [the toidi] said we
should come the following Friday. So we prepared beer and on that Friday went to the
kashi (the lineage's ritual site). But when we got there, it was said that Askalbab had gone
to town. I was very angry. How was I going to sow if we didn't do the anza-kash?! I said,
“that’s enough for me, I'll become Gamma Kristian”. So I took the beer and went home.
Some days later, there was an Orthodox holiday at Bako, and I went there and became
Orthodox.
In brief, Geshabab's problem was this: His toidi repeatedly postponed – and thus effectively
refused – to carry out a ritual for him. As a consequence, Geshabab was unable to sow his
field. For if he crossed a stream prior to the ritual, he or a member of his household would
be harmed by gomma. Conversion to Orthodoxy solved this problem for Geshabab. As in
the case of conversion to Evangelicalism, conversion to Orthodoxy means no longer being
subject to the rules of karta. The ritual of anza-kash, however, only is a part of karta but not
of Orthodoxy. Hence, if one is Orthodox, harm cannot arise if one does not carry out this
ritual (cf. Donham 1999: 116 for similar understandings in Maale).
Geshabab’s case is exemplary, since almost all of the other elders reported similar
problems. Kalibab, for instance, recounted how his toidi, Gamibab, had refused to carry out
the first milk ritual for him. One evening, Kalibab had placed a calabash with milk in the
lineage’s ritual site, for Gamibab to bless it the next morning. But when Kalibab stepped out
of his house the next day to go to attend the ritual, he saw that Gamibab had returned the
calabash. This meant that he was not going to bless the milk. On another occasion, Gamibab
refused to castrate a bull of Kalibab's. Like tasting new milk, castration is an exclusive right
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of the  toidi, and to castrate on one's own would mean gomma. When Kalibab desperately
asked how he was going to drink his milk or fatten his cattle if Gamibab refused to carry out
the necessary rituals,  Gamibab allegedly barked at him to,  ‘Go away from me, become
amain or  Orthodox!’ And this  was what  Kalibab did indeed do before long.  Following
Geshabab’s example – and together with other elders who had been rejected by their lineage
heads – Kalibab turned to Orthodoxy as a new source of blessings.
To explain conversion to Orthodoxy, then, two questions need to be answered: Why
did these elders’ lineage heads refuse to carry out rituals for them? And why did the elders
not use traditional means to deal with this problem, but instead converted to Orthodoxy,
which was unestablished in Dell at that time? 
From  Chapter  1  we  know  that  in  karta  seniors  often  remind  juniors  of  their
dependence and push them to show respect by withholding from them what juniors are in
need of – land, permissions, blessings and so on. Lineage heads, in particular, are known to
act in this way. It is very common for a toidi to give his juniors the runaround, and to only
agree to carry out a ritual after having been ‘begged’ for a while.  As Geshabab tells us
above, ‘at first [the toidi] said he was too busy. So I begged him and begged him, and finally
he told me a day [to do the ritual].’ However, sometimes the toidi sticks to his refusal. This
usually happens when there is a conflict between him and the supplicant and, particularly,
when the toidi feels that the other has not been showing him proper respect. Indeed, a closer
look at the Orthodox elders’ cases reveals entrenched conflicts with lineage heads. While
each case has its specificities, it is possible to distinguish two main types of conflicts. These
are exemplified by the cases of Kalibab and Geshabab respectively. 
To  understand  the  conflict  between  Kalibab  and  his  toidi Gamibab,  one  has  to
understand that,  in  Dell,  Kalibab  is  widely  thought  to  have  a  much greater  name than
Gamibab (who is his older brother; same father, different mother). For one thing, this is
because Kalibab is wealthier. While Gamibab owns almost three times more land, Kalibab is
more hard-working and less prone to squander money on drinks. He therefore owns more
cattle than Gamibab and has more wives, children and affines. He also owns a ‘townhouse’
in  the  main  village,  from which  he  collects  rent;  and  his  own house  is  equipped  with
cushioned chairs, a solar light and a mattress. Gamibab, by contrast, only has one house,
which is equipped with no more than a couple of stools and a self-made wooden bedstead.
Beyond his wealth, Kalibab is also highly respected for his public virtue. He is renowned as
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a skilful conflict mediator, and many remember him as an excellent leader of  mol’a  work
groups, an office which he held for twelve years. He also worked as a judge on the local
social court for two years, and he was one of the first from Dell to send a child to secondary
school. All this makes Kalibab one of the most highly respected elders in Dell – a ‘great
man’ (gaeshabab) much greater than Gamibab, who is mainly known for his fiery temper
which frequently brings him into conflict with others. 
That Kalibab should be ‘greater’ than him, clearly wounds Gamibab’s pride. This
became particularly evident in moments of drunkenness when Gamibab often ranted about
Kalibab being ‘balaft’ – a derogatory term derived from the Amharic word for ‘rich person’.
Gamibab also repeatedly complained to me that people only ever called on Kalibab when
they needed a mediator, but not on him. All this gave Gamibab a sense of being dwarfed by
his younger  brother.  I  suggest that  it  was  this  sense of  being dwarfed which motivated
Gamibab’s refusal to carry out rituals for Kalibab. As lineage head, Gamibab expects to be
the greatest from among his kin. When his junior is publicly recognized as greater, this for
Gamibab feels like a form of disrespect. He reacts in the way  toidis  commonly react to
disrespect: by withholding their blessing. 
Similar dynamics are apparent in many of the other cases. Several of the Orthodox
elders belong to the richest people in Dell, whereas their lineage heads are much less well
off. Others have served in leading positions in the kebele, or have distinguished themselves
in karta offices, e.g. as Dell’s envoys to meetings with the ritual king. In brief, the Orthodox
church appears as a meeting ground of parts of the local meritocratic elite (the other part
being rich  amain men).  The achieved status  of  these  people  rubs  uneasily  against  their
toidis’ claims to (descent-based) superiority. This, I suggest, is what in many cases accounts
for conflicts and lineage heads’ eventual refusal to serve as a source of blessings. 
A second type of  conflict  is  exemplified  by the case of  Geshabab and his  toidi
Askalbab. To understand their case, one has to know something about their kinship relation.
Askalbab and Geshabab are both first sons. Their fathers, Wulako and Eri, were brothers
and Wulako was the elder brother. Until his untimely death in the early 1970s, Wulako was
toidi of Oni lineage. After his death, Eri became toidi. Eri died in the early 1990s. At this
point only one of Eri’s younger brothers, Soyta, was still alive. This man served as toidi for
some years. When he died, the lineage headship passed down one generation and Wulako’s
first son, Askalbab, became  toidi. Geshabab’s and Askalbab’s relation had never been an
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easy one since both were rich and competed for who was ‘greater’. These tensions were
intensified when Askalbab became Geshabab’s  toidi, since Geshabab now had to bow to
Askalbab’s authority. Geshabab did so and relied on Askalbab to carry out rituals for him. At
the same time, however, Geshabab also started to challenge Askalbab’s authority. Geshabab
claimed that, on his deathbed, Eri had told him that once Soyta had died, the Oni lineage
should segment. In that case, Askalbab would be the toidi of the descendants of Wulako, and
Geshabab would become toidi for the descendants of Eri. Indeed, while Soyta was lineage
head, Geshabab obtained from him a particular knife. After Soyta’s death, when Askalbab
had become  toidi, Geshabab used this knife to sacrifice sheep for his father, Eri. He also
started to carry out for his own sons certain minor rituals, which would usually have been
the prerogative of Askalbab. This clearly angered Askalbab and was perceived by him as a
grave sign of disrespect. Against this background, the logic behind his above-mentioned
refusal to carry out the anza-kash for Geshabab becomes clear. It could be paraphrased like
this: ‘If you slaughter sheep for your father and perform rituals for your descendants, then
why do you need me to do anza-kash for you? Do you not purport to be toidi yourself?’ 
Next to Geshabab, there are four other elders in the Orthodox Church who are heads
of their respective lineage’s highest-ranking junior segment. This means that while there is
not a single lineage head in the Orthodox church,  five out of twenty elders could have
become toidi, had they pushed for lineage segmentation. There is a real question, then, as to
why these people chose to become Orthodox rather than to become toidi. A similar question
applies  for the other  elders:  Traditionally,  men who could not come to terms with their
lineage heads, were assigned what could be called an ‘ersatz toidi’: an elder from a lineage
in  the  same  moiety,  who  would  carry  out  rituals  for  them  as  if  he  were  their  toidi.
Sometimes, such relations lasted for years, until the formerly rejected could return to his
original  toidi because the latter had changed his mind, or because he had died and been
succeeded by a more cooperative person. So why did these elders not make use of an ‘ersatz
toidi’,  a step which would have allowed them to continue following  karta? The fact that
they preferred to convert to Orthodoxy suggests that there was more at issue for them than
just a concern with blessings – for blessings they could also have secured through traditional
means. 
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The Shame of Being Alem
One or two years prior to his conversion, Kalibab found himself in an awkward situation. As
in previous years, he had gone down to Jinka when Easter approached, taking along eggs,
butter and two chickens. These gifts were for a man called Tesfay, who had once shown
great kindness to Kalibab’s son, Esias. Around 2002, Esias had moved to Jinka, to attend
secondary school. At the time, this was a novel and daunting thing to do. Jinka was not only
expensive. It was also deemed a  Gamma place, where – in the absence of relatives and
required to speak Amharic – it was hard for an Aari to live. Therefore, Kalibab and his
family were relieved and grateful when the parents of one of Esias's new schoolmates (both
of them  Gamma) offered Esias to  live with them for free.  Since that  time, Kalibab has
worked  to  reciprocate  Tesfay’s  hospitality  through  annual  gifts.  On one  such occasion,
Kalibab told me, Tesfay invited him to a bar:
‘We sat there for a while, drinking beer. Then a priest came in. All the men went up to
him and kissed his cross. It was very nice to see! [admiringly] But then they asked me,
“what about you? You are an elder, you are a father of children – what about you?” What
was I going to do?! I didn't wear a cross around my neck [as the Orthodox do]. So I said,
“I'm amain”. Later, when we had left the bar, Tesfay scolded me. “You should become
Orthodox. Don't remain Aari!” he said.’
To understand this passage, you have to know that Kalibab in reality was alem at that time,
not  amain  (Evangelical).  Tesfay  knew this,  but  kept  quiet  while  they  were  in  the  bar.
Afterwards,  however,  he  urged  Kalibab  to  not  ‘remain  Aari’ (which  here  stands  as  a
synonym for ‘alem’).  When I asked Kalibab why he had lied to the men in the bar,  he
replied as follows: 
‘You have to be either amain or Orthodox. If you are alem, they laugh at you, they laugh
out loud! They don't like it when you are alem. “That one eats dead animals; that one eats
dirty things”, they say. They belittle you (am naxnaxdek).’
Kalibab’s  lie,  then,  grew out of an acute awareness of Gamma people’s disdain for the
‘heathen’ Aari, in general, and their Orthodox disgust at practices like eating the meat of
animals that had not been slaughtered, in particular. Indeed, to tell a white lie was all the
more necessary for Kalibab since, by addressing him as ‘elder’ and ‘father of children’, the
other men had already imputed a certain respectability to him. His humiliation would have
been all the greater, then, had he revealed himself as alem.
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Kalibab’s move to present himself as an Evangelical points us to what has become
an ever more pressing issue for  alem  people in Dell:  a sense of shame at not having a
‘religion’. To be sure, the sentiment itself is an old one. Ever since the time of conquest,
Christian Northerners have demeaned locals for the ‘backwardness’ of their material culture
as  much as  for  being  ‘heathens’.  However,  in  recent  years,  two factors  have led  to  an
increase in the shame that alem people experience. 
First, more people now entertain personal relations with Gamma. This is especially
true  of  wealthier  people  (and  remember  that  the  Orthodox  converts  are  predominantly
wealthy). Some own houses in Jinka, and this has made them neighbours to Gamma people.
Others have established relationships with Gamma to trade livestock or grain. Yet others,
like Kalibab, have come into personal relation with Gamma due to the educational pursuits
of their children. The case of Kalibab illustrates how such relations can matter with regard
to shame. Kalibab may have long been aware that Gamma look down on non-Christian Aari.
But there is  a  difference between being critiqued by relatively remote others and being
critiqued by people whose opinion one cares about. To be told by Tesfay to ‘not remain
Aari’, certainly had a deep effect on Kalibab, who looks up to Tesfay and, indeed, feels
himself indebted to him. More generally, increased personal interaction with Gamma means
that people come to see themselves more frequently through Gamma eyes. This, I suggest, is
one factor that leads to a heightened sense that to be alem means to lack in respectability. 
A second, yet more important factor relates to the rise of evangelical Christianity.
Karta has been an object of critique ever since the first local church was founded in 1991.
To  this  day,  sermons  delivered  at  funerals,  weddings  or  other  events  attended  by
Evangelicals and non-Evangelicals alike, commonly involve statements about alem people
‘living in the dark’ or having been ‘fooled by Satan’. However, while  alem  people were
once able to shrug off this critique as the misguided view of a minority, they have now
become the minority themselves. This makes it more difficult to ignore the suggestion that
karta is fundamentally flawed and nothing more than a relict of the ‘old days’ (enna sets)
when people just did not know any better. It is true that, in light of their ethos of respect,
Dell  Evangelicals  hardly ever openly sneer at  others for being  alem.  Nonetheless,  alem
people are keenly aware that Evangelicals ultimately look down on them. As several of the
Orthodox elders recalled, in the years prior to their conversion, their own children – amain
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as  well  as  alem –  had  urged  them  to  give  up  karta  by  arguing  that  to  be  alem  was
detrimental to their father’s reputation. 
To be  alem, then, has increasingly become a source of shame, a blemish on one’s
name. This is particularly problematic for elderly men who, in other regards, have what it
takes to have a great name – dependents, affines, modern forms of wealth, personal histories
of public service and distinction,  and so on.  For these people,  conversion to Orthodoxy
offers an effective way to address this issue. To become Orthodox brings not just increased
recognition from Gamma. It also turns one into a person whom amain acknowledge as a
fellow  Christian.  While  Dell  Evangelicals  do  have  their  misgivings  about  Orthodoxy
(especially relating to its permissive stance on alcohol), they do not articulate these publicly.
Thus, whereas no evangelical public event goes by without an explicit critique of  karta,
Orthodoxy is never attacked in this way. Similarly, whenever amain go out to evangelize in
Dell, church leaders stress that people should not target the Orthodox but only the  alem
people. In brief, to become Orthodox is to stop being someone whom others look down on
as a ‘person without religion’ (haymanot jint dakibab). It takes away the blemish from one’s
name. 
My argument,  then,  is  that  conversion  to  Orthodoxy is  mainly  motivated by the
desire to realize the value of name more fully than is possible when one is alem. As I go on
to show in the final part of this section, Orthodoxy is an excellent means to this end. It not
only takes away the blemish from one’s name but even helps to magnify this name. 
Conversion as Purification – Becoming Gamma through Orthodoxy
As a way into my argument that Orthodoxy helps to magnify people’s name, consider the
following  two  accounts  of  what  is  involved  in  becoming  Orthodox.  The  first  is  from
Kalibab, the second from Masmaybab, another elder. 
‘When I  had attended our meetings [of the newly formed Orthodox group] for some
months, the teacher [deacon] said to us: 'You have to go down to Holy Mary [Orthodox
church  in  Sinigal]  for  Ginbot  21 [‘Mary’s  Birthday’]  if  you  want  to  obtain  purity
(nytsunet afken). After that day you will not obtain purity. You must go for the day when
the  Berri  [God;  here  referring  to  the  tabot]  leaves  the  church.'  So  on  the  evening
preceding that day I went, together with Losha and Unta [his two youngest sons] and
some other people from our group. In Sinigal many people were assembled. We elders
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were shown into a tin-roofed house. We were served inʒera [a sourdough-risen flatbread
typical of northern Ethiopia] and meat,  and then we slept.  Early the next morning, a
priest went around, ringing a bell and telling us to get up. Outside we all formed a queue.
Unta and Losha were before me. The priest dipped their heads into a basin with water
and also sprinkled water over their backs. He told them their Christian name and tied a
cross around their neck. Then he dipped my head under water, and told me my Christian
name, Wolde Mariam. ... After this we were led back to the house in which we had slept.
We were given something that tasted like honey and took a sip of something that also
tasted of honey, and we were told to sit in silence and swallow it slowly. When we had
done this, we went out to see the tabot and the dancing. The priest told us to not abandon
our religion. Then we went home.’ (Kalibab)
‘After we had built the [hut] church, we all gave money and grain. We slaughtered a
sheep and called  a  great  Orthodox  priest  from Jinka,  called  Babos.  He came in  the
evening. He was very fat and had a long beard. He looked like God himself, and when
you saw him you got afraid (bashi; in the positive, admiring sense). We feasted with him.
The next morning, Babos prayed for a long time. He repeatedly touched the ground with
his cross, saying 'pure, pure' (nytsu, nytsu). Then he stuck a cross into the ground next to
our hut and from a flask poured some oily substance on the cross; it is like the blood of
[Saint] Gabriel. He also sprinkled water over us, murmuring 'pure, pure'. All this was to
render  xantsa-like  what  had  been  manna-like  (manna  bish  matsaxink,  xantsa  bish
masiken).’ (Masmaybab)
Both of these accounts foreground the topic of purification. Kalibab reports that the deacon
urged the members of the newly formed Orthodox group to ‘obtain purity’ by becoming
baptized; and he describes how this involved having one’s head dipped under water and
swallowing a honey-like substance. Masmaybab talks about how Babos murmured ‘pure,
pure’ while  consecrating the church ground and sprinkling people with water.  It  is  also
noticeable that  Kalibab and Masmaybab both use the Amharic ‘nytsu’ (pure/clean) rather
than its Aari’af equivalent ‘ch’ili’. In the local understanding Amharic is superior to, and
hence purer than Aari’af. So to use the Amharic term for ‘clean/pure’ further emphasizes the
purity that Orthodoxy affords. 
Kalibab’s  and  Masmaybab’s  accounts  reveal  the  understanding  that  to  become
Orthodox involves a transformation in the substance of one’s being, making pure what used
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to be impure. But what exactly is the impurity they think is cleansed away? In the deacon’s
and priest’s view, it is certainly the impurity that comes from sin. But what is it  in the
understanding of converts in Dell? 
Here, it is instructive to consider Masmaybab’s suggestion that Babos’s ritual acts
rendered ‘xantsa-like what had been  manna-like’.  (Remember that  manna  are low-caste
people who do not intermarry or eat together with the high-caste  xantsa.) Masmaybab’s
interpretation of Babos’s acts is striking, because there is not actually a single manna among
the Orthodox converts. In fact, it was repeatedly emphasized that manna would not even be
allowed to come near the church, since this would lead to pollution. And not only are all
converts  xantsa.  They  all  also  belong  to  high-ranking  lineages  that  are  deemed  to  be
particularly pure. Why then does Masmaybab refer to the elders as ‘manna-like’? And what
is meant by saying that they are rendered ‘xantsa-like’? To understand this, remember that
Dell people commonly describe their relation to the Gamma through the following equation:
‘Aari relate  to  Gamma as  manna relate to  xantsa’,  i.e.  Aari are impure and inferior.  In
Masmaybab’s understanding, then, it is not the impurity of sin which is cleansed away by
becoming Orthodox, but the impurity linked to being Aari: Through the priest’s ritual acts,
Aari people are purified and turned into Gamma. 
That one ‘becomes Gamma’ through Orthodoxy is indeed a shared understanding
among converts in Dell. Above, we have already encountered this understanding implicitly
when Kalibab reported Tesfay to have said, ‘You should become Orthodox. Don't remain
Aari!’ We also heard Geshabab recount how, faced with his obstinate lineage head, he said
to himself, ‘that’s enough for me, I'll become Gamma Kristian’. ‘Gamma Kristian’, in fact,
is the self-designation Orthodox people in Dell most commonly employ. And that one has
become Gamma is also expressed in dress, language and demeanour. Converts discard alem
charms and instead wear  around the  neck a  wooden cross  typical  throughout  Orthodox
Ethiopia. They frequently don the gabi, a white vestment wrapped around the body in a way
that symbolizes the cross. The sign of the cross is also used by Orthodox household heads to
bless food, and so are Amharic prayer formulas which replace Aari’af blessings. Rather than
‘Aari  gola  (beer)’ the Orthodox prefer to drink ‘Gamma beer’, which is of a finer texture
and more expensive in preparation. And various ‘Aari customs’ are discarded in favour of
Gamma ones, on which more below. 
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Now, the  concept  of  ‘becoming Gamma’ was  already encountered  in  Chapter  3.
There we saw how people embrace development and the consumption of ‘Gamma goods’ as
a way to achieve this transformation. I explained that the aspiration to become Gamma is
part of the aspiration to gain a ‘great’ name: Gamma being deemed superior to Aari,  to
become Gamma means a gain in reputation. The very same understanding is at play in the
case of conversion to Orthodoxy. This is why Orthodoxy contributes to converts’ name in a
more substantive way than just granting them the respectability of having a religion. More
than a way to rid one’s name of the blemish attached to being alem, Orthodoxy affords a
way to magnify one’s name by becoming Gamma. 
To sum up, my main argument in this section has been that conversion to Orthodoxy
was driven by the value of name. This is not to say that the aforementioned conflicts with
lineage heads played no role whatsoever. On the contrary, the need to look for a new source
of blessings certainly provided the immediate trigger for conversion in most cases. Yet, as I
have explained, blessings could have also been secured without conversion, by drawing on
karta ways  for  dealing  with  obstinate  lineage  heads.  That  elders  nonetheless  opted  for
conversion shows that they were after more than just blessings, and this ‘more’ I suggest
was an improvement to their name. 
But what exactly does it take to realize the value of name through Orthodoxy? And
what does it take to preserve or reproduce the purity Orthodoxy is thought to afford? What
sort of change in practice does all of this require? And what else other than ‘name’ might
converts find attractive about Orthodoxy? In the following section I address these questions
by taking a closer look at the social and religious life of the Orthodox community in Dell.
5.4 Fasting and Feasting – The Social and Religious Life of Orthodoxy in Dell
With his ethnography from the Zege peninsula in  Northern Ethiopia,  Tom Boylston has
offered us an excellent account of what Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity looks like in a
place where it has been firmly established for centuries. On Boylston’s account, the lives of
Orthodox lay people in Zege are marked by two main forms of religious engagement (2018:
70,  37).  First,  there  is  fasting  –  abstaining  from  animal  products  on  Wednesdays  and
Fridays, during Advent and Lent, and possibly at other times of the year. Second, there are
‘calendrical events’, notably Orthodox holidays and Saints days, and here feasting plays a
key role.
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Boylston’s characterization of lay Orthodox life has great purchase for the case of
Dell: here, too, fasting and feasting are the two main pillars of religious life. In this section I
therefore take a closer look at fasting and feasting, asking what exactly it is that they do for
people  in  Dell.  My  argument,  in  brief,  is  that  fasting  (alongside  other  practices  of
renunciation) is key to realizing the value of name since it makes visible the change and
commitment Dell people expect comes with taking up a ‘religion’.  Feasting,  too, shows
religious commitment since it is locally understood as an established part of Orthodoxy. At
the same time, feasting is also central to the way Dell people have traditionally cultivated
respect. Orthodoxy thus allows converts not only to gain respectability but also to revitalize
respect, and this makes up its particular attractiveness. 
Figure 15. Orthodox Christians from Dell join a procession to the church in Bako
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Fasting and the Importance of Discontinuity
Orthodox Christians in Dell take fasting very seriously. Except for one man, I never heard of
anyone breaking the fast. On the contrary, there were several occasions on which I was able
to witness people’s steadfastness. One time, for instance, I accompanied Masmaybab to a
conflict  resolution,  which took place at  an affine’s house several hours’ walk away. We
stayed there for close to two days, and during this whole time were hardly served anything
other than beer. At the end of the second day, a sheep was slaughtered and people (who were
all  alem) sat down to feast on the meat. Masmaybab, however, despite being very hungry,
refused to eat since we were in the middle of the Lenten fast. Instead, he went to sit outside
and, somewhat ostentatiously perhaps, slowly munched a handful of roasted grains which he
had found in his pocket. 
Fasting was also a big issue in Kalibab’s household. Since only one of his wives was
Orthodox,  Kalibab was concerned that  the  other  two might  inadvertently  serve  him the
wrong food on fasting days. I repeatedly heard him admonish them to take care, reminding
them that even a tiny bit of butter or a drop of milk would render food inedible for him.
Also, before entering one of the longer fasting periods, Kalibab commonly asked his wives
to gather together all pots, plates and utensils that had ever come into contact with animal
products, to wash them thoroughly and to dry them in the sun for several hours. 
The importance of fasting became particularly evident in how people reacted to the
one  man  who  was  known to  not  always  keep  the  fast,  Medaybab.  He  was  frequently
gossiped  about,  and  people  also  told  Medaybab  to  his  face  that  he  was  not  ‘walking
correctly’ and that his laxity was a threat to the good name of the Orthodox community.
Moreover, there were concerns about commensality with Medaybab. As Baddi, who is one
of the younger men in the church, explained, ‘look, when Medaybab comes home drunk and
sees that there is milk, he will drink it, even if it’s a fasting day… He isn’t a clean/pure
Orthodox (nytsu Kristian daki). Therefore, when he slaughters, we [other Orthodox people]
won’t eat. It’s bad!’ 
In their emphasis on the importance of fasting, Orthodox Christians in Dell firmly fit
into the broader Ethiopian Orthodox landscape. As Diego Malara notes, ‘[t]here is a wide
scholarly consensus that  no other  Christian group fasts  as  much as Ethiopian Orthodox
Christians do’ (2018: 24). And Tom Boylston describes fasting as that which makes people
Christians: ‘In the eyes of most Orthodox Christians I know, certainly in the villages, if you
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follow the fasts you are a Christian and if you don’t you are not, and that’s really all there is
to it’ (2018: 42).
So what is the importance of fasting? Among Orthodox Christians in Addis Ababa,
Malara  found  that  different  people  attributed  varied  meanings  to  fasting  including
‘forgiveness  for  one’s  sins,  protection  from evils  and  misfortunes,  and  blessings  in  all
aspects of daily life’ (2018: 24f.). At the same time, people agreed that one of the most
important points about fasting was to ‘kill the flesh’, i.e. to tame bodily desires and impulses
(ibid.:  25).  In  Dell,  Orthodox  Christians  see  fasting  slightly  differently.  While  they  do
consider it necessary for blessings (and violations of the fast a source of misfortune), I have
never heard them talk about fasting as being about taming bodily desires. Rather, fasting
here is conceived as key to maintaining purity. This becomes evident not least in people’s
reactions  to  Medaybab.  As  Baddi  puts  it  above,  due  to  drinking  milk  on  fasting  days,
Medaybab ‘isn’t  a  clean/pure  Orthodox’.  As  a  consequence,  Baddi  and other  Orthodox
people were adamant that they would not eat the meat of animals slaughtered by Medaybab,
since this would threaten their own purity. 
A second,  closely  connected  reason  why  fasting  is  so  important  to  Orthodox
Christians in Dell relates to their quest for name. I have already mentioned that one critique
levelled against Medaybab was that his failure to fast properly threatened the good name of
the Orthodox community. This was a more general concern. The Orthodox worried that if
they did not fast correctly, Evangelicals in Dell would think of them as being Orthodox
‘only by name’ (gurri namiken) but not ‘truly’ (dofen). This, however, would have made
them appear as no more than  alem  in disguise, and hence would have undermined their
claims to respectability. In other words, to realize the value of ‘name’ through Orthodoxy,
one has to show that one is committed to following its rules and that one has truly changed
one’s ways. 
Fasting is arguably the most important practice for Dell Orthodox to demonstrate
their commitment to Orthodoxy. It has the capacity to impress others because it sometimes
requires considerable will-power, as when Masmaybab goes to sit outside hungrily while
others enjoy a feast of meat. But there are also other ways in which the Orthodox work to
‘show change’. Three points can be made. 
A first  point  concerns  the  discontinuation  of  karta.  All  converts  have  stopped
participating in lineage rituals and no longer respect any taboos concerning their lineage
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head. What used to be given to the toidi – first fruits, a fraction of the money made through
selling livestock or receiving bridewealth etc. – is now given to the church. Similarly, it is
understood that Orthodox should not go to see diviners (azixandab). Two or three elders are
known to not always stick to this rule. But this elicits criticism from others, and is clearly
disapproved of ideologically. 
A second point  concerns  alcohol.  In  principle,  Orthodox Christianity  permits  the
consumption of alcohol; and for most church members, especially the elders, one reason
why they think they could not be amain is precisely Dell Evangelicalism’s strict teetotalism.
However, there also was a shared understanding that Orthodox should not drink excessively,
not least because this made them an easy object of evangelical ridicule. 
Third,  the Orthodox in Dell were also concerned to acquire religious knowledge.
This  stands  in  some contrast  with  what  has  been observed  among Orthodox Christians
elsewhere in Ethiopia. Thus, Boylston (2018: 70) notes that on the Zege peninsula, religious
knowledge is mainly ‘the domain of specialists, while for the laity… religious engagement
primarily  revolves  around  fasting  and  calendrical  events.’ Similarly,  Malara  (2018:  24)
observes that for most of his informants, ‘conformity to ritual rules was more important than
doctrinal  knowledge.’ In Dell,  however,  there was a clear  interest  in  learning about  the
‘content’ of Orthodoxy. This was supported by the fact that the deacons mostly preached in
Aari’af and thus were well understood by everyone, which would not have been the case
had they preached in Amharic. Also, of those Orthodox men who were literate, a number
owned a bible as well as small pamphlets, which they read regularly. I suggest that this
concern with religious knowledge reflects the fact that in Dell, Orthodox people above all
need to  manifest  their  commitment  to  their  religion  vis-à-vis  the  amain majority.  As  a
consequence, evangelical criteria for what constitutes a dedicated or ‘real’ Christian become
a point of reference for the Orthodox. Indeed, this shows not only in the interest in acquiring
religious knowledge but also in the problematization of alcohol as well as in the emphasis
on ‘separation’ from karta. 
All  in  all,  Orthodox  in  Dell  manifest  what  could  be  termed  an  ‘investment  in
discontinuity’. That is, they are concerned to make visible that their practice has changed
compared to when they were alem. Clearly, this is necessary in order to be able to realize
‘name’ through Orthodoxy. It is only by showing that one has stopped being alem, that one
becomes  the  kind  of  respectable  person  converts  aspire  to  be.  This  investment  in
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discontinuity means that the case of Dell is not adequately described as ‘syncretism’, if by
‘syncretism’ we mean a conscious project to mix two traditions.34 For Orthodox people in
Dell, syncretism does not work because to realize the value they aspire to realize through
Orthodoxy requires change. This supports my overall theory that to realize values through
new means often requires a considerable change in practice. 
Feasting in Gabriel’s Name – Orthodox Ritual and the Revitalization of Respect
If fasting is one pillar of religious engagement for Orthodox Christians in Dell, feasting is
the other. There are numerous occasions throughout the year on which congregants come
together for commensality. For each of the three main Orthodox holidays, Easter, Epiphany
and Meskel  (Exaltation of the Cross), the Orthodox men form a  mahber (association) that
buys and slaughters oxen. Some of the meat is eaten jointly, and the remainder is taken
home and consumed in the  household.  The Orthodox also feast  together  to  celebrate  a
child's first birthday or when someone moves into a new house. On such occasions typically
a priest will come from Bako to pray and to bless people by sprinkling them with Holy
Water. Many members of the congregation have personal vows (silet) to a particular Saint,
and on the Saint’s annual feast they invite Orthodox neighbours for beer and bread. Finally,
on the 19th and 21st of each month, the entire congregation assembles to feast in the name of
Gabriel and Mariam respectively.
Tom Boylston, in a chapter titled ‘Echoes of the Host’, has pointed to the ‘religious
significance, by analogy with the Eucharist, of any act of hosting’ (2018: 119). Observing
that purity concerns lead most Ethiopian Orthodox lay people to abstain from partaking in
the  Eucharist  for  most  of  their  lives,  Boylston  highlights  the  existence  of  ‘a  series  of
practices [that] serve as “echoes” – smaller versions of the same pattern, which allow for
everyday relationship-making among people and in the names of saints’ (ibid.). First and
foremost  among such 'echoes'  are  zikir,  commemorative meals aimed at  saints  or Mary
(ibid.: 127). Just as the real Eucharist means the communing of humans with God, so in
memorial meals,  ‘a collective of people and divine agents is brought into being.’ (ibid.:
130). 
34 ‘Syncretism’ can be approached from two angles. One can either try to say in objective terms whether
something is an instance of syncretism. Or one can talk about whether people themselves aim to syncretize
two religious traditions. The latter approach is more comfortable and interesting for anthropologists. This
is because the former approach requires a standard of ‘true’ religion against which any given manifestation
can be judged as either syncretized or not. But as James Laidlaw (1995: 6) points out, questions of the type
‘are these people really Buddhists, Jain, or whatever?’ are ‘either theological or vacuous’.
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The feasts held in Dell on the 19th and 21st of each month are such memorial meals.
Referred to as ‘Gabriel’, the feast on the 19th is dedicated to the church’s patron saint and is
masculine-coded: the food is provided by one of the men, and only men take confession on
this day. The feast on the 21st is dedicated to Mary and here it  is the women who take
confession and who provide the food. Gabriel is the more important of the two, and tends to
be a little more elaborate. It also is the most important ritual of the Orthodox community in
Dell overall. As such, it lends itself to a closer analysis of what feasting does for Orthodox
people in Dell.  Consider the following description which is from the day when Kalibab
acted as host.
In the early morning, Kalibab sends his two young sons, Losha and Unta, to cut
reeds and decorate the church by spreading them on the floor. He also tells them to buy
candles and matches in the village store. Kalibab himself, clad in his white gabi and with an
air of joyful anticipation, goes on a tour through the compounds of the other Orthodox men
to respectfully invite them and their wives to join him in church that day. Meanwhile, his
third wife and his two teenage daughters, who had been busy over the past week brewing 40
litres of ‘Gamma beer’, baking two enormous wheat-breads and preparing some 30kg of
shosha (a mixture of roasted wheat, barley, and dried peas), bring half of this food and drink
to the church. 
At around ten o’clock in the morning, the church starts to fill up, women sitting on
the left, men on the right, older people toward the front, younger people toward the back.
Since no deacon has come up to Dell this day, the service is led by Brano. Around 20 years
of age and a Grade 10 graduate, Brano has recently returned from a two months theological
training in Addis Ababa, organized and sponsored by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. After
the choir has sung a couple of mezmur, Brano makes the sign that people are to stand up and
face  the  back  wall.  He  then  begins  to  recite  psalms  from  a  small  booklet,  and  the
congregants repeat certain phrases and cross themselves at different points. After about 15
minutes, people sit down again. Rather than deliver a sermon, as he would on an ordinary
Sunday, Brano at this point hands over to his father's father, Geshabab, the first convert,
oldest man, and main church leader, whom we have already encountered above.
With a knife that had been stored in the church, Geshabab first carves the sign of the
cross into the large bread provided by Kalibab and then cuts off a piece. He steps up in front
of the congregation, holding the piece of bread in his left hand and a chalice in his right.
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One  man  after  the  other,  from  oldest  to  youngest,  goes  up  to  Geshabab.  Facing  the
congregation  each  man  confesses  his  sins  and  asks  for  forgiveness,  which  the  others
pronounce. Each then turns to Geshabab, tears off a crumb of bread, puts it into his mouth,
lowers himself by bending his knees and receives a sip of ‘Gamma beer’ – which at this
moment is considered ts’ebel (holy water) – from the chalice tilted over by Geshabab. When
all the men have finished, and while the choir sings two mezmur, Geshabab cuts up the rest
of the bread and fills a number of plates with roasted grain. Then the food is distributed, and
everyone  also  receives  a  cup  of  ‘Gamma  beer’.  After  the  concentrated  and  solemn
atmosphere  of  the  service,  the  mood  now  becomes  light  and  joyful,  and  people  chat
animatedly while they eat bread and grain and drink several cups of beer. 
Figure 16. Drinking ts’ebel at a Gabriel memorial feast
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At around noon, the part in church ends with organizational announcements and a
collection of the men's monthly contribution to the Orthodox iddir (burial association). Then
Kalibab invites the married members of the church to follow him to his house, where he
entertains them for the rest of the day with coffee, beer, and liquor, roasted grain and bread.
After much merry-making and in a state of happy drunkenness, one of the elders finally gets
up, thanks Kalibab for the hospitality and asks Gabriel's blessing for him and his house.
‘May  your  crops  grow,  may  your  wives  give  birth,  may  your  livestock  multiply.  May
Gabriel once again unite us in your house.’ Stepping into the balmy night, the congregants
part ways – only to unite again two days later for the feast of Mariam. 
Analysis 
In Chapter 1 I analysed commensality as a key technique for realizing the value of respect
(bonshmi).  I  made  three  points.  Firstly,  commensality  presupposes  and  thus  helps  to
produces  social  harmony:  In Dell,  people assume they cannot  eat  together  if  there  is  a
conflict among them, and this makes it necessary to solve conflicts before one starts to eat.
Social harmony, however, is the precondition for being able to meet each other with respect.
Secondly, commensality draws people into respectful interactions: Inviting and following an
invitation, greeting each other respectfully, granting precedence by offering up one’s chair
or by waiting for someone else to start eating, joking with each other in a kindly way – all
are deemed expressions of respect.  Thirdly, commensality creates relations: To ingest the
same food is considered a source of kinship, especially in the case of meat. Also, acts of
hosting others create obligations and lead to future return-invitations,  and thus to future
realizations of respect. 
It  is  important  to  recall  this  analysis  here  because  it  helps  to  understand  the
attractiveness  of  Orthodox  feasting.  Orthodox  feasting,  I  suggest,  is  valuable  to  people
above all as a way to realize the value of respect. The feast of Gabriel perfectly exemplifies
this. 
To begin with, Gabriel is an institutionalized occasion for conflict resolution. A large
part of the ritual in church consists in the men’s confession. Those who are not aware to
have committed any particular sin commonly pronounce a brief formula like, ‘we are human
beings, so sin is never far; may God forgive me if I have sinned.’ By contrast, those who
have sinned – which above all means: those who have been at conflict with another member
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of the Orthodox congregation – will  talk about this  in more detail.  In graver cases,  the
conflict has usually already been dealt with through mediation prior to the service. In the
case  of  minor  quarrels,  people  exchange  apologies  during  the  service.  It  is  only  when
everyone has confessed their  sins  and all  conflicts  have been resolved that  people start
eating. This follows the established understanding that you cannot share food if there are ill
feelings among you. 
After  confession,  when  the  actual  feasting  part  begins,  the  atmosphere  becomes
joyful  and affectionate.  At this  point,  people commonly get  up from their  seats  and go
around to greet each other heartily. The platters with food are distributed by children or
teenagers, which represents proper hierarchy – as, indeed, does the fact that it is the oldest
man who is granted the right to cut the bread. After a while, and as earlier in the morning,
Kalibab respectfully begs the adults to come to his house, and by offering lavish hospitality
to his guests, Kalibab shows them extensive respect.
All this reproduces relations among the congregants. Each time, it is another person
who acts as host and who thus pays off obligations and creates new ones. There is a clear
sense that members of the congregation are linked through ties of spiritual kinship (layered
on top of the ‘real’ kinship that exists among many of these people), and that this means that
one should also treat each other with special respect outside of the church context. Among
others, it entails a commitment to solving conflicts peacefully and to not sue each other in
court. It also expresses itself in the solidarity enacted when there is a death in one of the
households. On such occasions, other Orthodox, even those living at some distance, will
spend a great deal of time visiting, assisting and comforting the bereaved, as is commonly
done among close kin. 
The feast of Gabriel, then, allows people to realize respect – and so do the various
other feasts that regularly unite the Orthodox congregants. Given my analysis in previous
chapters,  it  is  not  hard to  understand why this  should be attractive.  I  have discussed  a
widespread sense of a decline of respect, and I have explained how this is closely linked to a
reduction in commensality. I showed in Chapter 2 that Dell Evangelicalism regards feasting
as a source of sin, and that this comes with de facto much reduced commensality among
Evangelicals.  This  also  affects  non-Evangelicals  in  as  much  as  there  are  overall  fewer
people to engage into reciprocal exchanges of hospitality. In Chapter 3 I showed how, in
their quest to build name through development, people have shifted their use of resources
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from feasting to acquiring modern goods. Here we also saw that feasting, beyond requiring
resources which could be used otherwise,  has come to be regarded as an expression of
‘backwardness’, of being ‘concerned only with one’s stomach’. Orthodoxy allows people to
reverse this trend. This is because it provides religious legitimacy to feasting. To feast as an
Orthodox is simply to do what Orthodox do, it is to show commitment to one’s religion and
cannot be read as an expression of ‘backwardness’. As such, Orthodoxy affords a way to
revitalize feasting and respect without endangering one’s name.
There remains the problem, of course,  that one might desire to use resources for
modern goods rather than for feasting – the objective trade-off does not disappear.  And
while  one  could  think  that  converts  no  longer  depend  on  modern  consumption  since
Orthodoxy provides them with an alternative way to build name, this would not correspond
to how the Orthodox themselves see things. Progress at development remains an important
aspiration for these people. If they do not perceive Orthodoxy as being at conflict with this
aspiration, it is because they have enough resources to excel at both. As I have explained,
the elders who joined the Orthodox church are almost all very wealthy, and so feasting does
not throw them back in any significant way. For these people, it seems, Orthodoxy is a way
to have their cake and eat it too. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In  a  masterful  study  of  the  Alaskan  Tlingit  people  and their  engagement  with  Russian
Orthodox Christianity during the 19th century, Sergei Kan (1999) has made observations
which resonate with my findings from Dell. One of Kan’s key contentions is that the Tlingit
case  is  only  poorly  described  as  one  of  ‘syncretism’.  There  certainly  were  continuities
between  pre-Christian  and  Christian  practice.  However,  this  did  not  mean  that  Tlingit
Orthodox  practice  deviated  from  Russian  Orthodox  dogma  and  liturgy.  Rather,  the
continuities were due to affinities between the two cultural systems. For example, where
Tlingit had traditionally been concerned with ancestor veneration, Orthodoxy put high value
on a very similar practice, namely the commemoration of the dead (ibid.: 433). According to
Kan,  these  affinities  made  Orthodoxy  directly  meaningful  to  people  and  facilitated  its
uptake. Indeed, it also was these affinities, which – after a period of engagement with a
thoroughly anti-traditionalist Presbyterianism – made many Tlingit return to Orthodoxy. 
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‘[A]s Tlingit converts to Presbyterianism gradually realized, the price they had to pay for
joining this powerful … institution was a significant loss of independence, including the
freedom to raise and educate their own children according to centuries-old traditions. …
In [the Orthodox church] they could be both “civilized” and respectable but also largely
independent, ideologically as well as politically.’ (ibid.: 238f.) 
In a way that echoes Kan’s, this chapter has made two main suggestions. Firstly, and with
regard to debates about dis/continuity in conversion to Orthodoxy, I have argued against
seeing Dell as a case of ‘syncretism’. This is not just because people here de facto practice
Orthodoxy in the same way it is practised by lay people across Ethiopia, namely through
fasting and feasting. They are, moreover, not personally invested in mixing Orthodoxy with
their traditional practice. On the contrary, I have shown that there is a real investment in
discontinuity, a concern, that is, to show that one has changed one’s ways – that one no
longer participates in karta rituals, that one keeps the fast, that one knows something about
the  doctrine  of  Orthodoxy,  and  so  on.  This,  I  have  argued,  is  necessary  to  attain  and
maintain  the  respectability  Orthodoxy  is  hoped  to  afford.  Secondly,  I  have  argued  that
despite requiring change, Orthodoxy also affords continuities with traditional practice. In
particular, I have pointed to the key role that feasting plays in both  karta and Orthodoxy,
and how this allows people to cultivate respect. 
All in all, Orthodoxy’s attractiveness is rooted in the fact that it allows to realize
otherwise conflicting values. Not only does it serve as a new and potentially more secure
source of blessings, it also brings both greater respectability and the chance to revive a more
respectful mode of sociality. At least for those who can afford it, Orthodoxy has thus proven
an answer to what in recent years has become a pressing concern: how to become more
respectable in the eyes of the wider world without ceasing to respect each other. 
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6. Conclusion
The starting point of this thesis was a claim frequently heard in my southwest Ethiopian
fieldsite: that ‘there’s no more respect these days’. The thesis set out to explore this claim –
to understand what is meant here by respect, why people think respect has declined, what
accounts for this decline, and how people seek to deal with it. 
Bonshmi or  respect,  the first  chapter revealed,  in  Dell  is  something that happens
between people. Never simply an attitude, respect here always manifests in action: in acts of
greeting and deferring, in offering things – from hospitality to labour to first milk – or in
refraining  from certain  acts  in  another  person’s  presence.  Respect  is  displayed  through
fearfulness and unquestioning obedience, through affection and attentiveness. The condition
of possibility for realizing this kind of respect is personal interaction. If everyone ‘only sits
in their own house’, as Kalinda put it, there cannot be any  bonshmi.  Karta  or traditional
practice, I suggested in Chapter 1, does precisely this: it draws people into interaction. If in
looking back to their engagement with karta people have a sense that karta was ‘good for
respect’, this is because it offered them rich opportunities to create the kinds of relations and
occasions  through  which  respect  could  be  cultivated.  To  participate  in  this  cultural
formation was to be invited to become kin with a great number of others and to unite for
commensality, whether in the context of work or ritual, of conflict resolution or everyday
life in the household. 
If  bonshmi  depends  on  relations  in  which  people  owe  each  other  respect  and
occasions on which they are brought into personal interaction, the past two decades have
seen changes that worked against these conditions of possibility for respect. Most significant
here  is  the  rising  aspiration  for  economic  development.  It  is  their  tireless  working  for
‘growth’ which  makes  people  spend  much  less  time  and  wealth  on  the  relations  and
activities that afford respect. Grain, money or livestock used for feasts cannot be invested in
new  business  ventures  or  to  acquire  tin-roofed  houses,  clothes  and  so  on.  Time  spent
drinking coffee with neighbours cannot be used to weed garlic fields or see to the optimal
growth of  livestock.  But  not  only does  the  quest  for  development reduce the  resources
people are ready to spend on relational activities. It also increasingly brings people into
open conflict,  especially over fields and grazing land.  All this  contributes to a  sense of
declining respect – of people being less ready to lend each other a hand, to show generous
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hospitality,  to  subordinate  personal  material  interests  to  values  like  neighbourliness  or
solidarity among kin. 
However, it is not the quest for development alone which has undermined respect. I
suggested that evangelical Christianity, too, has played a role in this. It is true that Dell
Evangelicalism does not feature aggressive rhetorics of ‘breaking’ or ‘spiritual warfare’. On
the  contrary,  this  is  a  Christianity  deeply  oriented  toward  humility  and  love,  which
emphasizes the importance of being respectful to everyone, whether senior or junior, friend
or foe. Dell Evangelicalism’s averse effect on respect is not to do with encouraging conflict.
Rather, it is to do with wanting to avoid conflict at all cost. Respect here, one might say,
above all becomes a matter of avoiding disrespect. But to avoid a disvalue ~X often is not
the same as realizing the value X. When people are sent home quickly after a funeral, this
may hinder them from sinning against each other. But it also hinders them from realizing the
positive potentials of interaction. 
The Challenges of Social Differentiation
There  is  a  further  way  in  which  conversion  to  Evangelicalism,  but  also  conversion  to
Orthodoxy, has contributed to what Dell people perceive as a decline of respect. I have only
sometimes hinted at this in passing, and therefore want to briefly develop this point here in
the  conclusion.  It  relates  to  increased  social  heterogeneity  or,  as  one  might  say,  a
pluralization of ways of life. Through religious conversion, Dell society has come to feature
three  distinct  ways  of  doing  things  –  karta,  Evangelicalism,  Orthodoxy  –  and  three
associated kinds of person one can be –  alem, amain, kristian.  It is true that these groups
share the same life-world, and that there are numerous ways in which their paths constantly
intersect  and in  which  they  are  linked across  religious  cleavages:  from living  in  pluri-
religious  households,  kin  groups  and  neighbourhoods,  to  being  brought  together  in  the
context of work or political meetings. And yet, there are also tangible divisions – divisions
which make it harder to coordinate social life, harder to generate the sense of unity and
common purpose that remains a widely shared ideal. 
Only  take  the  issue  of  diverging  calendars.  Evangelicals  and  Orthodox  rest  on
Sundays, but for alem Sunday is a normal working day. Orthodox and alem rest on the 12th,
19th, 21st and 27th of each month, but Evangelicals do not (unless it is a Sunday). What is a
major holiday for some people – say the evangelical Christmas or the Orthodox timket or the
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bi-annual lineage ritual in  karta – for others is a day without special significance. While
some eat meat, others fast. 
Indeed, food is another great point of division. Evangelicals refuse to eat the meat of
animals sacrificed for the purpose of reading intestines, as happens for instance during karta
funerals. They also refuse meat broth cooked with blood. Orthodox will not eat meat unless
from animals slaughtered by an Orthodox Christian. And most  alem, in turn, refuse to eat
what has been slaughtered by patrikin other than their lineage head. The same for drink:
While  alem and Orthodox drink beer and liquor,  amain  refuse any kind of alcohol – and,
indeed, are further subdivided into those who also refuse certain non-alcoholic drinks on the
basis of their visual resemblance with alcoholic ones (for instance a non-fermented corn-
flour drink that looks like beer), and those who think it is fine to consume these. 
These differences in calendars and dietary regimes are strongly felt in Dell, where, as
we saw in Chapter 1, sharing food is one of the most important lubricants of social life. Not
only have spontaneous exchanges of hospitality become more difficult in this way. It is now
also a rather challenging affair to organize larger social events like funerals or weddings,
house-warming parties or thanksgiving celebrations held upon obtaining a college degree. A
date needs to be found that works for everyone, diverse kinds of food and drink need to be
produced, space needs to be divided into areas for those who drink alcohol and those who
do not (not least because amain are averse to even smelling alcohol). Sometimes I even saw
screens being built from blankets, so as to shield Evangelicals from the sight of traditional
dancing. To coordinate these various demands requires not simply a lot of energy. It is also
an easy source of conflict: To work out the details of how to live together in a situation of
pluralism does not go without tensions. Here, too, then, there arises a challenge to relating to
each other respectfully.
And yet, the very fact that people are committed to dealing with this challenge points
us to the ongoing attraction respect holds for them. To be sure, there is disagreement as to
how best to realize this value: whether respect ought to be shown directionally or mutually,
whether one ought to strive for positive expressions of respect even at the risk of conflict, or
whether respect should be above all a matter of avoiding disrespect. But these differences
notwithstanding,  the  basic  vision  of  a  world  in  which  people  are  related  to  each other
respectfully – rather than through antagonism or indifference – remains a shared ideal. 
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To note this ongoing, shared concern with respect is important for two reasons, one
theoretical, the other ethnographic. First, anthropologists critical of the concept of values
often point to social heterogeneity to argue that one cannot ever speak of anything like
‘shared values’. But the case of Dell brings to attention what may well be a more general
point,  namely that  social heterogeneity does not  necessarily  index differences in values.
Indeed, heterogeneity may itself be the result of shared values. This is because – depending
on their social position and resources – different groups in society may rely on different
ways to realize a shared value. Thus, Dell people share the values of blessings, name and
respect, but different groups gravitate to different cultural formations to realize these values.
Building name through development is easier for rich people, but poorer people can work
toward the same goal by becoming religious virtuosi. Lineage heads are better positioned to
access blessings through karta than those further down in the hierarchy; but younger men
and women can access blessings through Evangelicalism, and for elderly men Orthodoxy
offers a way to access blessings independent of their capricious lineage heads. The values
are the same, the practices for realizing them differ. 
A second reason why it is important to note Dell people’s ongoing shared concern
with respect is that this sensitises us to their current efforts to revive a more respectful mode
of  sociality.  As  we  saw in  Chapter  5,  for  some  people  these  efforts  are  facilitated  by
Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity, which affords opportunities to build relations mediated by
commensality.  More  important  in  quantitative  terms  is  Evangelicalism’s  critique  of
development,  discussed  in  Chapter  4.  The  local  church  may  accord  low  value  to
commensality,  but  it  places  utmost  value  on  humility  and  mutual  respect  –  on  people
helping each other freely and giving up their personal interests in favour of God and human
others. To defend this vision against the onslaught of the market is, from the point of view
of respect,  arguably  the  most  significant  task Dell  people  presently  face.  Just  how this
struggle  will  play  out  in  the  long-run  remains  to  be  seen  and  clearly  merits  further
investigation. 
Values as a Dynamic Force in Social Life 
To understand Dell people’s laments about a decline of respect as well as their reactions to
this decline, I examined the recent history of Dell. This ethnographic analysis of change has
suggested that long-established values played a driving role in the transformations which
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Dell has witnessed over the past two decades. I showed that it was the aspiration to realize
the  value  of  blessings  more  fully  which  motivated  people  to  convert  from  karta  to
evangelical  Christianity.  This  concern  also  played  a  part  in  conversion  to  Orthodoxy.
Similarly, we saw how a long-standing concern with building name drove people to take up
the pursuit of economic development, and, again, also mattered for Orthodox conversion.
The  engagement  with  these  new cultural  formations  in  each  case  came  with  profound
changes  in  people’s  practice.  There  were,  for  one  thing,  no  attempts  to  ‘syncretize’
Christianity with traditional practice. Rather, we saw how both Evangelicals and Orthodox
Christians  had  a  considerable  investment  in  discontinuity.  Also,  engagement  with
development and the market economy here did not serve the end of expanding traditional
institutions. Instead we saw that people decisively shifted their use of time and wealth to
economically ‘productive’ activities and investments. 
Despite being motivated by long-established values, then, people here changed their
practice  profoundly  –  so  profoundly,  indeed,  that  their  ability  to  realize  respect  was
restricted.  But  how is  it  possible  for  there  to  be  continuity  on  the  level  of  values  and
discontinuity on the level of practice? How can established values drive change? Following
Robbins’ (2017) suggestion to make analytical use of the distinction between subjective and
objective values, and building on the work of Naomi Haynes (2017) and Max Weber (1946),
I formulated a model which suggests that personally held or ‘subjective’ values can motivate
people to engage with new cultural formations as means to better realize their own values.
Such formations are themselves structured toward certain ends or ‘objective values’ and
people will seek out those formations which are geared toward the kinds of values they hope
to  realize.  However,  the  sort  of  practice  required  to  realize  those  values  may  be  very
different  from  people’s  previous  practice.  To  realize  blessings  through  evangelical
Christianity, for instance, takes a notably different kind of activity than to realize blessings
through karta. Crucially, it is only by aligning one’s practice with the objective requirements
of a given cultural formation that one can succeed at realizing its ends. The motivation to
affect this alignment is provided by one’s own values.35 
By offering this model, my thesis contributes to recent efforts to move the concept of
values away from its earlier association with social stability and reproduction. Extending
35 Note the implication of this: Since for actors the successful realization of their own values depends on
following the logic of  the cultural  formations in  which they participate,  the relation between cultural
formations and actors is not properly described as one of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ – at least not if ‘agency’
is taken to mean resistance (cf. Laidlaw 2014: 5ff. for a critique of this usage of the term). 
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Joel Robbins’ (2004) suggestion that changes in values can drive change, this thesis has
argued that established values, too, can be powerful drivers of change. 
Objections and Responses
At least two major objections could be raised against the argument presented in this thesis. I
would like to briefly anticipate these here. The interest of this is not so much a defensive
one. Rather, my response to these objections helps to make two more general points about
values. 
(1) A first possible objection concerns my suggestion that while practices have changed,
values  have  remained  the  same.  It  could  be  questioned  whether  this  is  an  adequate
ethnographic representation of the situation in Dell. And, following on from this, it could be
asked whether  my argument about  established values as drivers  of  change would break
down if values turned out to have changed, too. In this latter case, after all, they would no
longer  appear  as  the  unmoved movers  as  which  I  have presented  them,  and this  could
suggest that something else has been driving change in Dell.
To argue against my claim about a continuity in values one could pick up from the
observation that  there now exist  numerous  new objects,  ideas,  practices and institutions
which people value and which they did not greatly care about in the past. Tin-roofed houses
or education, fasting or being humble toward juniors are examples of things that have only
recently started to be valued in Dell. So in what sense does this not constitute a change in
values?
Let me begin answering this objection by way of a general observation. This is that
the value accorded to particular things can change – not due to changes in overarching
values – but as a result  of new ideas about how the world works. Take breakfast as an
example. In the 18th century, the upper classes in northwestern Europe preferred heavily
sugared bakery goods for breakfast (Smith 2002: 184). Today, the upper classes prefer what
we would spontaneously think of as a healthier breakfast, say, cereals and fruit. However,
what has changed here is not the value which breakfast is supposed to realize – it is not that
there is now a new interest in ‘health’. In the 18th century, too, breakfast was considered ‘as
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a meal in which one consumed particularly “healthy” foods and drinks’ (ibid.). All that has
changed is the understanding of what constitutes healthy food.36
The observation that the value accorded to particular things can change as a result of
changed understandings about the world has great purchase for Dell. Take feasting as an
example.  karta and evangelical Christianity clearly differ in the value they accord to it.
However, this is mainly due to different ideas about the effects of feasting. In karta, there is
the understanding that feasting helps to do away with conflicts and to create kinship-like
relations. Dell Evangelicalism holds that feasting leads to conflict and that it is not needed
to relate people because they are already related through Christ. But the overarching values
in both cases are similar: peace, relatedness, respect, and the blessings associated with such
a state of social harmony. 
Or consider education.  Until  recently,  people in Dell  accorded very low value to
education.  This  was  reflected  in  low student  numbers  as  well  as  in  the  fact  that  most
students dropped out after one or two grades without having become literate. Today student
numbers are soaring, young people are extremely eager to finish Grade 10 and many go to
great length to achieve this and to move on to college. Again, this change is largely due to a
changed  situation  and  changed  understandings  about  the  world:  Until  recently  it  was
realistic to assume that education was a dead end, since no Aari would ever move up into
government  employment.  Today,  there  is  a  good  chance  that  you  can  make  it  into
government employment. And so while education previously was not valued because it did
not have economic use, it today is valued because it has economic use – the overarching
value is the same, only the understanding of how education contributes to realizing it has
changed. 
In short, then, my reply to the above raised objection is this: when I say that values
have remained the same, I am referring to overarching values not to the value accorded to
particular things. The latter may change due to changed circumstances and ideas. 
This answer, however, could elicit a second critique. For it could be said that my
claim about a continuity in values only works because the values I talk about are so abstract
36 Roy D’Andrade (2008:  24) makes a closely related point  when he observes  that  differences between
cultures are often prematurely attributed to differences in values, whereas the real difference may not be in
values but in ‘what-counts-as-what’ in different cultures: ‘when one encounters a society where people do
not hook their values to norms and practices the way one does oneself, one is likely to think that what is
different about the culture of these people is that it has  different values. […] Ethnographers and casual
observers see that people have different norms and cultural practices, and they then attribute the values
they would  have  to  have  if  they  were  to  do  the  things  they  observe  people  to  be  doing.  This  is  a
fundamental error in attribution.’ (ibid.: 24f., emphasis in original). 
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and  general  –  health  and  flourishing,  respect  and  reputation  are  perhaps  things  people
everywhere care about. In more general terms this critique could be phrased as follows: If
only one takes abstraction far enough one will always be able to construct a value which
unites what appears as substantially different. One could construct a value of ‘living a good
life’ and suggest that a great many cultures are all ultimately oriented toward this one value.
Evidently such a statement would be vacuous.
Now, I agree that there is a danger in values analysis to take abstraction too far and
to end up with accounts that tell us nothing about what particular people actually care about.
I do not think, however, that this is what I have done for the case of Dell. To begin with, it is
important to note that I did not construct any values, but simply translated the local concepts
of bonshmi, nami and anʒe, into respect, name and blessings. Also, I only used these terms
in the way they are used locally. Thus, if  bonshmi,  for instance, appears to cover a great
variety of practices and to be applied to diverse situations this is not due to my arbitrary
ascription but reflects local usage – and, indeed, tells us much about how central this value
is for people. 
But there is also a second reply to the objection that my claim about a continuity in
values  only  works  due  to  referring  to  overarching  values.  This  is  the  reply  that  when
researching values one has to take one’s analysis all the way through to people’s ultimate
values and not stop short at what really is only valued as a means to an end. Thus, if I ask
someone why they value working hard and they tell me that it is because they would like to
build a tin-roofed house, then I cannot leave it at that but have to go on asking what the tin-
roofed house is good for. This enquiry has to be pursued until one reaches the point where
what people give as a reason for doing something is felt by them to be self-evidently and
intrinsically good. One has to go to the point where ‘the spade turns’, as Wittgenstein (1973:
217) puts it (in the slightly different context of discussing reasons for following rules): ‘If I
have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am
inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”’ This process, however, in Dell continuously
leads to the discovery that respect, reputation and blessings are the bedrock of this society. 
These then would be my replies to objections concerning my claim that values have
remained  constant  in  Dell.  But  even  if  these  replies  are  not  accepted,  this  does  not
necessarily challenge my argument that established values here were drivers of change. It is,
after  all,  conceivable  to  have  a  situation  where  values  drive  change  in  the  sense  of
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motivating  people  to  engage with new cultural  formations,  but  where,  in  the  course of
participating in these formations people’s personal values change. Indeed, some such change
may have taken place in Dell, too, especially in the context of religious practice. I have no
investment in precluding this in principle. And more generally it would be misleading to
suggest that in Dell values only ever stayed the same. If in this thesis I have put emphasis on
the stability in values, this is to be seen not least as a relative statement: it is in relation to
the profound changes in practice that values appear as relatively constant. While it would
not have been impossible to press the data into such a shape as to suggest that there have
been changes in central values, this would have done violence to the ethnography. Similarly,
I have wanted to emphasize that the changes we see in Dell are not primarily the effect of
changed values, but rather are themselves driven by a set of long established values. Values
in this case appear as movers rather than as that which was moved. Here, however, a second
kind of objection could be raised. 
(2) A second query could be whether values really were what drove change in Dell,  or
whether  it  was  something else,  with  values  either  playing no role  at  all  (a  claim most
anthropologists might find too strong and with which I shall therefore not deal), or with
values only playing a mediating role – the role of an intervening variable, rather than that of
an independent one. As an alternative explanation, this objection would likely suggest some
form of coercion. And it could make this point by constructing for each of the changes I
have discussed an account highlighting force and necessity instead of desire and motivation.
When people leave  karta for Evangelicalism or Orthodoxy, it would be argued on
this account,  they do so perforce not because they have the vision of a world in which
blessings are more fully realized. Experiencing illness, or the death of children, or being
faced with a recalcitrant lineage head, they simply see no other choice than to convert.
Similarly,  it  could be argued that there are several factors that compel people to pursue
development.  First,  population  growth  and  land  scarcity  require  them to  look  for  new
sources  of  income  outside  of  agriculture  in  order  to  secure  subsistence.  Second,  the
Ethiopian state undeniably pushes its citizens to pursue development. Hence, taking up this
pursuit  may  above  all  be  about  accommodating  oneself  to  the  necessities  of  life  in
contemporary Ethiopia. Finally, recalling the fact that people were demeaned by the Gamma
(Northern Ethiopians),  one  could  argue that  their  desire  to  improve their  name through
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development follows from an inferiority complex rather than from any genuine vision of the
good. 
Admittedly, how we explain change is in some measure a question of theoretical
preference. If one was committed to showing that change in Dell was the result of coercion,
one would be able to present things this way. It is always possible to see the glass as half-
empty or half-full, one might say, and to either stress the push factors of change, i.e. the
forces behind it, or to emphasize that which pulls people forward, i.e. their values. Yet, this
kind of theoretical agnosticism is ultimately not helpful. The question rather ought to be
this: how much data can we make sense of through a given theoretical lense, and how much
data do we have to brush under the carpet? In the case of Dell, a power-based explanation
would have trouble accounting for the ethnography in several regards. 
To begin with, the notion that people pursue development out of sheer economic
necessity does, so far at least, not hold up to closer inspection. As mentioned before, Dell
has profited considerably from climate change, which has permitted planting two crops per
year instead of just one. Moreover, the growth of towns like Jinka has come with a rising
demand for farm produce, and this allows people to obtain much higher (inflation adjusted)
prices for grain and livestock than in the past. It is true that some hardly benefit from this
because they have barely enough land to feed their own families. However, and this is a
second crucial point to observe, it is often precisely these poorer people who relinquish the
pursuit  of  development  in  favour  of  being  virtuous  Christians  and  serving in  church  –
whereas the rich are those who strive hardest for development.
Similarly,  the  idea  that  state-power  is  the  principle  cause  of  Dell  people’s
engagement with development faces the problem of having to account for why there is so
little resistance. To be sure, the Ethiopian state is strong, even at the grass-roots level. But
the  anthropological  literature  is  full  of  examples  of  how subaltern  groups  can  use  the
‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985) to subvert the systems they are subjected to. Indeed, we
saw that far from resisting development, Dell people are often outright enthusiastic about it.
This  enthusiasm  would  have  to  be  discounted  as  ‘false  consciousness’ –  a  move  that
anthropologists, for good reasons, have largely eliminated from their repertoire. 
In  the  case  of  religious  conversion,  the  evidence  does  not  support  explanations
highlighting necessity over desire, either. I have already discussed this at some length for
the case of Orthodoxy. We saw that elders had the choice between a range of karta means
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for  accessing  blessings  independently  of  their  lineage  heads,  but  that  they  nonetheless
decided to convert. One may add here that hardly any of the elders had actually faced acute
suffering prior to conversion, but that most had simply worried that their lineage head’s
refusal to carry out rituals would eventually mean harm for them. 
Things  may seem less  clear  cut  in  the  case  of  conversion to  Evangelicalism.  In
accounts like that of Baza, the first convert (Chapter 2), conversion appears as a last-resort
measure that was only taken after all traditional means had failed. Indeed, as emerges from
Kalinda’s account in Chapter 1, in some cases people were not even sure if they would
survive conversion. For such cases, it seems inappropriate to describe conversion as fuelled
by a broader vision of the good rather than by immediate necessity. Importantly, however,
once Evangelicalism had established itself as a potent source of blessings, people converted
much more  quickly  and for  problems much less  grave  than  those  faced by the  earliest
converts – or even after they had already been healed by traditional means. This suggests
that conversion here was more strongly motivated by broader aspirations to improve one’s
condition than by immediate necessity. But quite apart from the question of the reasons for
conversion, it remains true that one has to ask why people stick with their new religion.
Here, I have shown that it is the view that Evangelicalism affords a world with less gomma
and richer in blessings, which makes being amain attractive to people. It is in this sense that
religious engagement here is about realizing a broader vision of the good. 
All in all then, the evidence supports explaining change in Dell as the result of a
quest for the good. It was the desire to better realize established values which ushered in
profound social transformations. If this argument is accepted, it is interesting to note that the
consequences of change were partly experienced as problematic. This observations leads me
to my concluding reflection. 
Final Thoughts: The Quest for the Good and the Problem of Unintended Consequences 
Two decades ago, James Scott (1998) published his much-read Seeing like a State. Scott’s
topic in this book were what he called ‘high-modernist’ projects to improve society through
rational planning and large-scale, top-down-imposed projects – from Soviet collectivization
to compulsory villagization in  Tanzania.  Why is  it,  Scott  asked,  that  even though these
projects were ‘animated by a genuine desire to improve the human condition’ (ibid.: 342),
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they  failed  in  such  horrendous  ways.  Or,  as  he  puts  the  question  succinctly  in  his
introduction: 
‘It is not so difficult, alas, to understand why so many human lives have been destroyed
by mobilized violence between ethnic groups, religious sects, or linguistic communities.
But it  is  harder to grasp why so many well-intended schemes to improve the human
condition have gone so tragically awry.’ (ibid.: 4). 
In tracing Dell people’s attempts to better realize certain values, this thesis, too, has dealt
with what could be described as improvement projects. Contrary to Scott’s case, of course,
these projects were neither imposed from above nor did they have as their stated aim the
large-scale  transformation  of  society.  Rather,  they  were  locally  initiated  and  aimed  at
improvement in particular areas of life. Specifically, these projects were about accessing
blessings more securely and achieving greater reputation. Like the schemes discussed by
Scott,  however,  Dell  people’s  improvement  projects  went  partially  awry,  namely  by
undermining  respect.  And  as  in  Scott’s  case,  there  is,  at  first  view at  least,  something
counter-intuitive about this. We are used to the idea that externally induced change – say, in
the form of structural adjustment – can have adverse effects on local people. But it is less
intuitive why change that is driven by people’s own values should lead them into conditions
which they perceive as challenging and in important regards unsatisfying. If realizing values
is about moving closer to the good, then how can attempts to better realize values lead away
from the good? At the same time, the case of Dell can hardly count as a rare exception. It is
a common human experience that trying to improve things is sometimes to make things
worse. 
Just what accounts for this in different cases might well be an object of enquiry for
the anthropology of the good. As scholars like Joel Robbins (2013a: 457) or James Laidlaw
(2014: 2f.) have made clear, the suggestion that values and ethics are pervasive in human
life does not amount to saying that people regularly manage to achieve what they consider
as good. But why exactly is this the case? And, specifically, why is this the case even under
conditions that are favourable to striving? Several decades’ worth of ‘dark anthropology’
(Ortner 2016) have offered us ample insight into how people’s quest for the good can be
frustrated by various forms of violence and deprivation.  But  why is  it  that  even where
people are not inhibited by such factors, the good is often perceived as hard to attain? 
The case of Dell has offered one possible answer to this question, which is likely to
apply in other cases, too: The attempt to better realize our values through new means is
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inherently risky. This is because we can never fully anticipate the demands these means will
make on us,  and how heeding these demands so as to realize one value will  affect our
capacity to  realize other values.  In Dell,  people could not possibly have anticipated the
averse effects  development and Evangelicalism were going to have on respect.  It  is  the
promises that loom large, not the possible side-effects. In this way, the quest for the good
constantly creates its own obstacles. To diminish the gap between ideal and reality in one
regard may open up or increase this gap in other regards. My aim in noting this, however,
has not been to advance a quietist  manifesto for sitting still  rather than trying to better
realize our visions of the good. On the contrary, my aim in this thesis has been to show that
the dialectic of striving for the good and responding to the challenges this can pose is a
potent source of change. 
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